

JPRS 75536

21 April 1980

# West Europe Report

No. 1567



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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21 April 1980

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No. 1567

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COMMENTATOR: WEST MUST INSIST ON MBFR VERIFICATION

DW081602 Bonn DIE WELT in German 8 Apr 80 p 8 DW

[Article by Cay Graf Brockdorff: "Verification Is Better"]

[Text] Nobody in NATO was surprised by the Soviet demand over the Easter weekend that the pullout of 20,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,000 tanks from the "GDR" announced by Brezhnev in October be taken into account in the Vienna MBFR negotiations on troops reductions. The West immediately rejected this in Vienna. When Brezhnev at the time in East Berlin announced the troop withdrawal which was to take place within a year he had added that return concessions by the West would not be expected. Now he demands them after all.

Brezhnev's announcement in the fall was received extremely coolly at NATO headquarters. It was assessed as the climax in the Soviet campaign against the forthcoming decision of the alliance on closing the arms gap. In the opinion of informed NATO quarters, the Soviet course of action in Vienna has confirmed this assessment of the situation. They also point out that so far only one regiment of the Soviet 6th Guards Armored Division has been withdrawn. The Soviets have announced further troop pullouts for the week after Easter and invited Western correspondents.

It is not clear where the tanks of the 6th division have been taken. Some reports also available in NATO said that they had been relocated to Czechoslovakia. It was predicted in NATO that in connection with the relocations this week the Soviets would again contend that their troops would be returning to the Soviet Union. Yet it remains to be seen whether their contentions turn out to be true.

This puts the spotlight on the problem of verification [kontrollen] following any kind of agreement on troop reductions in Vienna. Hoping that something may happen in Vienna at last after 6 years of negotiations one might be inclined to welcome any results and neglect the cumbersome topic of verification.

But unfortunately the situation is such that Vienna agreements on troop withdrawals without adequate verification would not reduce the danger of

war in Europe. On the contrary. Vienna without verification would only bring us the illusion of balance, more security and adequate strength and veritably invite the Soviets to demonstrate their superiority to us forcibly.

It has not yet become a matter of public awareness that the Soviet Union has enhanced its transport capacities in strategic dimensions ever since negotiations have been underway in Vienna. Twice a year it routinely demonstrates to us the personnel exchange in which 100,000 to 140,000 men each are flown to the "GDR" within 2 weeks. Naturally during peacetime the veterans return home. In times of tensions nobody need to fly back, and the flights would be increased.

The western military districts of the Soviet Union are crammed with big troop components. The 11th Guards Armored Army near Koenigsberg, the strongest big component which the Soviet Union possesses on the whole, can relocate its tanks overland by means of flatbed trucks. With the help of roll-on-roll-off ships other divisions with heavy equipment can simply land over the pier without any port facilities. Withdrawn U.S. troops, however, are 6,000 kilometers away. They cannot be secretly relocated back to Europe. Therefore verification measures in the western military districts by military inspection teams and reconnaissance flights are necessary. Verification without the inclusion of Soviet territory would make the FRG the subject of intensive Soviet verification measures. It would be pushed de facto into a special role, converted into a second-class state subject to sharp Soviet military requirements. Genscher has recognized this and for this reason he also insists on the inclusion of Soviet state territory.

NATO, at any rate, is prepared to allow verification by the Warsaw Pact on its territory. So far the Soviet side has rejected with outrage the suggestion that it allow verification on its territory as well. It laments that these proposals are merely aimed at serving espionage. You could also call it that if you are afraid that the other side might find out what you have in mind.

It is quite revealing that the "GDR" television service on Easter Monday charged DIE WELT with having reported doubts of French nuclear war theoretician Pierre Gallois about the value of disarmament. They said the newspaper is the mouthpiece of the capitalist imperialists. But there is something like the duty of the chronicler. If it were possible to carry this kind of journalism into the East so that the "GDR" inhabitants and Soviet citizens could ask their governments about the level of armament there and the purpose of the assault on Afghanistan, then the decisive step toward a real world peace order would have been taken.

Until then, however, it is necessary at least to insist on frankness and disclosure toward the Western party to a disarmament agreement. Disarmament agreements make sense only if either side is sure that it is not weakening itself unilaterally. Having recalled this to mind is the merit of Pierre Gallois, among other things. At least peace has been made a good deal safer if the Soviets know that they cannot launch any swift ventures unobserved. Should one instead waive effective verification and rely on the trustworthiness of the Soviet side as some peace politicians here suggest?

The last ones to learn Soviet love for peace that way were the Afghans.

## OUTLOOK FOR TNF MODERNIZATION IN THE 1980'S

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 31 Jan 80, 1, 5, 7 Feb 80

[Article by Carlo de Risio: "The Italian Armed Forces During the Eighties"]

[31 Jan 80, p 16]

[Text] National Defense Review Necessitated by East-West Imbalance

NATO's growing loss of "flexibility." The United States in vain seeks to obtain greater long-term military contribution from European allies. Italian army must have complete operational readiness within "interservice" context. Manpower.

In the book by Sir John Hackett, entitled "The Third World War"--a work written by several authors halfway between political fiction and working assumptions--we preferred to overlook the author's rather disrespectful and off-hand reference to Italy. In more than 400 pages, describing a possible new world war (based on certain assumptions), Italy's destiny is briefly sketched in just a few words: "In the south of the central sector, the AFSOUTH Command, together with an Italian government-in-exile hastily constituted, had moved to Spain. The Italian peninsula was now completely under Soviet control which is why it was not occupied in force by troops of the Red Army. The Italian and American air units based on the peninsula, constituting the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force, after initial operations, found themselves facing the virtual disintegration of NATO's southern region."

For the British--if not officially, then at least "unofficially," and less emphatically--Italy, yesterday and today, is something that can be overlooked, especially in military terms. In the words of Sir John Hackett we can detect the echo of Montgomery's rather very crude judgment--he was, by the way, deputy commander of NATO in 1949--when the marshal and Viscount of El Alamein, with malice and contempt asserted that the Western Alliance was alright from the North Sea to the Alps but that, beyond the Alpine barrier, there was nothing but "a ring of spaghetti."



The things of this world are unpredictable. Even more unpredictable is the behavior of the Italians. It might very well be that, in case of misfortune, the "spaghetti" (not necessarily boiled in Chilean salt) might turn out to be indigestible to any possible aggressors. It might also be that a country, resounding with warlike slogans, full of pretense and daggers during 20 years of fascist rule, afterward however proving itself in bitter fighting on the battlefield, might, in an entirely different situation, and after playing down military ideals, reveal entirely unsuspected moral and spiritual resources and, finally, display a strong character.

Beyond the metaphor and the paradox, as the risks of the international situation tend to increase, the conviction is slowly taking hold that an acceptable defense of the peninsula must be taken into consideration by the national community, in spite of the financial difficulties and the tight economic situation. We cannot fool ourselves into thinking that it will be the others who will shoulder the direct burden of Italian defense by simply charging the whole thing to inter-Allied solidarity.

In this regard, the contemporary crises in Iran and Afghanistan have peremptorily returned the debate within NATO to its realistic terms. For entirely too long have the Europeans been shifting the burden of providing for their security upon the United States. Now, the Americans are ever more insistently asking for greater European participation in the common defense, although this does not imply the assumption of commitments outside Europe or an extension of NATO's sphere of responsibility in order to respond to the worldwide challenge from the Soviet Union. It must be added that the request for greater European participation simply means a greater strengthening of NATO; that would enable the United States to concentrate on containing the Soviet threat in areas outside the Alliance, especially in those areas which guarantee oil supplies for the West.

Many setbacks (and that is what they were) could have been avoided if the Europeans had played their full part and a crisis, such as the one in the Middle East, could perhaps have been avoided if the United States had been able with greater commitments to turn toward areas outside the Alliance, even though we must consider the lack of determination on the part of the United States executive branch and an ever greater reluctance of the Americans to play the role of "world's policeman," after the Vietnamese trauma.

So far (Prague aside), the Soviet Union's policy of expansion and spreading influence has manifested itself along the "periphery" of NATO, in other words, of Europe. But, if the European allies continue to be out of tune, things might change. As a matter of fact, they have already changed--in negative terms.

NATO strategy--we can never repeat often enough--is based on the "flexible response" and on "forward defense." The "flexible response" is based on

the "triad" of nuclear strategic arms, nuclear tactical weapons, and conventional forces. Each element of the "triad" is essential and cannot be replaced by any other. The effect of the growing imbalance in the conventional sector has been multiplied recently by the effect in the field of so-called "theater" nuclear weapons. Consequently, NATO strategy has lost a good deal of its flexibility. As a matter of fact, deterrence is now guaranteed only by one of the elements of the "triad," that is to say, the military balance existing on the strategic level between the United States and the Soviet Union. The danger of aggression by the Warsaw Pact has thus been treated.

The risk that the Soviet leaders must now calculate boils down to asking themselves whether the United States is prepared to defend Europe with its strategic arms, thus exposing itself to the destruction of American home territory. This has made Soviet policy much more aggressive in the full awareness that the Soviets will be able, without running any great risk, to reduce Western freedom of action. Recovery of flexibility for Western strategy is indispensable both in the sector of "theater" nuclear arms and in the sector of conventional forces.

If the West and therefore Italy--which must remain an integral part of it--do not shoulder the relative burden, then its entire foreign and security policy will be irremediably discredited. Its lack of willpower would then be interpreted as a first step toward political capitulation. Consequently, Soviet policy would become even more inclined toward taking risks, in the certainty that the Westerners would have neither the moral strength, nor the material capacity to resist.

That Italy must do its part is axiomatic--otherwise it would renounce any guarantee of security. In these columns we have been emphasizing the ground and naval-air aspects of national defense. We must now just as emphatically add that the ground forces are less integrated than the naval-air forces for reasons not only involving the mobility but also mentality and concepts. The strengthening of Italian naval forces and boosting the "air umbrella" obviously would have no meaning whatsoever if the ground forces were not able to prevent the occupation of national territory. In that case, Sir John Hackett would really be right in anticipating a breakup of the Italian front, with the tactical air units (or their remnants) of the Italian air force leaving the peninsula and taking off for other shores.











The characteristics of operations conducted by modern armored and airlifted forces, which the Warsaw Pact has in ample supply, considerably reduced the importance of the "cushion zones." This discovery is confirmed by the fact that the attrition which the attacking forces could suffer as a result of Yugoslav and Austrian resistance is certainly reduced, not only because of the size of the respective forces, but also because the strategic concepts of these two countries are substantially on a prolonged territorial defense, conducted through guerrilla methods, whose effects could be exerted

only after a certain period of time, after the attacking forces have cut through those two territories (territorial defense, so highly touted by Yugoslavia, is certainly not based on "stopping" the main body of the attacking force, which is impossible, but rather on partisan warfare which is a part of the national saga, recalling the fight against the Axis from 1941 until 1944).

In concrete terms, the advance warning which the Italian ground forces could have is extremely limited and the absolute requirement is that the army units have complete operational readiness. We are part of an alliance which, if necessary, could be reinforced by naval and air forces, not only because it has them in appreciable quantities, but also because of the flexibility inherent in these types of forces. On the ground, however, there is no practical possibility of reinforcement. We must rely on what we have. Nor can we assume that we are going to get any ground forces from the Central Front (West German Armed Forces, United States Seventh Army, British Army and French Forces, the latter being outside of NATO anyway) in order to sustain the southern front.

A clear understanding as to concrete "priorities" seems essential in order to establish strong points, to spell out the principles to guide the strategy and structure of the Italian armed forces during the Eighties and, even more specifically, to define the allocation of financial resources among the three services which are not enough to do everything. It is to be hoped that this will happen through an elimination of the "traditional" rivalry between the various services, stopping any debates and arguments on the practical or theoretical validity or futility of the defense of the "Gorizia threshold [gap]."

There must be only one, rigorously concrete priority of objectives among the three services. From it must spring 10-year planning whose definition must likewise be viewed from a combined, interservice angle. The nation's defensive capability does not derive from the sum but rather from the product of the individual components. An imbalance in one of them could ruin the solidity of the entire assembly and would constitute a factor of weakness which a possible aggressor would not fail to exploit.

	<b>Paesi NATO(1)</b>	<b>Paesi del patto d'Varsovia 2</b>	<b>Rapporto 3</b>
<b>4 Totale soldati</b>			<b>1-1,2</b>
<b>5 soldati di unità combattenti.</b>			<b>1-1,2</b>
<b>6 carri armati</b>			<b>1-2,7</b>
<b>7 artiglieria</b>			<b>1-2,5</b>
<b>8 aerei tattici ad ala fissa</b>			<b>1-2,4</b>

Balance of power between NATO and Warsaw Pact.

Key: 1--NATO countries; 2--Warsaw Pact countries; 3--Ratio; 4--Total number of military personnel; 5--Military personnel in combat units; 6--Tanks; 7--Artillery; 8--Fixed-wing tactical aircraft.

[1 Feb 80, p 15]

[Text] General Staff Wants 'High-Quality' Army

Personnel, materiel, organization, and training are the decisive factors in the program. The real danger of a decline in allocations also has its reflections in the

industrial sector. Absolute target of 28,000 long-term volunteers.

Several months ago, there was a suggestive, original, and brilliant article in *CORRIERE DELLA SERA* by Ambassador Roberto Ducci on the topic of Italian defense. The author told us that, ever since Italy was unified and until today, all wars fought were started by Italy and that nobody in reality has ever treacherously attacked the peninsula ("long peninsula full of difficulties," as Churchill put it). Besides, the real "winning trump" in Italian defense, in case of invasion, could be a war conducted by "simple forces" (in other words, a partisan war), something which is extremely troublesome for an aggressor. This is a rather suggestive thesis which however loses some its validity upon concrete examination. With its population density and its orographic configuration, Italy would lend itself rather poorly to a war of "attrition," assuming that the territory is occupied. The 1943-1945 partisan struggle was possible--although there is a tendency to forget that--thanks to the fact that the German army, in spite of the winter-time "holding action" on the "Gustav" and "Gothic" lines, was being chased by the British Eighth Army and the American First Army which "moved up" along the peninsula, while the Third Reich was nearing its end. Besides, we have never really seriously studied any instrument of guerrilla warfare (apart from the Red Brigades). In just a few words, on the concept level, we have nothing at all, in a situation such as the Italian one, that could "replace" conventional defense. Advocating the contrary means engaging only in academic arguments.

We must give the general staff credit for having done and doing much to modernize and "Europeanize" the Italian army with the undeniable objective of giving it the kind of complete operational readiness that would enable it to be employed with a minimum advance warning and without preventive force augmentation. The idea is to put together a high-quality instrument. This is the target of plans for the eighties. But this is so also for another reason. If it is not to remain a mere statement of principle, the European decision must be expressed in the homogenization of the standard of the Italian forces with those of the other Western European armies.

Four factors are decisive in a qualitative improvement of the Italian army: personnel, materiel, organizational structure, and training.

Like similar French and German establishments, the Italian army is based on a draft. This manner of recruitment still specifically seems to be the best, both from the moral angle and from the aspect of efficiency. The problem resides in the short duration of mandatory service (12 months) which makes it extremely expensive to teach draftees how to use complex and expensive weapons systems and, on top of that, their logistic support turns into a big problem. As far as employment is concerned, the often considerable expenditures for initial training are not backed up by an adequate period of utilization of draftees in the various units and



the equipment is subjected to severe wear and tear due to the constant rotation of operators.

In this context and in view of this overall situation, it is absolutely urgent to integrate the draftees with long-term volunteers. The 23,000 men provided for under current legislation would seem to be sufficient. But in fact however they are not available because incentives of an economic and social nature--first of all, the unemployment situation--turned out to be insufficient when it comes to getting for us the qualitatively and quantitatively necessary recruiting volume. This is a problem which must be solved on a priority basis. Besides, one essential aspect involves the improvement of the economic conditions of the cadres. Officer pay is no longer sufficient either. For officers and NCOs, who constitute the mainstay of the army, a satisfactory economic status must represent more than just job security. Responsibility, commitment, and discipline required as well as the indispensable transfers, with the hardships inflicted on families, must be adequately recognized and remunerated. If these problems are not solved, through higher pay, through housing construction, and easier access to home ownership, the situation which is already intolerable would become totally insupportable. A rather high resignation rate from the service, often involving the most highly-skilled personnel, and a widespread sense of uneasiness, which cannot be ignored--these are "warning" signals. It would just be rhetoric to pretend to call upon the "traditional spirit of discipline" and the "sense of duty and sacrifice." An army of frustrated and dissatisfied individuals, forced to cut corners to get from pay day to pay day, would not do anybody any good.

As for materiel, reorganization involved taking "obsolete" equipment out of the inventory and dissolving about one-third of the operational units in order to concentrate the fighting equipment that was still any good within the remaining units (here we note the elimination of regiments and the switch of brigades). Just 5 years ago, a long-term equipment modernization program was drawn up. It was based on two assumptions: keeping the modernization and renewal capacity, permitted by the 1975 regular budget, at constant figures--about 200 billions per year at constant 1975 values--and using special allocations to carry out an organic equipment purchasing program--involving about 1.1 trillions at 1975 prices--in order to eliminate some of the unacceptable shortages which had arisen in the past, in vital sectors, such as AT and AA defense.

The way things really are, the financial assumption was not carried through regarding the regular budgets. For 1980, the allocation available for equipment and materiel in the regular army budget comes 160 billions, in other words, taking inflation into account, about 80 billions at 1975 values, equal to 40 percent of the presumed available resource. These programs therefore were cut back while others were simply canceled. If this tendency is not reversed rapidly, fund shortages will necessitate a revision of the entire planning effort for the supply sector and steps of a

structural character likewise. These have so far not been taken because the army "promotion" law, as well as the laws for the other two services, now seem to be retaining their program character. This feature is indispensable not only to prevent a new and drastic reduction in forces but also to sustain the Italian armament industry. The homogenization of the standard of the Italian forces with those of the other Western European armies would remain an empty expression so long as it is not possible for Italian industry to participate in joint production programs within the European context: those joint production programs are possible only if the Italian army equipment types and their replacement cycles are similar to those of the other European armies. Otherwise, given the small dimensions of the domestic market and the enormous costs required for research, development, and industrial production of modern weapons systems, Italian industry would simply be reduced to the status of a subcontractor or, at best, a producer operating on licenses.

Talking about pennies for defense in Italy usually sounds somewhat like blasphemy. But, regarding military planning, it would be sufficient to keep the current percentage constant, even though it is one of the lowest not only in Europe but also worldwide.

The fact that the Italians are supposed to be rather "strangers" when it comes to military affairs must be viewed in the light of the effort to streamline the support organizations and to make them more efficient, especially the territorial ones, in order to get personnel and resources and in order to give them greater functional effectiveness; but the results of this effort have only been marginal. Local "parochial" opposition and special interest groups have had a decisive effect here. And so we have a paradox here. Shifting battalions around, reassigning military personnel from one town or another indeed causes a kind of civil war to break out. Mayors, city councils, and entire population groups rise up as one man when military personnel are moved out, thus affecting the local economy which obviously gets a "shot in the arm" from the presence of these valued "customers." But those soldiers must not do any shooting or they ought to shoot only very little; let them go to the movies, to the bars, to the restaurants, or let them go with the "girl friends"--but make as little trouble as possible. (Indeed, the Italian soldier does only between one-third and one-fifth of the firing which his Western fellow soldiers can do and this is done in a very small number of field exercises, practically none of which are on a large scale. The big exercises during the sixties are only a distant memory now.)

The current training level is furthermore influenced by the short duration of the draft and the shortage of long-term volunteers as well as shortages of money, fuel, and ammunition and above all training areas and firing ranges. The Defense Ministry admitted to the Chamber the current shortage in terms of training, concluding that "armed forces that are not getting any training are only a waste of money."

The argument about "military servitude" is reaching pathological proportions (apart from the obvious political background noises). Ecological, social, agricultural, tourist, and forestry arguments are often cited rather pretentiously. And the famous "mixed parity committees" on "military servitude," established within each Italian region and made up of representatives of the government, the military, and the local authorities, often proved to be inadequate when it came to coming up with solutions responding to the army's needs. This "happy land" is obviously inclined toward "affable, roly-poly wars." Military tourists are welcome but those who shoot are not. Too easy and too simple. But also very dangerous considering the times we are living in and these indeed are not happy times. As usual, the nation that refuses to bear arms for itself will inevitably be doomed to bearing arms for somebody else.

#### Army Statistics

Total expenditure: 1.5 trillion.

Personnel: 20,000 officers (including about 2,000 regular); 26,000 NCOs (including 1,500-2,000 regulars); 225,000 EM (draftees).

Term of service: 12 months.

Operational units: one armored division; three mechanized divisions; one independent mechanized brigade; five motorized brigades; five Alpine brigades, one parachute brigade; one missile brigade.

(Plans call for the organization of a second independent mechanized brigade following the reduction of motorized brigades to four; they had territorial defense missions.)

Equipment: 800 "Leopard" tanks; 100 "M60A1" tanks; 6,000 armored combat vehicles; 57 artillery and missile groups.

[15 Feb 80, p 14]

[Text] Navy--Basic Element for Stability in the Mediterranean

Developed at programs after 1975 "promotion" law.  
ASW defense and "command" of the sea. Resumption of order for foreign customers. A confrontation necessitating the credibility of the Italian fleet at a good operational level continues in Europe's inland seas.

Three separate basins (the Tyrrhenian, Ionian, and Adriatic Seas), with a peninsula in the middle; almost total dependence on maritime supply lines; a coastal configuration which is the longest among all of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. It seems obvious to describe the context of the Italian naval situation in this fashion; so obvious,

as a matter of fact, that almost no reference is made to the country's natural configuration and to the maritime aspects which influence its way of life, its survival, above all in military terms. This is also to be blamed on the by no means forgotten rhetoric when we tried to gain primacy in a sea which is a tricontinental point of intersection, thus destined to "attract" real, authentic powers, some of ancient and some of recent formation and tradition: yesterday, Great Britain and France, today, the United States and the Soviet Union. The keys to the Mediterranean--Gibraltar in the west, Suez and the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the east--are still held by others although these are allied and friendly countries. Balance and dialogue, on the Italian side, have replaced the manifestations of power of yesterday which were rather flimsy anyway.

This is the dimension within which the Italian navy is moving now, the service which "does not make any noise," as Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American theoretician of maritime power, put it.

Integrated into an allied deployment which still retains a considerable margin over the Soviets, the Italian naval instrument is slowly but constantly improving in terms of credibility, performance, and defensive capability. The 1 trillion in the 1975 10-year "promotion" law--apparently a tremendous sum in terms of special allocations but in reality a "pittance" day after day eroded away by devaluation and growing costs--at last enabled us to have a long-term shipbuilding program. The "lean" postwar years, up to the sixties, are now a distant memory. The construction of ships, of engines, of weapons systems, and of all of the implements of war and logistics is now entirely domestic. The resumption of shipbuilding at home has also had beneficial effects on foreign orders.

A modern naval vessel--undoubtedly a "sophisticated" product from all aspects--is the best traveling industrial exhibit which one could desire; it is a secure means for getting new outlets for domestic work. This is the context within which we must view the world cruise of the destroyer "Ardito" and frigate "Lupo."

Qadhafi's Libya likewise preferred to turn to Italian shipyards for the construction of four missile-firing corvettes (better us, than the others, including the Soviets) and it is furthermore known that Oto-Melara at La Spezia has sold naval guns to half the world. People often criticize the money that "goes out" for the armed forces--including the navy--but people are singularly reluctant to quantify the money that "comes back in," through foreign orders.

So far we have been talking about the allied naval establishment in which the Italian navy has been integrated for a number of years. In the Mediterranean, everything revolves around the core represented by the United States Sixth Fleet. But we must once again look at the strategic missions of the Sixth Fleet and especially its nucleus, the attack carriers. There is great doubt that, in an emergency situation, those aircraft



carriers--after launching their planes--would remain in the European inland sea. The real problem remains command of the surface and the underwater areas, with ASW search and hunter groups and the control of the routes east of Gibraltar.

It seems obvious that, in the course of the decade which has just started, we will see a growing research and technology commitment on the part of the West in order to neutralize the underwater threat. Experience has taught us that ships, considered as "platforms," remain the most suitable means for diversified weapons systems against underwater vessels. The configuration of the Mediterranean, in its middle section, suggests the possible areas of confrontation: the Sicilian Channel, the Sardinian Channel, the Gulf of Genoa, and the Otranto Channel, in other words, natural "bottle-necks," portions of the sea which are ideal for ambush and consequently for interdiction. But it is necessary also to look beyond to secure control of waters that are far from the coastline of the home country.

In general outline, the Italian operational fleet must be broken down into two "task forces"--one of them in the Tyrrhenian and the other one in the central Mediterranean and Ionian--as well as five light groups for surveillance and patrolling of the "bottle-necks" we mentioned earlier and the northern Adriatic. Along with surface vessels, helicopters and aircraft, we also have here the hunter-killer subs of the "Toti" and "Sauro" classes and an increment of missile-firing hydrofoils and motor-gunboats (the target for this type of vessel is 18 units with a final "optimum" situation of 30 units).

In recent years, it has been said repeatedly that the cover available to the navy was too short in order simultaneously to cover the head and the legs. Now, the exposed sections are slowly covered with the commissioning of new units. The standard of 100,000-120,000 operational tons seems to have been attained, although there are still reasons for doubt as to the maintenance of this operational minimum, both in consideration of the anticipated decommissioning of many units which are "over-age" and because of growing costs which make planning margins extremely labile within the standard budget and also under the 1975 "promotion" law. (Here we must realize that, nowadays, 1,000 tons of naval vessel costs an average of 35-40 billions.)

When it comes to "money well invested," the bitter debates which have arisen on the "through-deck" cruiser which is now in the naval register under the name of "Giuseppe Garibaldi," have been redimensioned not only because of the very precise function assigned to the unit but also because of the funds allocated.

In practice, this is a unit of 10,000-12,000 tons (not 18,000 tons, as was said in the beginning, hinting at an assault vessel out of proportion to the tasks and to the dimensions of the navy itself). In plain language, the "Garibaldi" is to work together with the "Vittorio Veneto," with a



helicopter detachment which, compared to the latter, is rather big, consisting of 16 rotary-wing craft instead of nine. Persons who are critical or even supercritical are of the opinion that these fund allocations will always remain nominal since it is rather problematical that we are going to have the planned anti-ship and ASW helicopters available for our operational units. There is some truth in this criticism; but one cannot judge programs by challenging intentions. "Garibaldi" and "Vittorio Veneto" will in practice constitute the central nucleus of the two "blue-water groups" that have been planned. For the time being at least--stressing the "through-deck" ship--STOL aircraft are still a rather remote target, both in terms of the reliability of such aircraft (they must still be checked out fully, along with their operational capabilities) and because, in view of the budget allocations and also the special funds, one cannot assume that there will be a further burden on the navy budget.

Somehow we always get back to the much talked-about question of the "mistaken ambitions" connected with the navy's "pretense" to have its own shipboard aviation (hence, the "bothersome question" of aviation for the navy and not aviation of the navy, in other words, we are getting back to what the situation was some time ago in the past and we are getting into a bitter debate which is a reflection of a lack of understanding which goes back to before and during the war of 1940-1943, when we paid a high price for the lack of naval-air cooperation). Fortunately, as a result of the gradual elimination of yesterday's frictions, we are beginning to get a clearer picture of the navy's need for having shipboard aircraft for surface and ASW operations as well as the no less stressed need, on the part of the air force, to have units suitable for "operating over the sea." Besides, the fact that new generations are beginning to take over at the "top echelon" of these two services is another important circumstance in favor of mutual understanding and cooperation. The "interservice" spirit which had difficulty in getting off the ground--and this could not be otherwise because, as it is usually put, "one is not born with a memory"--is emerging ever more clearly and it is hoped that the "traditional rivalries" will be buried once and for all.

Above all, the by no means happy times which we are heading into demand a common policy, a single "voice" among the three services, not only between the air force and the navy. The latter is moving in a dimension which is "flexible" by nature and, over a span of 30 years, it derived undoubted advantage from constant cooperation with navies that have a stronger tradition and more experience--such as those of the Anglo-Saxons--and above all due to the wider availability of equipment. The West retains supremacy of the sea, with a margin which, we said, is still quite noteworthy, in other words, a considerable margin of superiority over the Soviet Navy, created by Admiral Gorshkov, with undoubted tenacity and determination. But this is a shrinking margin. An example, apparently a minor one, will serve to illustrate the situation. In the 1969 ALMANACCO NAVALE ITALIANO, the description and illustration of the U.S. Navy took up 67 pages as against 22 pages devoted to the Soviet Navy; in the latest

edition, 10 years later, the description of the "U. S. Navy" took up 54 pages while 42 pages were devoted to the Soviet Navy. The expansion of the USSR on the seas is now a definite fact; this includes the strengthening, between 1967 and today, of the fleet "on station" in the Mediterranean which has been added to the "traditional" fleets in the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East, plus the even more recently established fleet in the Indian Ocean, the indispensable support--also in order "to show the flag"--of the policy of reaching into the waters of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, which has its counterpart in the combined air and ground operation in Afghanistan.

The Mediterranean, "the world's oldest sea," is still one of the primary targets of Gorshkov and his aides, in spite of the ups and downs in Moscow's policy in the Arab World. The equilibrium and stability of the central section of the European inland sea are indispensable and irrevocable in terms of a serious and credible Italian naval presence in all of its components.

#### Naval Statistics

Total expenditure 359.8 billions (excluding committed expenditures: pay).

#### Personnel:

5,201 officers (regular); 9,465 petty officers (regular); 3,747 volunteer petty officers, 1,589 yeomen; 20,296 draftees.

Term of service: 18 months

Equipment: three cruisers, seven destroyers, 14 frigates; eight corvettes; 41 minesweepers; ten submarines; one hydrofoil; four motor-gun boats; two naval transports; two fleet resupply vessels; two salvage vessels.

[7 Feb 80, p 18]

#### [Text] The Air Force of Tomorrow

New dimension of air force must last until the year 2000. Almost the entire combat aircraft inventory must be replaced. Strong pull from aerospace industry. Personnel problem must be solved to correct troubled situation of NCOs and flight controllers.

While the army must have units with complete operational readiness, so as to facilitate preventive augmentation and with minimum advance warning time, the most outstanding feature of the air force is represented by the need for constantly, even in peacetime, keeping its equipment at a high readiness level in order to be able to respond to any offensive within a matter of minutes. Generally speaking, it is unthinkable for the air

forces to expect to have any "breaks" in their preparation for action, unless we want to accept dangerous (and often irremediable) defense "vacuums."

It is not easy, at the start of 1980, to come up with a complete picture of the Italian air force because of the complexity, variety, and dynamic nature of events characterizing it. The finance "promotion" laws for the three services--with a "staggered" sequence, first for the navy, then for the air force and finally for the army--may have had the effect of permitting long-range planning and programming but nevertheless inevitably placed the armed forces where the respective instruments have to be reorganized. In plain language each service is coming out of one dimension in order to enter another one.

This "moment" of pause is even more noticeable for the air force whose operational level must be such as to assure its effectiveness until the year 2000. Furthermore, the personnel problem has assumed great significance, characterized as it is by the loss of pilots and specialists by the problem of the air controllers, and by the trouble the NCO's are having; the latter two phenomena exploded "outside" in a rather traumatic manner, especially the by no means always calm examination of the situation by the information media and undeniable political speculation.

Equipment and men, in other words--that is the inescapable binomial.

The crux of the problem, when it comes to equipment, emerges fully if we consider that this involves almost the entire combat aircraft inventory as well as the aircraft assigned to the flying schools, plus the radar for air defense and the missile system. In particular, the important thing is:

(a) To modernize the now "obsolescent" line of F-104G and S fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft with a modern multirole attack aircraft (MRCA-Tornado), capable of effectively carrying out counter-air, interdiction, and reconnaissance missions;

(b) To give the flying schools a new trainer (the MB-339), replacing the MB-326;

(c) Through the purchase of missile batteries, to guarantee the defense of particularly worthwhile targets against low-level and very-low-level attack (Spada program);

(d) To boost the air defense radar setup through the procurement of new sensors and the updating of those already available.

Parallel to these "primary" programs, there are other, no less important requirements: modernization of the light components of the combat aircraft inventory (currently consisting of the G-91Y and R) with the AM-X

Italian-designed and Italian-produced aircraft; the updating of the current F-104S interceptor and the subsequent production of its successor; the renewal of the helicopter component with particular reference to the training component. This, in overall terms, is a well-organized and certainly expensive program. But the line of reasoning adopted for the navy also applies to the air force. In spite of malfunctions, delays, and the failure early to understand the personnel problems (such as the failure to avoid the well-known episodes of the protesting NCO's and flight controllers), we must give the general staff credit for having, over these past several years, recreated an aircraft industry and having returned it to a market which seemed closed to us because of stiff competition and because of the objective difficulty in getting back into a complex, sophisticated sector that keeps changing rapidly and continually. Today, nobody can deny that the Italian aerospace industry constitutes the sector in the entire Italian industry which exerts the "strongest pull" and that the difference, in terms of the asset balance sheet (more than 225 billions in 1978), between imported raw materials and exported finished products is expressed by a particularly positive influence on the development of the balance of payments with foreign countries. Looking at a cause-effect relationship, the fate of the aerospace industry certainly depends directly on orders for the air force and hence on its ability to handle a regular and constant process of equipment modernization.

So far we have been looking at programs that were launched in a situation that was quite satisfactory both from the aspect of responding to the technical and operational requirements established by the general staff and from the viewpoint of meeting deadlines--and this is true almost 3 years after the entry into force of the "promotion" law for the air force. But we have had some "fits and starts" nevertheless: the most alarming among all, a few months ago, came when, in accordance with the restrictive interpretation on available funds, deriving from the 1979-1981 finance law, the assumption was aired to the effect that, starting in 1981, we would no longer be able to guarantee the financial coverage of the programs associated with the "promotion" law. The damage resulting from that would have been tremendous not only for the air force but for the industries involved in those programs. Because of Italy's "defection" from the MRCA project, we would have been running the risk of paying--within the European consortium--penalties higher than the amount of the expenditures earmarked for the pursuit of the program which fortunately was properly supported and guaranteed.

Sophisticated and expensive equipment, in other words, which nevertheless will guarantee a "return" that will be most consistent in the form of future orders. But manpower continues to be the most serious problem. Like a hemorrhage the air force keeps losing trained pilots who go off looking for better-paying jobs with Italian airline companies, a phenomenon which has created a crisis in the operational readiness status of air force units whereas, under different conditions, a gradual departure of those pilots could, as in the past, have accommodated both civilian and military



requirements. In this connection, new standards were devised in order to raise military pay about 40 percent in the bill on the new pay schedule.

Compared to a "body" of about 70,000 men, the commissioned pilot amounts to just a few hundred--a "handful" and an elite at the same time. But we must be careful here. Today's NCOs are no longer those of yesterday. Especially in the operational units, the old-line "sergeant" is now a character out of the romantic past. In the "technological" air force, ranks no longer reflect real values in the sense that NCOs are technicians who do not suffer from any "inferiority complex" and even less so, from a "caste" complex. Steps are urgently necessary in order to bring the NCO and commissioned officer segments in line with the peacetime requirements of the air force and to guarantee equal and adequate career development. As a matter of fact, this is a problem shared by all three services. In this context, particular importance is attached to provisions pertaining to NCOs in the three services, essentially for the purpose of standardizing recruiting and promotion procedures (by reducing the period of time prior to integration into regular status for air force personnel, from 8 years down to 3 1/2 years, making career advancement less slow and giving a considerable number of NCOs a chance to become commissioned officers through selective examinations); but we also need an initiative designed to review the officer promotion standards which are still governed by a law going back to 1955. All of these measures taken together will enable us to put an end to the unwelcome phenomenon of the "uncertain military personnel situation" whose intolerability, in social terms, was rather loudly confirmed by the recent case of the "civilianization" of personnel assigned to air traffic control. The problem of promotions is very important to military personnel; because of the accentuated rank pyramid, promotions are very slow and more selective than for civilian personnel. Through the requested passage of these new standards, the political establishment must do its part to resolve all of those problems.

Another serious problem involves housing and this is something that keeps coming up for military personnel in all three services. It is only too well known that military personnel on active duty, because of the requirements connected with their particular "status," are subjected to transfers which are much more frequent than in any other category of government employees. This indeed is a drama which is multiplied through its family aspects, with all of the dozens of problems connected with that, either involving the move of the entire family group or a forced "separation." To eliminate the serious trouble spots, parliament recently passed a law for the construction of military housing for military personnel and a system of housing allocations. The law in question here calls for the use of funds, to be charged against the defense budget, for the construction of military housing units in the amount of 15 billions in 1978, 20 billions in 1979, and 30 billions annually from 1980 until 1987. This is no small amount and it should in the end alleviate the troubled situation to which military personnel are exposed because of the housing situation.



We have thus devoted as much space to personnel--in this rapid and certainly incomplete review--as we devoted to the equipment which would be totally useless without the human factor.

For the air force in particular, modernization of equipment must go hand in hand with a credible and coherent "response" to the legitimate needs of our personnel. The air forces come third in terms of service seniority and we hope it will be entering the eighties with the determination to revitalize itself completely. In defending the country, the ground forces and the naval forces would make no sense without an efficient "air umbrella" that must be as wide as possible. The question which the Italian taxpayer asks himself so often on the advisability of voting a portion of the nation's resources for defense can meet with a positive response only through the harmonious development of the three services, with efficient equipment and proper personnel management procedures which yet remain to be fully accepted.

#### Air Force Statistics

Current expenditures: 510 billion.

Modernization: 160 billions.

#### Personnel:

7,000 officers (including 4,000 regular); 53,000 NCOs (including 25,000 regulars and 7,500 short-term); 30,000 EM (draftees and extended-service).

Term of service: 12 months.

Operational units: 6 F-104S interceptor groups; 2 F-104S fighter-bomber groups; 1 F-104G fighter-bomber group; 2 G-91Y fighter-bomber and reconnaissance groups; 3 G-91R fighter-bomber and reconnaissance groups; 2 RF-104G fighter-bomber and reconnaissance groups; 2 Breguet-Atlantic ASW groups; 1 "C-130" Hercules transport group; 2 G-222 transport groups; 1 miscellaneous aircraft transport group; 1 miscellaneous aircraft radio-range group; 1 air rescue wing, HH3F and AB 204 helicopters.

Schools: one SF-260 group; two MD-326 groups; two G-91T groups; one P-166 group; one TF-104G group; one Nike missile air-brigade; three liaison units with light aircraft and helicopters.

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## WESTERN ALTERNATIVES IN POST-AFGHANISTAN SOVIET RELATIONS

Paris ESPRIT in French Feb 80 pp 3-12

[Article by Paul Thibaud: "Let's Open Our Eyes"--passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] Reactions to the Russian intervention in Kabul continue to grow at such a pace and with such intensity that commentators and diplomats, at least those in Western Europe, appear to be overwhelmed. They were getting all prepared to send to Moscow expressions of their consternation (and their resignation). But suddenly things get out of hand in the United States, in worldwide public opinion, and even in the Third World. In short, there are new developments, and the spluttering of the experts is the sure sign. Let's open our eyes and ears! The world is changing; as it is so often, that which is new is not made up of unprecedented events--it is rather that a new vision of things is imposed which allows us to grasp more completely the meaning of events which were allowed to slip by without being well understood.

#### Ideas and Arms

Thus we have this Soviet invasion. It does not modify the global balance of power, according to those who are amazed at all the fuss over it: Without a doubt, Afghanistan is not in any way an essential position, in any case the USSR already held the country, it only made a change of administrators. Indeed, but the important fact is that Amin was going down to a bloody defeat; if the Muslim rebels won, they would not fail to expose the realities of this Moscow-supported regime, and the Russians were possibly headed for a situation even worse than that of the Americans after the fall of the Shah. A situation unprecedented for them: never has a non-communist regime had the chance to conduct the post-mortem on a communist regime. In that respect, such a reverse would be fraught with menace, not only because of the facts which could come to light, but also because of the symbolic value: communism continues to portray itself as history's Elect, and it submits as proof that no communist regime up to now has been overthrown, that (with the exception of the Russian zone of occupation in Austria) there is no example of post-communism, no case of a return to capitalism. An impressive argument for this apparatus which often succeeds in endowing its actions with the mystical or infernal prestige of irreversibility.

Why did the USSR let itself be driven into such a corner in Afghanistan? Doubtless because the political preparations were poor. Skillful mobilization of desires for social and economic progress, followed by elimination of all non-communists who supported the same lines, and finally invasion of the society have made of East European communism an apparatus of which can founder, as at Budapest, or be subverted as in Prague, but which in any case controls all social space. Unlike Afghanistan, where Islam, "feudalism," "tribalism," and all the archaisms which Georges Marchais denounces facilitated a revolt from the bottom, a more and more threatening counter-legitimacy.

Theoretically, communism does not take power without a preparation which assures it of monopolizing political values. It only comes to power by means of a national front whose slogans and programs are democratic and patriotic. In simple terms, the communists within the national front wait for the chance to decree who are the real democrats and the real patriots; the power to define the essential words enables them to move from the policy of a large coalition to a party monopoly. We have seen this strategy used from Cuba to Vietnam, not to mention the people's democracies of Eastern Europe, the only real differences being differences of pace.

The pace in turn depended on a cultural and ideological preeminence which enabled the PC to paralyze its adversaries and prevent them from breaking the alliance in time. Now this preeminence is weaker and weaker. In a number of countries the "democrats" or the "national middle class" have remained at the helm. In Portugal we saw the process derailed by a complex interplay of factors, of which one of the most important was the discrediting of communism by Western Europe's proletariat in 1975. In the Third World there are many examples of nationalisms which, while taking advantage of militant communists and Soviet aid in the framework of an "anti-imperialist" (that is, anti-Western) strategy, very effectively resisted the drift and excess which would have cost them their legitimacy. It is in relation to Third World nationalisms, where allies have refused to become satellites, that the communists have met their most bloody defeats. From Indonesia to Egypt and Algeria, not to mention Iraq and the Sudan, the Communists have been a swing force, exploited without shame, and suppressed without pity.

Have these defeats convinced the Soviets that their ideological weaponry is becoming less and less effective? In any case, the military has of late become the most prominent instrument of their foreign policy. The three countries of Indochina furnished the best opportunities for a gradual assumption of power by the communists, preserving the appearance of certain pluralism and manipulating a national consensus to their advantage. However, the progressive patriots like Sihanouk, Souvanna Phouma, or the Vietnamese third force were from the start cut out of power by parties which only trusted their own apparatus and their own weapons. In a slightly different way, in Angola the Cubans are more than simple technical advisers to a nationalist government; they are to a great extent the military

and even political base of an MPLA [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] which would be unable to disengage itself from them as easily or quickly as Sadat did with his Soviet advisers.

This direct intervention strategy, taking charge politically and militarily, was something the USSR decided upon for Afghanistan in 1978, for it was in April of that year that the progressive Prince Daoud, who had established the republic 5 years ago, was assassinated and replaced by the communist Taraki. What the present crisis reveals is the gravity of the consequences of this mentality of intervention with no limits and no retreat. The supple tactic of aid to progressive leaders has often failed, and local communists have often paid the price, but at least by means of it the Soviet Union had avoided finding itself entangled in Vietnam-style webs. Among the many comparisons which have been made between Kabul and other cities invaded militarily (Kabul/Prague, Kabul-Budapest, Kabul/Bangui ...) the most justified is actually that which one could make with Vietnam when Kennedy provoked the fall and assassination of Ngo Din Diem. In both cases, one client was replaced by another, and it was the intervention of the protector--rather than internal politics--which sanctioned the leader's fall.

#### The USSR is Vulnerable

According to an editorial in LE MONDE (11 January), Europeans are perplexed about the Kabul affair, they are asking themselves whether the Russians performed a "surgical operation," risky but limited (in which case one need only hold one's breath for a moment) or whether indeed this is the beginning of a far broader strategy for the Middle East (in which case we must think quickly). This dilemma is a poor analytical tool in that it restricts our investigation to Moscow's intentions, while what is really needed is to take note of the ideological and political enfeebling of communism, military interventionism being but one aspect of this weakness.

Those who cry, "Munich! Munich!" do not see this. We no longer have to deal with a power whose fascinating cynicism is seen as a sign of its invulnerability, but with a messianism which is shop-worn, discredited, grown turgid in "apparatchikism, feeding itself on chauvinism. To invoke detente automatically is to hide one's head in the sand, it is to conjure up fear, to be "afraid of being afraid," LE MONDE aptly states; but to cry "Munich!" is only marginally better. This is fright in the highest degree and, I believe, to fail to appreciate the novelty of the situation.

The Soviet Union, as before the Tsarist regime, maintains itself by chauvinism and militarism. This means both that it puts itself into more and more dangerous military situations, and that a military failure could have consequences for it as decisive as the Crimean War or the Russo-Japanese War. A regime which has no other base than demonstration of its power, with which one can only identify to the extent that it is winning, is obviously vulnerable in defeat.



International feeling on the subject of the invasion of Afghanistan, the massive condemnation of the USSR in the General Assembly of the United Nations, represents a change in what one could call the world ideological configuration, at the expense of "achieved socialism." The crises of the "people's democracies" of Europe, the debate on the gulag and totalitarianism, have been the first stage of this process; now it is extending to the Third World: the normal credit which communism won in the countries of the old Indochina has been lost, the Chinese cultural revolution is laughable. The Soviet Union, especially in Africa, is practicing a style of assistance which is heavier, more military, and more constraining. The Havana Conference gives the ideological key to the new Russian strategy: the Cubans tried to impose a doctrine which would make the USSR the protector of the nonaligned, thus would make the Third World its client, an outlying part of the "socialist" camp", wherein it would hold, in the name of anti-imperialism, a certain political right to intervene. This doctrine, then illustrated essentially by the example of Angola, seemed acceptable to many countries (primarily because of the South African intervention in Angola), but reactions to the Afghan affair show that the Third World really rejects the "two camps" mentality which would give the USSR any rights over it.

Thus it is that the sophisticated formulations of the latest fellow travelers, of ideologues like Régis Debray, like certain collaborators of LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, collapse. These authors have never admitted that reflections on the gulag and totalitarianism were the intellectual and moral axis of our time. For them the fundamental opposition was between imperialism and those who fought it; they saw the world starting from Santiago, Chile, not from Prague or Kolyma; criticisms of "achieved socialism", to the degree that they were accepted and not seen simply as ideological manipulation, had for them only local value; human rights, Chomsky ends up saying, are a slogan advanced by Carter and Brzezinski to exonerate imperialism. It is this formulation which is collapsing today. Who can come tell us now, like CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Education], that the USSR is the natural ally of the people of the Third World?

#### A Western Victory

The right of peoples to rule themselves and, more generally, human rights, have properly become the basis of a universal consensus, while strategic ideologies, anti-imperialist ideologies, those which divide the world into two camps, appear as instruments to justify dictatorships: the internal dictatorship of bureaucracies or of "monocracies" of all sorts which use their anti-imperialist line as a mask, and also the external dictatorship of the country which heads the camp supporting "struggling peoples."

It can be said that we have here an enormous ideological victory for the West, which seems to be the sole bearer of the principles of freedom. But one must still avoid confusing the principles the West espouses with



the way in which it uses its power, confusing principles with the powers, governmental and otherwise, which claim them. It is evident that if the West appears in the best position at present, this is a measure of the extent to which it has allowed the free play of opposition and criticism within itself, the extent to which government has not been the proprietor of legitimacy.

Democracy is characterized by the "transcendence" of the law, by the fact that power, in a democracy, is never absolute and can always be challenged in the name of the principles it is charged with representing and implementing. This holds not only in internal politics but also in international relations. No state, whatever its responsibilities, could pretend that defense of democratic principles has anything to do with the discipline that reigns in a "camp," still less to do with the mutual defense of all the powers affiliated with it. An international group can only be called democratic if the relationships of authority and exploitation which characterize the concerned nations can be challenged.

These banalities need to be recalled, since in the stupor which has seized the West one can hardly discern the renewal of confidence in democratic values, the desire for less cynical international relations and, on the other hand, the strengthening of a "Western camp" mentality which could lead back to McCarthyism while it reveals a return to good Atlantic conscience.

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish several possible ways of interpreting and utilizing the present overthrow of the balance of political values.

### Three Attitudes

1) The return of /Atlanticism/. Perhaps this is what the resurgence of American moralism and messianism heralds. The end of guilty conscience, let us affirm our natural rights everywhere, against Brezhnev as well as against Khomeyni, let us use our power...And here some start saying that the only duty of Europeans is to close ranks with Carter. Which at best can only define an attitude in moments of crisis.

This defense of the West ignores the immensity of dominating and exploiting behaviors which are ours. It puts all anti-Westernisms in the same category. It justifies the protection of the United States' preserve in Latin America and Europe's in Africa.

Atlanticism is the view of things of those who see Moscow's influence behind everything that moves outside the Soviet camp, who, like Annie Kriegel or Henry Kissinger, can think only in terms of global strategy. In this perspective, Khomeyni is the equivalent of Karmal, they are two anti-Westerners and because of that potentially allies. The gap between the Third World, even in revolt against the western system, and the socialist camp

cannot be seen by those who view the West as a beleaguered fortress. If such a tendency prevails, we will not only have a return to the cold war but a return to the "Western camp" mentality with all the narrowness and lack of imagination which that entails; a return also, in the Third World, of reactionary ideologies (Islamic, anti-imperialistic...) which the USSR will always be able to exploit.

The flaw of Atlanticism is to revive good conscience without perspective, being so reactionary, so dependent on communism, that it can only conceive of defensive tactics, tactics which take communism as an insurmountable reality, whereas the present situation obliges us to think about the demise of communism, to study ways of surpassing it, to study its decline. The Orwellian denunciations of a menacing communism (cold war) are perhaps as obsolete as the detente which was based on accepting it. As long as one does not think beyond communism, one will oscillate between two attitudes with respect to it: fear and complacent euphoria.

2) The /neutrality/ which continues to weigh heavily on the attitudes of French diplomats and commentators does not attempt to profit from the change in the ideological configuration. For the good reason that it does not see it. It cultivates a vague idea of detente and, from behind, of a possible "liberalization" of Soviet communism, with which it maintains good relations (if exhortatory and preachy) to which the Russians lend themselves to the degree that one is always interested in maintaining illusions that others want to create for themselves about us. Neutralism is largely a creation of European vanity, of a feeling of being the most cultivated and most intelligent which is fed mostly by attitudes. It has, however, had one policy, that of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," a project not to abolish the camps (De Gaulle was a realist), but to "relax" them, to establish a joint zone of political and cultural dialog thanks to the efficacy of which the appurtenances and regimentation imposed on the nations could become less rigid.

This project foundered in August 1968 and no one is still caught up in it except by way of ancestor worship and lack of imagination. If there remains anything, beyond a few diplomatic vanities, beyond the illusion of the "special role" of France or Europe, it is the humanitarian policy which the FRG conducts with regard to the GDR, obtaining, at the price of political silence, the development of concrete relations which improve somewhat the life of the East Germans.

The essential flaw of neutralism is to cling to the least costly principle of all, that which confounds prudence with ethics: /in medio stat virtus/ and thus is unable to develop any ethical imperative. The only truth it can handle consists in comparing the sins of the one against the sins of the other. Thus we have the journalists who write fair and balanced stories of the type: the Russians in Afghanistan are horrible, but the Americans in Santiago, in Santo Domingo...are no less bad; as to the French in Chad, Kolwezi, Bangui, they hardly behaved any better...These are all valid

points which need only be linked to a perspective which responds to the exigencies of the situation. Refusing to pick a camp serves no purpose if one remains perplexed or complacent between the two instead of developing the active and concrete universalism which would correspond to the demand for new criteria and new international conduct coming from public opinion.

3) /Internationalism./ Neutralism being situated on principle between the camps ends up with immobility and a clear conscience; it cannot take into account the dynamics of public opinion; in the possibly impassioned movements against a great power (and especially against the USSR) it can only see the danger of a return to the cold war. Because of its deep-seated immobilism, neutralism winds up being composed of both diplomatic good taste and the cynicism of successful business. By contrast, Atlanticism is a recovery of moral sensibility to the benefit of one camp which is only relatively less culpable than the other. Carter is the ideal agent of this movement, and it is the basis of his present ascendancy in the United States: he is the man who brings together again for Americans awareness of being powerful and of being just.

Internationalism, however, must defend at this point the transcendence of its principles in relation to the two camps, all the while working to put these principles into effective practice. This means several things:

a) First of all, the private international organizations, which in recent years have acquired such great importance, should be supported: Amnesty International, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), Freres des Hommes (Brothers of Man)...more generally all which, independently of states, realize the existence of a globally recognized principle, whether this be the objectivity of scientific research, fairness in sports competition, or the right of free movement and free contact of tourists. One finds here areas of rights which are beyond the scope of states and for which the Pen Clubs, the Mathematical Societies...are responsible.

This should clear up the boycott problem which is frequently raised with respect to both big sporting meets and scientific conferences. It is not a question of allowing sports or medicine to become tools of a political idea, however worthy. It is a question of asking oneself what moral principles govern a particular activity and if, in a specific case, they are sufficiently respected that one does not fall into nonsense and derision. The Olympic Games, for example, beyond their spectacular beauty, embody ethical principles: fair competition and rising above confrontations in the meeting and mutual recognition. Universal brotherhood is their utopia; this is why without free association not only among the athletes but also between the spectators come from diverse countries and especially from the host country, there are no true Olympic Games; they must be boycotted, because the Soviets are not promising in Moscow to respect freedom of association. It seems to me that a boycott defended with such arguments would be better founded and much less ambiguous than

the boycott called for by Carter, which makes of sports a tool manipulated by the state and not the bearer of an ethical imperative of its own which must be respected.<sup>1</sup>

An international gathering can be boycotted in order to express one's indignation, as one refuses to shake hands with someone. But awkwardness of such a reaction is that it is too vulnerable to the hazards of subjectivity. The consequences of such gestures run the risk of being ephemeral unless they are linked to reflection on the conditions which are indispensable to international contact which is not to be laughable. Unless the crisis turns to war, relations with the USSR will pick up again soon enough. The climate will suddenly change, we will see the good sides of the Russians, we will take off our dark glasses and put on rose-tinted ones, there will be new poems in praise of detente...It is far better to search more deeply for continuity in the criteria which one applies, even at the risk of being less spectacular.

The important thing is that little by little a real international society is being created, not only in relations between the states, but also in the interaction of transnational institutions which represent partially and little by little put into practice those universal values which they state cannot appropriate. The post-cold war and post-detente world must be one where that which transcends the international balancing game seeks and finds its proper places, where the common awareness created by the media finds means of expressing itself and acquiring a certain authority.

b) Internationalism also contradicts the bloc mentality. It can only be opposed to the Kissinger-Sonnenfeldt doctrine according to which discipline must reign on both sides and the right of repression is admitted or at least tolerated within each of the two camps.

The West's relative ideological victory derives from the fact that within the West intolerable situations can sometimes be changed. Spain and Portugal have emerged from dictatorship, and even Nicaragua, tomorrow perhaps Brazil; the American army did not intervene in Iran to save the Shah...This is possible to the degree that the dominant power of the Western camp does not exercise the sole right of defining the meaning of words and principles. (L. Brezhnev defines terms like democracy, revolution, fraternal assistance, in his domain...)

To the extent that the United States accepts not being the only source or only criterion of rules recognized by the non-communist world, it will be possible for this side to function in pluralism, dialectically. The attitude of Americans toward Iran, their capacity to forgo a test of strength and to open up a fundamental debate on the disputes with that country, to admit for example that it is not only a question of hostages but also a problem of the wealth of the Shah being sheltered in the banks,-- this attitude can be a yardstick for their capacity to be a power which respects the idea of international order rather than simply imposing its own.<sup>2</sup>



In even greater measure the emergence of democratic movements in South America (in Brazil especially) which, to use much less revolutionary language than that of the Sixties, are nonetheless opposed to the United States, will inevitably pose the question whether the West has or has not become more open to pluralism and to challenges to domination and inequality.

If it turned out that the language of human rights was only employed in a polemical way (against Moscow) and that, with the passing of the post-Vietnam crisis of conscience, it is for the West not a source of self-questioning but the foundation of moral comfort, we will return to the unhappy situation in which it is the East that is the hope of the outcasts and oppressed of the West (and vice versa), in which the attraction of Moscow for the countries of the Third World would once again be well nigh irresistible. The "socialist" camp will then retain a negative legitimacy, whatever permanent defeats it may have incurred, since the West will not have shown that its own political values can inspire movements which can change its power structure. This is (or was) the case with social democracy in European societies, but there is no movement of equal scope (far from it) which condemns the oppressive nature of the international order dominated by the West.

(c) In a situation where the mentality of camps and negative alliances (anti-imperialism) is partially transcended, the interaction of international institutions could become more fertile. The UN could go beyond being simply an arena of confrontation and accommodation, and become the place where some ruling principles take form. The efforts to launch a UN commission to investigate Iran are perhaps a symbol of the new roles trying to define themselves.<sup>3</sup>

This can only come about bit by bit, with incoherencies and hypocrisies along the way;<sup>4</sup> the road is perhaps still not closed for all that. It is important that this road stay open as a benchmark of that international conscience which has been forming these last years through the complex action of the media (action which snobs and dogmatists find it fashionable to slander with no quarter) surrounding events and problems such as the gulags and totalitarianism, Vietnam, hunger in the world, Biafra, the scandal provoked by some all too ostentatious dictatorships, and now Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

This article may seem optimistic and even utopian. In reality it starts from the conviction that to analyze the present is to identify the opportunities it offers. Perhaps we are simply in transit between a detente where the ideology of "everything is fine and getting better still" reigned, a mixture of comfort and indifference, and a cold war in which the West will show its fear and its toughness. Perhaps it is only this, but in the interlude, engers, rejections, questions appear which offer the chance to invent a world. One could well ask oneself also just what could be the role, in this historic invention of a new universality (not a closed universality, but one open to criticism of its principles), of a



Europe which might be something other than the principal prize of the conflict between the blocs: the gateway to something that will surpass them, not neutrality, not a place of equi-distance, but the beginning of something that will replace the confrontation of the two principles.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See the article by Joffre Dumazedier: "Are Athletes Property of the State?", ESPRIT, January 1977. Jacques Julliard in LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR defended the idea of doing away with the Olympic Games because they are degraded by commercialism and chauvinism. The idea does not seem persuasive. Sport is a magnificent spectacle because it is a competition. And all competition has a tendency, in our world, to become worldwide. If the Games were discarded, we would re-create them without much delay, in the form of world championships or in some other way. And undoubtedly we would find the same vices denounced today. It would be far better, I am sure, to demand reforms to limit the manifestations of nationalism in the stadium, as L'EQUIPE urges. In any case, this position obliges us to debate the fundamental question: what are the principles which make up the legitimacy of the Games and which cannot be transgressed? If my answer is a little different from that of J. Julliard (even though I also endorse the boycotting of the Moscow Games) it is because it does not seem to me that the Games can ignore nationalism; they should rather sublimate it in the acceptance of a common code and the experience of aesthetic communion.
2. See on this subject the February ESPRIT, especially the introduction by Olivier Mongin and the round-table (discussion).
3. See in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (January 1980) the article by the American jurist Richard Falk: "A UN Tribunal for Fallen Tyrants.". One imagines that, to a greater degree than the General Assembly of the United Nations, the specialized organs (UNESCO, UNICEF, the High Commission on Refugees) can develop in terms of their own terrain a moral code, rules of conduct, and hold states responsible for complying with it. (For example, the right to exile a part of the population has been challenged by the conference on the boat people). This can only happen if the organizations in question are aware that they are not just simple technical organizations acting for the states, but also the representatives of an international public opinion still in process of formation.
4. For example the title of R. Falk's article raises from the outset a question: why limit tribunals just to /fallen/ tyrants? However, this question does not destroy the value of the proposal; it only shows that there is inevitably a discord between power and justice.

## DEFENSE POSTURE ON WORLD WAR II ANNIVERSARY RECALLED

LD101205 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 8 Apr 80 p 8 LD

[Editorial: "Never Again a 9 April"]

[Text] "Never again a 9 April," Hans Hedtoft said when, as Social Democratic Prime Minister, he led Denmark into the Atlantic Pact, which has since been the foundation of our nation's foreign and defense policies. Forty years after the day of shameful occupation there is no doubt about this foundation, even if Hedtoft's exclamation was only the declamatory expression of a new generation's attitude. Opinion polls have given fluctuating reports of the general public's attitude to NATO, but only the extreme groups which fantasize about Denmark's ability to keep itself separate from the world of which it is part--and who are the same people who oppose Denmark's EEC membership--are outraged over the Atlantic Pact as a solid base.

However, at the present time there is--despite what is happening in the world--an increasing reluctance to fulfill those obligations which are a consequence of Danish membership. This reluctance has been seen growing in the radical liberal party, which in its search for a basis for its continued existence has returned to the attitudes which permeated the political philosophy of which P. Munch was the exponent and which, on 9 April 1940, was steamrolled by the course of history. Disarmament was for Munch a confirmation that Denmark had left a dreamworld and was making a realistic evaluation of its position. Exactly the same idea is worshipped now by some of his heirs. They make NATO's shield into a dream, and they wish to appear realists who consider Danish participation in the mutual defense pact of no value whatever.

It is not surprising that defense expenditure must seem to many extremely high, when one remembers that our society must at present resign itself to profound economic reorganization involving cuts in public spending. It is, however, a fact that defense budgets have always been kept at a level that is the lowest possible and even borders on the indefensible. This cannot be said of any other part of public spending policy. It would be most unfortunate if the Social Democratic government, which has tough defense critics in its own ranks and is being pressured by the radicals, showed itself unable to withstand this pressure.

In 1973 the Folketing determined very clearly the goals of defense policy. It stressed at one point that in the event of attack our defense forces should be able to take up the struggle immediately, so that allied forces could be brought in and the struggle continued together with them, and elsewhere that practical preparations necessary for the successful delivery of such troops be made to the greatest possible extent in peacetime. The Folketing has not altered the content of this program declaration.

Developments in the thirties which, as far as Denmark is concerned, led up to 9 April 1940, were bound to trigger a major war. The lesson which Denmark learned from it was to join the Atlantic community and face the consequences for defense policy. This view is no less important today, when the world is a completely different but no less dangerous place. And we must never let ourselves forget what happened 40 years ago.

CSO: 3106

## CONSEQUENCES OF GREEN PARTY FOR SPD, CDU EXAMINED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Mar 80 pp 19-21

[Article: "Are Greens Making It Easier for Strauss ?"]

[Excerpt] The SPD is afraid the Greens might take too many votes away from them and thus help Strauss come to power. The Social Democrats are therefore forced to enter into a sharper confrontation with the environmentalists. Wischniewski wants "no concessions" made to the Greens and Bahr asks to have them labeled distinctly as "our enemies."

CDU/CSU politicians, in speaking of the environmentalists, had thus far merely made the usual noises about red infiltration. Following the latter's good showing in the Baden-Wurttemberg elections, they make no effort at hiding their satisfaction. Kurt Biedenkopf, director of the CDU campaign in North Rhine-Westphalia wasted no time in touting the Greens as a "serious political force" and proposed that they be included in the fairness agreement signed by the major parties last week.

Chancellor nominee Strauss quickly followed suit. At the Land journalists' press conference in Dusseldorf last week he said he did not view the Greens as standing "on the far side of the Rubicon" such as the Communists or the National Democrats. Asked whether to enter a coalition with the Greens, who are anti-atom, Strauss, pro-atom himself, would "not say no, under no circumstances, not at any price."

These are strange times. Because the Greens certainly have made no bones about their dislike of Strauss. When their Baden-Wurttemberg front-runner, Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever was asked on election eve about his ideas for the Bonn scene in case the Greens were successful countrywide, he said that his friends, if elected to the Bundestag, "would see to preventing" the election of Strauss as chancellor "in concert with the SPD and the FDP."

The Social Democrats, for their part, consider the silent partnership Hasenclever dreams of a nightmare. SPD party secretary Egon Bahr said after the election in the southwest: "The Greens are our enemy, a fact which will become more and more apparent in the weeks and months to come."

The worries of the Social Democratic strategists center on the very next Landtag elections in the Saar on 27 April and in North Rhine-Westphalia on 11 May.

In the Saar, the latest polls showed the SPD and the CDU running neck and neck. The Liberals came in at about 5 percent and the Greens at a little over two. If the environmentalists manage to gain just one percent of the vote in the wake of their Baden-Wurttemberg success, they could eliminate the FDP, the CDU's present coalition partner, helping the CDU itself attain an absolute majority— provided the major share of the Greens' increase is registered at the expense of SPD and FDP as heretofore. There would then be no liberal voice speaking for the Saar any more and in the Bundesrat there would be a monolithic phalanx of CDU/CSU-governed Laender.

And if the Greens succeed in gaining more than four percent of the vote in North Rhine-Westphalia, they would make life very difficult for the socialist-liberal coalition government of SPD Minister President Johannes Rau. If the CDU took over the reins of government in Duesseldorf, the Bonn coalition might stop functioning effectively even prior to 5 October, since the CDU/CSU could then use its two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat to block passage of all legislation.

Predictions so far are that SPD and FDP will successfully clear the North Rhine-Westphalia hurdle. But, even if they do, the danger will not be past. While the election strategists at SPD headquarters in Bonn are concerned about the Rhine and Ruhr elections, what really worries them is the Greens' gaining four percent of the vote in the Bundestag election. As one of the SPD planners put it: "If the Greens do no better than they did in the European election, that is still bearable. Anything over that and things become critical."

If the got four percent but stayed below the five percent barrier, they might yet save Strauss, far behind as he is. But this could only happen, if the Greens really do gain a substantial share of the vote and if he manages to reverse his own downward slide. Given another two percent of splinter votes, he would then attain an absolute majority of 47 percent— a result the CDU/CSU itself no longer thinks possible.



The Social Democratic leadership does not seem to have a clear idea of how to stop the Greens' advance. Eppler's attempt, at any rate, at offering the SPD as a better alternative to the environmentalists appears not to have succeeded and his position, supported by 41 percent of the delegates to the Berlin party congress, seems weaker.

So as not to plunge the party into renewed controversies about policy on the eve of the Bundestag election, SPD party chief Willy Brandt is inclined to support Eppler and his followers. "I consider it not only desirable, but necessary," Brandt says, "to add to the political mainstream of this country those elements of the Greens' program which are right."

But the majority of the leadership supports Helmut Schmidt and wants to get tough with the Greens. Presenting the SPD draft platform last Tuesday in Bonn, the party vice chairman Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski set down the course to be followed. There will be "no concessions to splinter groups in the political landscape," he said.

On the Monday after the election, the influential chairman of the SPD working group on employee matters, Helmut Rohde, warned North Rhine Westphalian Minister President Johannes Rau not to run after the Greens. It would be far better to deal with the concerns of the area's industrial workers, with their fear of inflation and unemployment.

Rau felt he was being criticized unjustly and countered by saying he had no intention whatever to make up to the Greens.

At this meeting of the party presidium Schmidt still kept his own counsel. But before the parliamentary party next day he spoke out. Teachers and other public servants enrolled in a pension plan might well rack their brains over the environment and clean air, the chancellor remonstrated. But the workers had to think about holding on to their jobs.

But the Social Democrats do agree on one point: They intend to drive home the argument to all of the environmentalists' sympathizers that the Greens are wittingly or unwittingly helping hoist Strauss into the saddle.

It is easy to see why they are harping on the chancellor issue. The polls have shown that 79 percent of all potential Green voters prefer Helmut Schmidt as opposed to 55 percent of the total population. Of 100 young Green sympathizers only 15 would vote for Strauss.

The environmentalists themselves are aware of this danger. They are trying to keep their supporters within the fold by telling them that there is no real choice as between Schmidt and Strauss or, as Jusos chairman Gerhard Schroeder put it: the choice is "the scam of the decade."

There is no doubt but that the SPD will not be able to shake the hard core of the Greens, presently estimated at 2.5 percent of the total vote, by conjuring up the Strauss bugaboo. But, as Willy Brandt says: "Quite a few of those who are thinking of teaching the bigwigs, in the SPD as well, a lesson will, when the Bundestag election rolls around, cast their vote for someone else."

Even now SPD campaigners claim (as the Hamburg Bundestag candidate Freimut Duve has) that the environmentalists have won "nothing but Pyrrhic victories." In Schleswig-Holstein, for example, they kept their anti-atom candidates Klaus Matthiesen and Guenther Jansen from winning. Their support for Stoltenberg and Albrecht had helped dismantle NDP which had been an important forum for environmentalists during the Brokdorf and Gorleben protests. They weakened Eppler and the ecology wing of the Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD. And, finally, their one-issue environmental campaign is in effect driving a wedge between environmentalists and the unions.

This strategy, aimed at giving the Greens a bad conscience, is beginning to hit home. Last weekend, two days prior to the Greens' platform conference in Saarbruecken, one of their leaders, the former CDU member Herbert Gruhl, had confidently appealed to Erhard Eppler to "leave the SPD and to come over to our side." But the former SPD member Hasenclever made it clear that "a controversy between the ecology wings of the established parties and us is not at all desirable." Saying "we are of course closer to Schmidt than to Strauss," Hasenclever adds that the Greens will perhaps have to "consider the possibility of not succeeding in the Bundestag election." Could it be that they are beginning to doubt their own strength?

Should the Greens succeed however in keeping their supporters' hopes alive that the party will gain some Bundestag seats, then the socialist-liberal warning of the Strauss danger might lose some of its urgency. Because the Greens do harbor the illusion that they could help install Helmut Schmidt for another term as chancellor, if their party were represented in the Bundestag as of next October.

"In such a case," Hasenclever rhapsodizes, "I am sure the SPD and the FDP would honor our program. In return for this, we would acquiesce to an SPD/FDP minority government."

The Social Democrats know full well that this will not come to pass. If the Greens obtain five percent or more in October, there is a good chance that there will not be any socialist-liberal coalition government.

For that matter, Strauss will not become chancellor, either.

If there should be a standoff between the CDU/CSU and the SPD/FDP or if neither should have a sufficient majority to form a government, only two possibilities for stable government would remain— a grand coalition or a bourgeois bloc.

If a grand coalition were formed, the Social Democrats would not accept Strauss as either chancellor or vice chancellor.

It is more likely, however, that the Liberals might not be able to hold out against the pressure to form a majority government and would, for reasons of state, join forces with the CDU/CSU. The condition Hans-Dietrich Genscher would stipulate for such a statesman-like act of submission is to insist on a CDU and not a CSU chancellor. And Franz Josef Strauss would have no other choice than to pay this price.

9478

CSC: 3103

APEL ON ISSUES RAISED ON PACIFIC TRIP

OW081343 Cologne ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 4 Apr 80 DW

[Excerpts from interview with Federal Defense Minister Hans Apel, by correspondent Schauer; place of interview not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] You are coming from the Far East. In the near future destroyers of the Federal Navy will be sailing in this direction. Is this routine, coincidence, or a new strategy?

[Answer] It is routine and coincidence. We plan exercises of this nature every year.

[Question] But might it not harm detente policy as a whole?

[Answer] It cannot because everybody knows, and so does the Soviet Union, what these voyages are all about.

[Question] Now about your trip: Have you been looking for Pacific flank protection for NATO?

[Answer] No, the purpose was to talk with friends about security policy in the broadest sense of the word. What matters in the case of Japan is that we keep markets open in Europe for Japanese products. What was involved in New Zealand and in Australia was the question of how the agricultural policy will influence these countries in the future. What also became plain, as before, however, was that we will not assume any military tasks outside the NATO area.

[Question] Do the countries you visited wish to be included more in the NATO consultations, do they wish more European presence including economic presence? Does Europe have to make up for lost ground here?

[Answer] They definitely do not want to be included in the NATO presence, and we would have to reject that, too. But they are interested in maintaining a security policy dialog with us, and they are keenly interested in the economic issues.

[Question] Japan emphasizes its common interests with Europe. Will a German-Japanese arms cooperation emerge?

[Answer] There are no indications to that effect at the moment, because the Japanese economy itself is quite capable of developing everything it needs, but we are open to dialog. After all, Japan is our friend, and if we can do business here, then there is no objection.

[Question] What is the Japanese stance on the boycott demands of the United States anyway?

[Answer] The Federal Republic and Japan have very similar positions. We are located on the dividing lines between East and West, Japan also has occupied territories. We exist on trade with the East in important sectors, we depend on the security of the energy supply. We have worldwide trade interests. This results in similar approaches to problems, especially because both states depend on the presence of the United States for their security. This means that we do go along with the concepts of the United States but bring in our own needs; after all, solidarity is not a one-way street.

[Question] And also reservations vis-a-vis certain American demands?

[Answer] No reservations, but a policy by the West does not mean that all will do the same. The aim must be correct, the aim is the same.

[Question] Detente vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is probably of very great value for the Japanese, isn't it?

[Answer] One can see a rather similar position with regard to this question. Both countries clearly want to preserve peace.

[Question] Australia, however, demanded most rigid reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and unconditional support for the United States. Did you find understanding at all for the temporizing and not so rigorous stance of the European countries?

[Answer] There was a long dialog between the prime minister and myself. The result was that due to a different geographic viewpoint matters look different. But in the end it became clear that our position from our point of view was correct as much as I have understanding for the Australian position.

[Question] Did you find some sort of understanding for Soviet fears with regard to encirclement or closing the arms gap and the step that was taken as a result in Afghanistan?

[Answer] I have always pointed out that every Western politician who wants to engage in politics must try to see the approach of the Kremlin politicians



when he makes his own considerations. Then he must see to it that such fears do not come about. Our policy cannot create this kind of fear. On the contrary, we expressly offer to the Soviet Union arms limitation and arms control here in Central Europe.

[Question] Did Afghanistan play a very great role in your talks?

[Answer] Not a very great role, but naturally it brought up a most current question: How will things proceed? What must be done? And here, too, the answers are the same: Moscow is not greedy for war, Moscow does not run exaggerated risks, it becomes active when it thinks it can achieve something easily, containment of Soviet influence mostly through development aid, recognition of the right to self-determination of all people, no involvement of NATO blocs or others, particularly, however, securing our energy supply, military presence--if necessary--only by the United States.

CSO: 3103

## SPD JOURNAL ATTACKS MILITARY EXPERT WEINSTEIN

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 20 Mar 80 Supplement pp 12-17

[Article by Claudia Wolff: "Weinstein's Lessons"]

[Text] "The flights he has taken as this newspaper's military-political analyst would equal more than 20 times the earth's circumference. He lived among the Papuans and took part in maneuvers conducted by the Australian army at its jungle combat training center in Brisbane. In various theaters of war and at focal points of world events he has met with commanders-in-chief and heads of state, with rebels who today occupy cabinet posts, has visited Arab palaces and American warships, has been to headquarters and has taken part in jungle wars." These are some of the things the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG says about Adalbert Weinstein, 63, its contributor of many years' standing. The current world crisis theater gives us occasion to pay homage to Weinstein as a member of a very special group of military experts.

In some instances one single sentence characterizes a man in his entirety. In May 1979 Adalbert Weinstein, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE military expert complained that the NATO defense ministers are faced "with a challenge which taxes all their energy and all their political acumen, namely the stylish trend calling for more disarmament and more arms control in the West."

In some instances one single sentence characterizes a man in his entirety—and along with him the kind of thinking he represents.

The military lobby senses a rare opportunity to reverse the "stylish trend" by mounting a media offensive to hold up to ridicule the opponents to a new round in the arms race who have almost been silenced anyway and been forced into a corner, as the SPD congress has shown. The West is weak, the West does not have the will to defend itself, the West does not act, the West is lacking

in spirit, the West is far behind in armaments, the West is a veritable picture of misery in the military and strategic sense.

This high-pitched lament serves the purpose of tearing down the actual Western arsenal of destruction to the point of publicly likening its potential to that of Indian blowguns. And if it is blowguns we have, then we must modernize, of course. The West may be small, but its heart is pure; it simply must become a bit stronger.

Let us take a closer look at Adelbert Weinstein, the leader of the chorus of mourners and we will find that he is a true representative of his crafts guild.

What is it that we lack and that is missing from the NATO concept? As early as in 1978 Weinstein bemoaned the fact that "the grandiose sweep of offensive thinking" is lacking (a gaily scientific quote from the writings of historian G. Ritter)— "such as underlay the Schlieffen Plan and as is contained in the Red Army's plans for military action."

The lament is persuasive; in fact it carries Weinstein closer to the truth than he might care to admit: his strategic ideas and those of the Soviet military leadership, as he interprets them, appear to be much the same. Comrades, as it were. They need and depend on one another; in a sense, they base their *raison d'être* on mutual disclosures— one happy family.

We must therefore proceed with caution when Weinstein, echoing almost all the other armchair strategists, tells us that the Soviet arsenal differs from the Western arsenal in that it is offensive. We must indeed proceed with caution and first take a good look at Weinstein's collected works. The fact is he has told us often enough in expert language that deterrent strategy calls for offensive planning in defense matters. In 1973, for example, when the then American Defense Secretary "thought aloud as to whether the West might be forced to employ tactical nuclear weapons first," Weinstein philosophized about the difference between "first use" and "first strike." "America is no doubt preparing for a first strike possibility so as to deter an enemy attack by perfecting offensive weapons. But this strategy is predicated on the offensive threat acting as the basis for nuclear defense." That is just fine and in a world-wide sense, at that.

A special feature of military-strategic Agitprop journalism over the past decade has been the buildup of the "Red Navy" as proof of the ever more aggressive character of Soviet military planning. To be sure, just 4 years ago Weinstein thought it likely that the navy was merely being "modernized."

"The age of long-range, wide-area weaponry forces the Soviets to take to the sea...Floating missile bases are to offset weak spots on land...The U.S. Navy is powerful...The constant ideological offensive is designed to cover up a desperate Soviet reaction to their military problems; they are always one step behind American naval strength."

But what about the Soviet divisions and the numerically far superior armored units? Suppose we consult Weinstein as to real capabilities of the armored hordes. 1976 must have been a strong year for us, a far cry from our present miserable blowgun state of affairs. In the spring of 1976, in any event, Weinstein did his best to publicize the optimistic statements of Defense Minister Leber, a man he highly respected. At the time Leber made the somewhat gleeful forecast that "the balance of power will not be measured in terms of the number of divisions within 5 years...Having crossed the 'technological threshold,' Western security policy has taken on a new dimension...The classical army, equipped with so-called precision weapons will soon have a destructive capability of such awesome power that no enemy can hope to achieve victory in the classical sense."

Once precision weapons are available, Weinstein asserts, "warfare will be revolutionized." Then Soviet armor will become as harmless as Hannibal's elephants "when the Romans realized the animals could be immobilized by a well aimed blow to their tendons." Weinstein is a historian, too, you see. "Before long, the family of precision weapons will include most of the arsenal of the German army: armored cars, multi-purpose aircraft, 'thinking bombs.' (The bomb no doubt thinks along Weinstein's lines.) Laser beams and radar, infrared and pilotless missiles will transform the quality of the army." That really makes us feel good, the more so since we need not fear that the advance of the happy "family of precision weapons" has been halted in the meantime. The Moscow military leaders, too, will "modernize" and thus "revolutionize" their concept of warfare. (Please note the remarkable convergence of the newest revolutionary ideas in East and West!) "But the Soviets will not have an easy time of it. The West has an advantage, having crossed the technological threshold first. The Soviet Union will have to tend its elephants a while longer."

Weinstein makes this statement out of compassion rather than fear. These backward elephant keepers are almost a bit ridiculous after all. But today, in the light of counter-revolutionary preventive measures being discussed to safeguard the well-known "vital arteries" of the West, in the light of talk about forming expeditionary corps, about instituting the draft in America or registration for it and about lengthening the term of army service in the FRG, Weinstein's major argument is that expensive super technology alone will not do the job. The soldiers of the American volunteer army, it is said, are too feeble-minded to operate their sophisticated equipment. (At least there is hope somewhere.)

The auspicious development of the happy "family of precision weapons" is due to the lunar program and to the practice war in Vietnam. Weinstein interpreted the escalation of the Vietnam war with a great deal of sympathy, taking great care not to judge the American involvement from the point of view of the country or the people, but from the point of view of overall strategy which made the air war urgently necessary in order to deter China. "The escalation acts as a buffer which keeps the small war from becoming a large one. In this sense, it is of secondary importance whether the bombardments will force North Vietnam to come to the negotiating table. From a strategic point of view, peace negotiations with Hanoi could be considered a by-product of escalation." Weinstein's Vietnam analyses plainly show that human feeling, that human compassion is anathema to any sort of sensible strategic planning. For that very reason we should not forget these analyses now that he is once more appealing to our strategic conscience.

The war went awry once the home front gave way. With an eye to the military men, Weinstein wrote: "The war is being lost in Washington. The demonstrations are poisoning the climate in the big cities." Which was far more serious, from a strategic point of view, than the poisoning of the Vietnamese climate by means of chemical pacification agents. And then there were the emotional factors. Unfortunately, the American government was "unable to control them." The result was that the area "was no longer looked upon in terms of being worth defending" but in terms totally alien to strategic considerations. "Moral criteria are taking over." He sadly shakes his head. Strategic thinking, it seems, is not at all easy.

In January 1973, at the height of the terror bombings, for once briefly raises the "moral responsibility" question: "Has the borderline to inhumanity been crossed with the employment of modern bombs?" What a naive question. One has to look at the big picture: "Doubt concerning the employment of technical weapons render the Western defense system valueless...The threat of letting the rigid, technical defense machinery go into action in case the other side fails to listen to reason must remain credible." Which is something the rice farmer simply had to accept when the bombers appeared overhead.

The more horrible the weapon, the better the deterrent. In other words: whoever is appalled by the actual impact of novel deterrents and whoever is horrified at the thought of such weapons actually being used is simply being obtuse and has no capacity for strategic thinking. The strategists have a difficult time with these people and their oldfashioned nervousness. Whenever they hear the words "weapons and armies...they come up with the same old associations of battles and warfare." So, let us be done with the old associations which paralyze our will to arm ourselves. They are best combated by introducing a strategy jargon devoid of all reality and not containing a single reminder of blood, corpses, of dirt, terror, radiation and death. This type of jargon



operates with such concepts as raising and lowering a "movable curtain of destruction" (which opens the way for the neutron bomb), raising and lowering the "atomic threshold," establishing a "harmonious" relationship between different weapons systems, remedying a "conventional weakness," forming a "triad" consisting of "classical," tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weaponry. It sounds like music, sheer music. Just so we do not get a glimpse of reality which might harden our resistance against this expertise which defies all reason.

"Anyone who is prepared to accept any type of weapon as a means of preventing war will be able to think about the neutron bomb without emotion."

Weinstein has not tired of singing the praises of the neutron bomb as being the perfect instrument to fill the "strategic gap." Only the "Neut," as the expert calls it without the slightest show of emotion, can turn Russian armor into "scrap metal on wheels." This Big Aunt is absolutely essential to complement the happy "family of precision weapons" which will "revolutionize warfare." (And I know it is all needed to prepare for "non-war.")

Whenever deterrent mentality turns a somersault and approaches the absurd, the expert shuts his eyes to any doubt concerning the methodology he uses. What looks like an absurdity to the outside observer is labeled a military-strategic lag of our side, a gap that must be plugged as quickly as possible. Western Europe's present "weakness" is a result of a whole array of unthinkable strategies ranging from "flexible response" to a complicated system of escalation threats (the triad again!) and, finally, to the nuclear-strategic annihilation strike which only the Americans can actually unleash. Given this game plan, Weinstein astutely concludes —and he is not the only one— that Western Europe would be totally destroyed, if a step one, step two (conventional/tactical-nuclear) war were fought without the Americans, in the interests of their own self-preservation, setting the nuclear-strategic suicide machinery in motion. True enough. But what conclusions can be drawn from this insane deterrent logic which goes around in circles? It follows that Western Europe will be more secure to the extent that it can itself guarantee more escalation. Western Europe will be more secure when enough medium-range missiles are stationed there to turn it into an attractive first and second strike target at long last.

Western Europe will be more secure, the more of a threat it becomes.

And the expert is convinced that those, world-wide, who have the weapons will play the game exactly, "rationally" and flawlessly according to the rules of deterrent strategy he has devised.

And there we have the true insanity of present-day technological militarism.

To break out of this insane circle of logic does not mean having any illusions about the noble aims of the highly militarized "peace camp;" it merely means putting up resistance in one's own backyard.

## AIR FORCE BEGINS USE OF ALPHA JET

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 21 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Be: "49 of 175 Planes Ordered Are Delivered"]

[Text] Fuerstenfeldbruck—The Air Force took over a new weapons system, the "Alpha Jet," on Thursday. It is the first fighter aircraft jointly developed and manufactured with a European partner—in this case with France. In Fuerstenfeldbruck, the first such unit, the 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing, was officially placed into service by Lieutenant General Obleser, the Air Force Chief of Staff. The Air Force will be commissioning 175 aircraft of this type in all, to replace the obsolete Fiat G 91s. This modernization process will result in an appreciable increase in fighting strength.

General Obleser said that two problems which arose while the planes were being tested had since been overcome. On the one hand there had been a firing point in the power unit flow during violent flight maneuvers and on the other, the blastoff mechanism of the pilot ejection system had not functioned reliably. Given the program as a whole, its magnitude, duration and complexity, Obleser described these problems as "natural occurrences of relatively minor consequence." But he did say he was not yet satisfied with the delivery of spare parts, ground service and testing equipment. In the case of this aircraft, the General stated, the Air Force has for the first time been in a position significantly to influence the development of a weapons system and has shared in accepting the risks involved. From the outset, he added, the "Alpha Jet" was developed and built as a close-support aircraft. No priority had been given to it as a training plane. (France uses the aircraft for training purposes.)

As a light all-weather fighter-bomber, the "Alpha Jet," Obleser said, will be used in joint formations with the heavy all-weather "Tornado" and the heavy all-weather "Phantom." All the Fiat G 91s will have been replaced within 2 years. Following the changeover of the Fuerstenfeldbruck wing, the 43d Fighter-Bomber Wing in Oldenburg and the 41st in Husum will be equipped with "Alpha Jets" by the end of 1982. "The task assigned to the 'Alpha Jet'," the General said, "is to attack stationary and moving targets, both armored and unarmored, in the immediate vicinity of our own units and in the depth of the combat area. That is the purpose for which the aircraft was designed.

It has a sufficient disposable load of ammunition without being significantly hampered in its maneuverability or its low-level flight characteristics. It has up-to-date firing control equipment and is easy to service." According to Obleser, the cost of the aircraft has been DM 3.5 billion (with the cost per system amounting to DM 20 million). They will remain in service for 15 to 20 years and have a life span of 5,000 hours of flying time.

Pilot training will take place in Fuerstenfeldbruck. Weapons and low-level training will begin in Beja, Portugal in May. In addition to the 175 aircraft the FRG has purchased, France has ordered 200 and Belgium 33, which means that more than 400 will be built for the present. There has been an expression of interest from other countries, such as Egypt, the United States and Morocco, the Ivory Coast, Togo and Nigeria. Export arrangements are being handled by France, but the supplier is to be the FRG.

The "Alpha Jet" has a two-man crew and its two engines will bring it up to a speed of Mach 0.85. The aircraft is 13 meters long and has a wingspan of 9 meters; it carries a 2. cm cannon and an assortment of bombs and unguided air-to-ground missiles.

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## BRIEFS

AFGHAN EVENTS, U.S. REDEPLOYMENT--Veitshoechheim--Lt Gen Hans Poeppel, army inspector [of the Bundeswehr], said during his visit to the staff of the 12th Tank Division in Veitshoechheim, Wuerzburg rural district, that "events in Afghanistan mark a strategic watershed." Events in the Persian Gulf are prompting the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO to consider and reflect on the new situation. He assumes the continuing presence and support of U.S. troops in Europe despite events in Kabul and Teheran. But U.S.-based troops might be needed in other places which have assumed new strategic importance. For the Bundeswehr this means that it must carefully review its preparedness and as far as possible improve its quality. The 4th army reform, now being implemented, provides a good basis. It will facilitate the operational control of units and its modernized anti-tank weapons will add to its deterrent. But the process of modernization must be continued, funds provided for structural reorganization and problems of personnel structure resolved in time. [Text] [LD091753 Hamburg DPA in German 1736 GMT 9 Apr 80 LD]

CSO: 3103

YOUNG SKDL LEADER HENTILÄ: 'DAYS OF MINORITY ARE PAST'

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Jan 80 pp 1, 14

[Article by Jan Lindén: "Communist Federation Soon To Be History"]

[Text] "The 1980's will hardly leave a 'federative communist party' of today's type as a legacy to the 1990's." So says Jorma Hentilä, secretary general of the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL). He does not mean by this to prophesy a totally reestablished unity at the far left of the political field. But the minority's days of glory are past. There is a good deal to indicate that today's situation with two federations within one party will be a thing of the past by 1990.

Jorma Hentilä, secretary general of that organization since 1977, is generally a cautious prophet with regard to the 1980's. He does not count on any great changes.

On the domestic political scene Hentilä notes that the right side of the party field is slipping to the left. That means that the parties of the center are caught in a squeeze.

One of the great challenges of the 1980's for the leftist parties is the government employees' increasing percentage of wage-earners. In the 1970's the collectivist party brought home the victory in the competition for the "new" voters. Much of the strength of the left during the 1980's depends on how the second round ends.

#### 1984 Change of Presidents

And concerning the presidential election Hentilä's opinion is clear:

"We are assuming a natural shift in the president's post in 1984."

On the international scene Hentilä notes that during the last few years the scenes have already been shifted to a new position. That casts a shadow over the whole of the 1980's.



"I do not foresee any third world war, but our international milieu will be more negative than in the 1970's.

"The détente process has come to a halt and even retrogressed. Significant progress is hardly to be expected in the 1980's.

"Although I do not believe that we are entering into a new cold war, the international situation will be very unfavorable."

#### "Afghanistan a Result"

Hentilä concedes that he still has a rather pessimistic view of the international situation. But it is not a recently acquired pessimism. It has increased particularly during the last 2 years as the developments in détente came to a halt.

"Neither the decision on European missiles nor the Afghanistan affair is a cause, but rather a result of the whole situation.

"It is obvious that the arms race will continue, and perhaps for the time being gain increased momentum. And if in spite of everything some progress is made with regard to arms limitation, that is just fine."

Jorma Hentilä sees global resource problems as an underlying cause of the growing tension. The big problems of the 1980's will be questions of raw materials, energy supply, possibilities of growth. In general, how an equitable distribution can be ensured.

"How these problems are solved will influence the international development to a great extent."

#### Two Alternatives

"During the 1970's there was a great deal of talk about the new economic world order that was to be effected under UN management. But thus far there are no signs that a start has been made with realizing the goal proclaimed."

For that reason, according to Hentilä, there are only two alternatives for the 1980's:

"One is for the UN declaration to be put into effect. In the other case there will be changes in the international labor distribution not in accordance with the UN's lines but in a way that is dictated by the multinational firms and the economically powerful states. If that happens the problem of economic relations between rich and poor will be intensified. There is a question of a security policy factor that cannot help but affect international politics."

#### The Right Moves Toward the Left

Here in Finland the SKDL secretary assumes the basic political divisions will continue to exist. That is, a continued threefold division according to the pattern left-center-right.

"But the right side of the party field is moving toward the left!" Hentilä adds.

"If we look at the National Coalition Party over a somewhat longer period, it has moved to the left...

"At the party level, therefore, a shift of that kind is continuing. Perhaps not at the same rate as in the 1970's, but still. And that means that the parties of the center are getting in a squeeze. Even now there is talk within the National Coalition Party of a sort of 'center right.'"

#### Liberals Badly Off

In Hentilä's opinion the Liberal People's Party is worst off of the three parties of the center. The National Coalition Party's advance is principally at the expense of the Liberals, although the Center Party and the Swedish People's Party are also under pressure from the right.

"Even though the basic political structure is maintained, there are changes in the economic and ethnographic structure of society. These are changes that favor parties other than the agrarian ones.

"In spite of this the Center Party has generally managed to hold its positions," Hentilä believes. "The Communist Party has succeeded surprisingly well in establishing itself in urban areas, and the party can count on a certain agrarian base that will still exist.

"In addition, the Center Party's foreign policy position is of the type that contributes to the party's chances of holding its positions."

#### Rightist Hatred for Swedish People's Party

"The Swedish People's Party can again count on a stable base, even though the relative number of Finnish Swedes is declining. But the party is under attack from two sides. To the old competition from the left must be added the National Coalition Party's increasing efforts to establish itself in both languages.

"But the Swedish People's Party in any case has a sort of elementary base that it can fall back upon and that the Liberals, for example, lack."

#### Contest for Government Employees

One of the biggest challenges of the 1980's, especially for the workers' parties, is the increasing number of government employees among wage-earners. In relative terms the real workers are decreasing.

During the 1970's that trend indisputably favored the National Coalition Party, which won the struggle for the souls of the government employees.

"The decisive thing now will be the amount of confidence the parties of the left manage to create among these new voter groups. That will decide how the position of the parties of the left develops in relation to the National

Coalition Party," Hentilä explains, but without offering to give us a tip on who will win the second round.

"It must also be borne in mind that the so-called government employees group is very heterogeneous," he adds. "There are, for example, high-paid officials and ordinary charwomen.

"It is clear in any case that the crack troops of both the People's Democratic Left and the Social Democrats are still wage-earners in the manufacturing and construction industries. They are not disappearing, even if their relative number is decreasing," Hentilä emphasizes.

#### Protest Movements Still Here

During the 1970's the protest movements emerged on the political scene. In Hentilä's opinion there is some risk that we may have that phenomenon to contend with in the 1980's as well.

"Protest movements of the Vennamo type should disappear unless they are able to adapt. But populist movements will have a certain soil to grow in. The development of society, with the problem of the environment among others, creates a base for them.

"The 'old parties'' chance lies in going along with the times, noting the problem in time, and reacting to it at the field level, not just with abstract talk at the leader level."

#### No Risk of Two Communist Parties

"A protest movement of a different kind is the minority phalanx both within the Communist Party and in the broader Popular Democratic Alliance. But it is a movement on the decline.

"The golden age of the minority came in the years 1970-1973, if we consider the whole SKDL. Since then the group has steadily lost its positions," Hentilä says.

And the trend seems likely to continue, to judge by the last two Riksdag elections and the trade union election. Within the Communist Party the minority phalanx's positions have always been stronger, but here, too, the trend is beginning to show clearly.

Does this mean that unity will be restored within the SKDL in the 1980's?

"We have lived through the time when the probability that two parties would be formed was greatest," Hentilä answers. "The situation was most critical at the transition from the 1960's to the 1970's. Now 10 years later, there is no longer that risk."

#### Rapprochement

Hentilä also notes that it has been possible to discern a certain striving for better understanding among the minority group.

"There are many who want better relations. But on the other hand there are those who have gotten stuck in such extreme positions that they can no longer recover and get unstuck.

"That problem is found within all parties. But the 1980's will hardly leave a split, at least not one of the present type, i.e. two federations within one party, as a legacy to the 1990's.

"I often say that we had a "Federative Communist Party of Finland" during the 1970's."

#### Leftist Cooperation as in San Marino

In spite of the split within the SKDL/EKP [Communist Party of Finland], in any case leftist cooperation with the Social Democrats has functioned without great friction since 1966. And Hentilä cannot detect any problems that would undermine the basis for a continuation along that line.

"Since 1966 we have had a political situation such that there were no political or ideological obstacles to the SKDL's participating in a government. The program has been decisive.

"Finland can really be compared in this respect with only two states in Europe: Iceland and San Marino! In other countries the parties to the left of the Social Democrats have stayed out of governments for reasons of principle."

#### Center Party and National Coalition Party

There has been no reevaluation of the attitude toward government collaboration and the broad majority governments in the SKDL either.

"In the situation where the left is in the minority in the Riksdag and there are possibilities of forming a center-left government that is still a practicable alternative," Hentilä states.

And what about the National Coalition Party?

"The question of the Coalition Party's possible collaboration in a government during the 1980's depends to a great degree on the general political development. First of all, the decisive thing is the position taken by the parties of the center, how they are oriented. And then, of course, it depends on the Coalition Party itself."

Hentilä continues to take a negative attitude toward a government in which both the SKDL and the National Coalition Party would participate.

"Such a government would in practice be an all-party government. At most that is an alternative that can be considered in a national emergency."

## Leftist Government?

And if the Riksdag gets a leftist majority? It has been said that the left will not shoulder the responsibility of government alone?

"It is at most a question of whom to collaborate with on the bourgeois side," Hentilä explains. "If at the end of the 1960's, when we had a majority in the Riksdag, the left had formed a purely leftist government, that would have driven the parties of the center to collaborate with the National Coalition Party. Would that have been fortunate from the national point of view in the long term?"

"That point of view must be considered in the 1980's as well.

"But a great deal also depends on the parties of the center. Are they willing to enter into a government with the left if the Riksdag has a leftist majority?"

Will we get a leftist majority in the Riksdag during the 1980's, then?

"We have generally had bourgeois majorities as long as we have had a parliament. But there is nothing that says that all elections during the 1980's have to result in bourgeois majorities.

"The biggest part of the population will be wage-earners. It is the fight for the [votes of] the lower government employees that will decide a great deal."

## Own Candidate in 1984

Speculations about the presidential election of 1984 are already going full blast. Hentilä, at least for the time being, takes these activities calmly.

"We have been assuming that a natural shift in the president's post will take place in 1984. That view is based on the picture we have of the various parties' views of the matter and on the concept the president himself presents."

Hentilä is expecting a normal election in which every main political movement has its own candidate. He does not believe in any big election alliance, or in a leftist coalition around a common candidate.

"If we look at the situation today, both the SKDL and the Social Democrats have candidates of their own. It can also be assumed that the parties of the center and the National Coalition Party will also have theirs."

## Bourgeois Fear

"I know that on the bourgeois side they are hunting high and low for a person that could be the candidate of a broader front. They are afraid Mauno Koivisto will be the Social Democratic candidate..."



Thus far the bourgeois search has led to no result. It is this inability to find a strong bourgeois opposition candidate that, according to Henttilä, has led to speculations that "perhaps Kekkonen would still continue..."

"That this would happen is still not probable. And I should prefer that no such situation would arise as in 1956, when Paasikivi was pulled in in the final stage. That was not so very nice..."

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CSO: 3109

## POST-AFGHANISTAN FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, U. S. RELATIONS

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by French Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet: "France and the United States"--passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] French-American relations, to my mind, cannot be divorced from two principles:

- 1) Alliance and friendship with the United States are imperatives for France, its security, its prosperity. It is thus important to preserve a climate of confidence between our two nations through the constant exchange of information and, to the degree it is possible, through close consultations.
- 2) We should only treat with the United States on a basis of independence and reciprocity. However, difficult it may sometimes be to maintain this position, we would lose all credibility in the world, any possibility of advising and influencing, if we alined ourselves, voluntarily or under pressure, with Washington, in the all too frequent manner of our European friends.

With regard to the present events in Iran and Afghanistan, what are the implications of these two principles for France's foreign policy?

In Iran: a taking of hostages, responsibility for whcih involves the Iman Khomeyni, the man who holds power in Tehran, and whom we had given asylum and protection. In front of this manifest violation of diplomatic conventions and of the most sacred rights of human beings, our reaction should have been immediate. And more, even if it is not prescribed in diplomatic usage, it would not have been a waste of time to have expressed our sympathy to the American people with a little warmth, for, in foreign policy, relations between people sometimes count for as much as the relations between governments and chancelleries.

In Afghanistan: an independent nation is invaded and a government and regime foreign to it are imposed by force. We regret, here again, that our reaction was tardy and our condemnation of the agression a bit hesitant. We are in the camp of freedom. The Americans too, and with us for

two hundred years. Must one quote General de Gaulle, since we have the cheek to make use of his name to dress up I don't know what sort of neutralism which is nothing but the road to renunciation and servitude? Here is how he spoke to Eisenhower, president of the United States: /"If, materially speaking, the balance between the two camps dividing the world should seem to be equal, morally it is not so. France, for her part, has chosen. She has chosen to be on the side of free peoples; she has chosen to be there with you..." / Must one be reminded that, in the Berline crisis, in the Cuban crisis, the president of the French Republic, without waiting for anyone, first placed himself alongside the United States of America?

Among allies it is natural to converse and work together, especially when vital common interests are menaced. Some have opposed, as a framework for these conversations, the Atlantic Alliance. It is technically true that by the letter of the treaty, Afghanistan is not in the geographic zone covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. It is no less evident that, according to the spirit of the treaty—which is 30 years old and should be brought up to date—the members of the alliance must consult with each other when there is a danger to the security of Europe. Everyone will agree that the push of the Soviets toward the warm seas and the sources of oil supply cannot leave Europe indifferent.

But, even if one objects to a meeting of the Atlantic Council, there are a number of other means for concentration. It would have been an inspired move for our government to have taken the initiative in talks between the Americans and Europeans. Form is truly important, as Jacques Chirac has said, in times of crisis. If we had been less passive, we would not have found ourselves in the awkward position of being invited to Bonn and being obliged to decline without much real justification.

We speak sometimes of the "two superpowers," as if we put them on the same level, as if they presented the same danger to us. Now one is the United States, our ally because we share with her the same ideal of liberty and progress, the same concept of human rights. With the other, we force ourselves, in a climate of detente which recent events have shown to be fragile, to entertain and develop a certain economic and cultural co-operation, but we know the limits, since by the very admission of our Soviet partners, peaceful coexistence does not in any way imply the relaxation of the ideological struggle. We are thus warned and should remain on guard. With the Russians, the threat, always present, is military and political. With the Americans, there is the danger of economic and monetary pressure, not to mention linguistic and cultural invasion. This is important, but of another order.

We cannot be neutral any more. Our geographic position, not to mention our history and our global responsibilities, forbids it. Can it be imagined that in event of an American-Soviet nuclear war, we would try to pass by inconspicuously?

Does anyone believe that if West Germany, thanks to a reunification in which Moscow would hold the trumps major in its hands, should be finlandized or made a satellite, we could long remain independent? A genuine solidarity thus unites us to our allies and in the first instance to the Americans. And this is why, in times of crisis, it is important to show common determination. It is the only way to preserve peace.

What therefore is the meaning of our independence? By no means that we seek to disengage ourselves from our duties as an ally. By no means that we are candidates for admission to the club of the nonaligned or the ostensibly nonaligned.

### Keep Its Freedom

It means first of all that we intend to keep our freedom of judgment and decision. De Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military organization of the Atlantic Alliance for two reasons. He would not acquiesce in the principle that France's security, that is the decision to employ nuclear deterrence (to employ the weapons) should rest alone in the hands of the president of the United States. He also refused to be drawn automatically by the United States into external adventures where French interests were not necessarily those of Washington.

No more today than in the past can we afford to be presented with a /fait accompli/, nor to follow the zigzagging of White House policy in all its improvisations and hasty commitments. Let us take the example of the Olympic boycott, and the economic sanctions against the USSR, from the convocation at Bonn. I am not judging whether the measures taken were well-founded or not. They were made widely known and afterwards we were invited to join in them. This has nothing to do with a strategy of freedom--which is very necessary--but which can only be effective if it is coordinated and decided in mutual agreement.

The United States bears crushing responsibilities for the present world situation: monetary anarchy, laxity in matters of oil policy, economic and commercial egocentricity, chaos in Iran, passivity in face of the Cuban penetration in Africa, the tragedy of Cambodia, failure to understand Third World problems, etc...But these American failings, egregious as they may be, cannot serve to excuse our own mistakes. Europeans have always been guilty of "followership" with regard to Moscow. And if we have sometimes been "reserved," we have never spoken out clearly, for example, in order to resist the American monetary "diktat" in Jamaica. But all this contention will not excuse us from showing solidarity when it is our independence, our freedoms, which are at stake. We do not have the right to be divided when our security, the existence of Europe, and peace depend on our common determination, clearly expressed.

It is pleasant to go to India be shown the flowering of nonalignment by New Delhi's "iron maiden". It would be less opportune, perhaps, to do a slow waltz, in the country of Sibelius ("valse triste"--composition by Sibelius) with a neutralism under the guardianship of Moscow. It is much more urgent to take the initiative of a vast concertation between Americans and Europeans. On the agenda: the reestablishment of a stable international monetary order, capable of supporting world economic recovery, the definition of a strategy of freedom, development, and peace. The two world wars could have been avoided if the allies had shown in time, while we were still at peace, the same solidarity which was to unite them, tardily, in the war, to save their independence and freedom at such a cost in terms of destruction and sacrifice.

We are not speaking of an anti-Soviet crusade. Nor in any way of a return to the cold war. It is a question of stopping the masters of the Kremlin, in time, from making miscalculations.

With all equivocation gone, "detente" could perhaps once again acquire a meaning, a concrete content, that is to say something other than a camouflage for Soviet expansion.

But first we must talk to Washington.

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## GISCARDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: U. S., FRG RELATIONS

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 8 Mar 80 pp 1, 6

[Article by PCF Politburo member Maxime Gremetz: "Atlanticism Confirmed"-- passages between slantlines published in italics]

[Text] The recent televised "fireside chat" of Giscard d'Estaing on international policy issues yields a wealth of lessons.

His statements on his occasion completely confirm what we had already discerned in the joint communique adopted at the end of the Giscard-Schmidt summit. In a manner which was openly "Gaullist"--by virtue of the repeated use of the notion of France's "independent policy"--Giscard d'Estaing confirmed his alinement with West Germany and his allegiance to Carter.

Thus he announced his understanding of the measures taken by the United States to strengthen its military, on the pretext--which he already used with Schmidt--that it was necessary to maintain balance in Europe. An elegant way of endorsing the decision of the United States and NATO to put new American missiles in Europe, thus giving the FRG nuclear weapons, of supporting Carter's measures to create an expeditionary force of 100,000 men to intervene anywhere in the world, and to build new military bases in Turkey and elsewhere.

So it is plain to see just exactly what the words of Carter and Schmidt mean when they affirm that the commitments in the Atlantic Treaty will be fully honored.

Just what are these declarations worth which are made by a president of the republic who dares say one day that France is not concerned with the NATO decision, and the next day that he approves?

Of what value is the speech on disarmament at the UN by a man who, the moment the U.S. decides on a new escalation in the arms race, performs the astonishing feat of going through an hourlong interview without even speaking a word about disarmament?

In reality, the government is more concerned with pursuing its military interventions in Africa than with contributing to the strengthening of detente and world peace.

In the present international situation, such a refusal to engage our country in playing a positive role for peace is especially serious and damaging for France and its people.

Truly, France's place in the world, its democratic traditions, its visibility, should enable it to make effective and original contributions to the search for disarmament.

A France speaking with its own voice, rejecting any alinement, as well as isolation, could from this point of view play a considerable role.

Moreover, proposals for action are not lacking.

The PCF, for its part, has formulated several which would be realistic and concrete initiatives. Georges Marchais has also spoken twice on the subject. Last 24 October in a letter to the president of the republic he demanded that our country participate actively and in full sovereignty in the international negotiations on disarmament.

In Geneva where France sits now after years of absence, our country should play a positive role; it should also participate in the Vienna talks on the reduction of forces and weapons in central Europe. France owes itself also to examine closely and respond to the proposals formulated by the socialist countries. We insisted that the government make known what measures France intends to present at the next Madrid conference follow-up to the Helsinki conference on European security and co-operation.

In this spirit the PCF also proposed that our country take the initiative in a conference to bring together the signatory states of the Final Act at Helsinki to discuss the totality of disarmament issues.

Finally, on 11 December, our party proposed a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual security.

To all these proposals, Giscard d'Estaing has to date refused to respond, even though he himself announced on 17 December that he would answer Georges Marchais.

The government has a decided tendency to forgetfulness, to omissions, when it comes to disarmament!

In fact, all the soothing speeches of the president of the republic fail to mask that his policies turn their back on detente and peace while fully subscribing to American strategy.

Thus on the subject of the next conference at Madrid, his minister Francois Poncet clearly confirmed at the Committee on Foreign Affairs that Giscard d'Estaing is establishing pre-conditions for the holding of this meeting.

It must be understood that in this undertaking he is receiving the support of the socialist leaders, F. Mitterand in the lead. In fact, the latter endorsed, at the February meeting of the International in Vienna, the installation of new American missiles in Europe and has set the same pre-conditions as Giscard d'Estaing for holding the conference of Madrid. Along the lines of Francois Mitterand, J.-P. Cot stated at the Conference of Socialist Parties of the EEC that it was necessary to /"take measures to re-establish the military balance between the East and the West,"/ and violently criticized those who /"rush forward toward disarmament, choosing by this pathetic and confused flight not to confront the hard realities."/

Thus the facts show that if there is one point on which one could agree with Giscard's statements in his televised talk, it is when he declares that there exists in France a consensus on foreign policy shared by all political parties with the exception of the PCF.

In these conditions, and in face of the threat which the senseless acceleration of the arms race represents, it is now more necessary than ever not to yield to resignation and to strengthen the struggle for peace and disarmament. All the political forces of our country, the workers, must take in hand this important question and struggle for these concrete objectives: immediate ratification of the SALT II agreements, suspension of implementation of the installation of American nuclear missiles on European territory, opening of negotiations to stop the arms race and to begin their reduction, particularly in Europe.

Action is also necessary in preparation for the holding of the Madrid conference, so that end results in constructive proposals leading to disarmament and security in Europe.

Whatever happens, French communists are resolved to devote all their energy to the popular movement for disarmament, for in this area as in others, a forceful public opinion is the decisive pre-condition for every step forward.

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## ROCARD DIFFERENCES WITH MITTERRAND, JOSPIN UPDATED

Paris LE POINT in French 3 Mar 80 p 46

[Text] The managing committee of the Socialist Party (PS), which met last Saturday, was supposed to probe the statements made by Rocard during the program known as "Cards on the Table." However, ever since last week, Mitterrand, (on Radio Monte Carlo), and Jospin (in the newspaper MATIN) explained their differences of opinion with the congressman from Yvelines. Here are the thoughts (and second thoughts) of each of them.

[Question] Will there be primary elections with the PS?

[Answer] "We are both very attached to the concept of party unity, and for this reason there will be no primaries. However, there will be a consensus agreement," was the way Michel Rocard summed it up for us.

In effect, the PS' statutes make it seem likely that some 180,000 Socialist Party militants will vote in their sector. The votes will be gathered together at the federal and then the national level. If neither of the candidates obtains the required majority, Congress will decide. Now, this system seems weighty and cumbersome to the congressman from Yvelines. He would prefer that on the eve of the candidate's designation the party's leadership simply carry out an enquiry among those elected to determine who supports whom. That would enable the least well-placed candidate to withdraw. Thereupon, the congressional vote would be a mere ratification.

Francois Mitterrand's reply: "I would bar any suggestion that the question of the candidacy might be settled on the sly by two or three people meeting in some secret office; the standard procedures must be respected."

## Self-Management

"The term 'self-management' is practically a technical word. I prefer to describe the society which we want to build as responsible socialism or as a socialism of freedom."

Such reserve is new to Michel Rocard who was the first, since 1966, to make self-management his war horse.

Answer given by Lionel Jospin: "I was rather saddened to see that the representative of a body of ideas which had contributed greatly to showing us the merits of self-management should now seem suddenly to abandon those ideas, particularly given the views he upholds."

#### Attitude Toward the Communist Party (PCF)

"What we have in common (with the PCF) is that we are the representatives of the labor world. The PCF has its place in the democratic institutional game. It will not be we who close the door. They closed it themselves, unaided. It is up to them to open it again."

Michel Rocard made a "historical" bow to the communists. But that is as far as the compliment goes and it was followed by a warning: It is up to the PCF to take the first step. In fact, Michel Rocard speaks as if he finds the PCF more cumbersome than useful. However, he goes on expecting to receive the votes of its electorate.

Answer by Francois Mitterrand: "the political line of the PS from Epinay to Metz--against which no one took up a position--is what we call the strategy of union of the left. That is our strategy."

#### With Whom Would a Socialist President Govern?

"The government would consist of groups of men and women who recognized themselves in these options (those of the President)... Radicals of the left, perhaps some ecologists, perhaps some members of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU). They will evidently have the right to preserve their political identity." The political families mentioned by Michel Rocard, who might be associated with a socialist government represent currents of political thinking whence the congressman from Yvelines acquired his diplomas.

Answer by Mitterrand: "If the socialist party were to govern alone, it would do so on the basis of the political choices outlined under the common program, those which the evolution of time makes necessary..."

#### Rocard as President: What He Would Do on the Institutional Level

"A president of a French socialist republic, before dissolving the assembly, would naturally, in the few weeks or few months remaining, have the will and the ability to provide by means of that government of his, all the legislative action needed to carry out his intentions.... The broad range of the choices made starting from the presidency would serve as a model for the whole system."

Michel Rocard takes up the stand that in the event of a leftist victory, the current assembly would vote for a certain number of major reforms. Dissolution of the assembly would only come afterward.



Answer by Mitterrand: "If a socialist is elected? How could he do anything other than dissolve the National Assembly right away? How could he believe that legislation could be adopted which would suit the firm objectives figuring in the common program and the socialist project, and obtain a moderate majority, what is more? Doesn't he realize that this means doing away with privileges?"

If VGE Is Elected, What Would Michel Rocard Do?

"The left never weakened when it was a question of voting for good reforms. We could join forces on a number of solid reforms.

Michel Rocard has no intention of slamming the door and he might be receptive to VGE's overtures.

Answer by Jospin: "Evidently, what we must bar is the idea that the socialists might govern in alliance with the right."

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## REVIEW OF PCF POLITBURO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, COMMUNIQUE

## PCF Membership Drive

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Feb 80 p 5

[PCF Politburo statement: "An Appeal from the Politburo--to Carry On the Reinforcement Campaign with Boldness and Ambition"]

[Text] The campaign for membership renewal and the general meetings of the cells is in full swing. The good results already achieved confirm a mood of confidence and adherence that is favorable to the strengthening of the party. The meetings held have been characterized, on the whole, by sizable attendance and a higher number of memberships than last year. More than 20,000 men and women have joined our ranks since the beginning of the campaign. In addition, more general meetings are going to be held during 1980 than in the preceding years.

This situation constitutes a major political fact. In the face of the outburst of lies and anticommunism, ranging from the right to the government to the Socialist Party and aimed at weakening our party, this is obvious: thousands and thousands of manual and intellectual workers are joining the Communists' battle today by taking out memberships. This is the response to the attacks against the party of the workers, the revolutionary party, and it also marks awareness of the fact that in France, this party constitutes the main obstacle to capital's austerity policy and to imperialism's aggressive policy.

Thousands and thousands of manual and intellectual workers are joining the French Communist Party today because they approve its policy and its action for the rights of man, for justice, truth, happiness.

The Communists--the cells, sections and federations--will boldly and ambitiously continue and develop their efforts for powerful strengthening of the party by:

- holding a large general meeting in each cell between now and mid-March;
- ensuring the success of the thousands of meetings planned and enrolling thousands of new members;

--issuing membership cards to all Communists rapidly;

--making sure to offer all new members the essential new-member subscription to L'HUMANITE;

--giving to the enterprises the attention and aid necessary for these tasks, and creating new cells.

The balance-sheet drawn up at the conclusion of the campaign will certainly show new progress in memberships and cells, and new initiatives will then be taken so as to give to the workers and France the ever stronger and more active Communist Party which they need.

Paris, 26 February 1980

#### Joint Franco-German Declaration

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 7 Feb 80 p 9

[PCF Politburo statement: "After the Franco-German Summit"]

[Text] The joint declaration published at the conclusion of the Franco-German meeting is an act that conflicts profoundly with the requirements of detente and peace, as well as with the interests of France.

It expresses the desire to strengthen the Atlantic bloc and extend its field of action, under the direction of the United States. At the same time, it expresses the FRG's enhanced role as the bloc's leader in Western Europe.

It testifies to Giscard d'Estaing's alinement with the FRG chancellor and their common allegiance to Carter and to the policy of American imperialism. This is strikingly evidenced by their support of the U.S. positions on essential points in current matters.

This is the case as regards the events in Afghanistan, where they are disputing a country's right to make treaties of mutual assistance with another country. This position is all the more out of line in that they forcefully cite, in this declaration, the fact that they belong to the Atlantic alliance. In the same breath, they subscribe to Carter's diktat aimed at the USSR--a diktat all the more insolent when it comes from a leader of the FRG. As for Giscard d'Estaing, his many military interventions in Africa disqualify him from giving lessons on this subject.

This is also the case as regards their concept of detente, which they judge to be "more difficult and uncertain" solely because of the fact of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

They thus try to mask the responsibilities of American imperialism and of NATO, which well before the events in Central Asia refused to ratify the American-Soviet SALT II agreement, increased their military budgets consid-

erably, and took the decision to install new American rockets on European territory. They also want to make people forget that at the origin of the events in Afghanistan lie the open interference by Pakistan and the United States in the internal affairs of that country. In this way they want to conceal the essential fact that while deliberately provoking a climate of tension and fear in the world, imperialism is trying to justify its outrageous arms race and its rejection of the peace proposals of the USSR and the socialist countries. Giscard d'Estaing and Schmidt are even hinting at their desire to jeopardize the holding of the coming Madrid conference on European security and cooperation.

This is the case with the emphasis placed on fidelity to the Atlantic Pact, and especially the assertion of their "determination to honor the commitments to it," which show that Giscard, with his social-democrat friend Schmidt, are answering Carter's appeal and are considering letting France be dragged into adventures decided on by the United States.

At the same time, Schmidt and Giscard are claiming the role of European policemen concerned to ensure "the fundamental equilibria" on our continent. In other words, it amounts to a political plan, to wanting to ensure the social status quo--that is, keeping the capitalist system of exploitation in place and rejecting real democratic change.

On the military level, the French government approves, in this way, NATO's decisions providing for installing new American rockets in Europe and the possibility of the FRG getting nuclear weaponry.

This allegiance to imperialism's leader underlines the fallacious and political character of the declarations of support for the nonaligned movement, whereas the positions of the latter are at the opposite pole from this orientation. The nonaligned movement stands against the policy of the blocs, against imperialism's pillaging of the resources of the countries of the Third World, against neocolonialist interference and intervention, and in favor of the right of every people and every nation to determine to free itself from every form of exploitation and to give itself the system of its own choosing, by the ways that suit it. Giscard and Schmidt's objective is truly clear: not having succeeded in achieving their aim at the Havana conference of the nonaligned nations, they desire, within the framework of a division of labor among the capitalist powers, to seize on international events in order to divide this movement and make it abandon its anti-imperialist orientations.

The document adopted and the decisions taken on the occasion of this meeting constitute a further step toward European and Atlantic integration. France is caught as a cog in a real supranational machine.

This is evidenced by the attempts to set up a common European defense, the decision to move ahead in the joint manufacturing of heavy weapons, and the extension of the powers of the European Assembly.

In parallel with this, Giscard d'Estaing is effectively renouncing the position of having France play the fundamental role which it can and should play in favor of detente, disarmament, European security. He is agreeing to reduce our country to a subordinate role, to submerging it in an integrated Europe, under FRG leadership.

Furthermore, Helmut Schmidt did not beat around the bush in this regard when he declared: "France and the FRG have coordinated their foreign policy to a extent that is very rare between autonomous states." Thus the notion of autonomy is substituted for that of independence, and one wonders whether Helmut Schmidt has gone so far as to consider France of future "land" of the "Bundesrepublik" [Federal Republic]. This is what the repeated abandonments of sovereignty by Giscard's government are leading to.

Nevertheless, Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing should take into account the relationship of forces prevailing in the world, and imperialism's contradictions of interests. This forces them to wear masks on certain questions, to use a double language.

They cannot do everything they would like to. For example, no reference is made, in the declaration, to the proposed boycotting of the Olympic Games in Moscow, or to measures to put the economic screws to Moscow. This is also why Giscard d'Estaing made some embarrassed comments and verbal contortions after the meeting.

In our country, all the forces of the right are expressing their support for this policy of surrender of Giscard d'Estaing's. It must also be noted that Francois Mitterand, in the name of the Socialist Party, has adopted the same attitude of support by expressing a positive judgment on the Franco-German declaration.

In this situation, the forces of peace must mobilize and act energetically for the prompt ratification of the SALT II agreements by the United States, for suspension of the implementation of the NATO decisions and the opening of negotiations leading to reduction of armaments.

Guided by the sole concern for the independence and security of France, for peace and detente, the Politburo reaffirms the French Communist Party's determination to play its full part in this effort, and it calls on the Communists to take initiatives to unite and rally in action the French people, men and women, who are devoted to the national interest and to peace.

Paris, 6 February 1980

#### International Olympic Committee Decision

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 14 Feb 80 p 11

[PCF Politburo statement: "Long Live the Olympic Games!"]

[Text] The Olympic year is beginning with the solemn opening of the Winter Games at Lake Placid, in the United States.



We are very pleased about this.

We salute all the participants equally and we wish them great sporting success. We hope that the competition enables the champion men and women to demonstrate the possibilities of human performance.

By triumphing over the difficulties created for it by reasons foreign to sport, this 22nd Olympiad can and must mark an epoch: it can and must enable the Olympic Games to assert themselves as the highest manifestation of sport and to perpetuate a history that only the two World Wars were able to interrupt.

This is why we attach the highest importance to the Olympic year's proceeding to its close under the conditions planned for unanimously by the International Olympic Committee and to the Winter Games in the United States being followed by the Summer Games in the Soviet Union.

In our view, physical activities and sports are an essential element in human progress, a dimension of culture. Sport, as a language common to all humanity, is an important factor for communication and understanding among peoples.

The confrontations which sportsmen engage in are honest and peaceful. Sporting cooperation and sports exchanges answer to the aspirations of the peoples for peace, friendship, fraternity. The Olympic Games, broadcast by television today, bring together in the same passion hundred of millions of people on the five continents symbolized by the five rings.

For these fundamental reasons, we believe that the national Olympic committees and the IOC [International Olympic Committee] alone, together with the athletes, are entitled to decide on the conditions under which the Games are to take place every 4 years.

Thus we feel the deepest indignation at the feverish blackmail and threats of Carter, who, disregarding the independence of the sports movement, is trying to balance the holding of the Games with those base ambitions and egotisms which Pierre de Coubertin stigmatized by calling them "mercantile and electoral interests." It is intolerable for governments to want to hold the athletes as hostages.

The French government has the duty to repel all pressures exerted on it for cancellation of the Games, for postponement of them or transferring them to another country. It has the duty to reject all attempts to get it to put pressure on the sports movement itself. It has the duty to place the influence of de Coubertin's fatherland at the service of the Olympic movement, at the service of fraternity and of peace.

Paris, 13 February 1980

## U.S. Moscow Olympic Decision

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 6 Feb 80 p 11

[PCF Sports Committee communique: "Working for the Olympic Games to Be Held under the Best Conditions at Lake Placid and at Moscow"]

[Text] In a few days, the Winter Olympic Games will open at Lake Placid; they will also be the occasion for a meeting of the International Olympic Committee.

The Olympic Games which are thus going to begin should be able to be held under good conditions and continue in Moscow this summer.

They will enable sport to make new progress, and will be an inestimable contribution to friendship, knowledge, cooperation among the peoples, peace.

The threats which the American leaders are making against the holding of them are serious and unacceptable, and they imperil the Olympic ideal which was reborn in France, and even the holding of big international competitions.

Examination of world reaction after President Carter's political aggression against the Olympic Games shows that it is not easy to manipulate sport, sportsmen and world political opinion, that use of the boycott as an election weapon and for reviving the cold war has brought about and will continue to bring about, we are sure, a broad rallying of all those who want sport and the Olympic Games to live.

Despite strong pressures, very few countries in the world have made the same kind of declaration as Carter, Mrs Thatcher, Pinochet and Kissinger. In France, the American party led by Lecanuet is only managing a draw, despite the aid of Simone Veil.

On the other hand, we note that the IOC has rightly rejected all foreign pressure on sport, that 10 national Olympic committees of Europe, meeting in Frankfurt, have made a similar declaration, and that an important meeting of national Olympic committees in Mexico is being held in the same spirit of defense of the Olympic Games.

In France, the CNOSF [expansion unknown] has also declared clearly in favor of the Olympic Games. Significantly, a great many top-level athletes and coaches have decided that no one could determine on his own and have committed themselves to independent action in favor of the holding of the Olympic Games--a position with which the Communists are anxious to express their entire sympathy.

We support this approach all the more because while we have always acted in favor of a good policy for development of sport, we are opposed to its political use.

This appeal by leading athletes is being widely echoed in the country, among the youth and in the enterprises. It is already producing a great many demonstrations of approval and support.

The Sports Committee, for its part, has examined how, with the party's militants, and with respect for the independence of the sports movement, it can make its most effective contribution to the development and expansion of a broad movement of public opinion in France and in the world in order for the Olympic Games to be held under the best conditions and be a great festival of sports and youth at Lake Placid and at Moscow.

It is also in this spirit that Georges Hage, Communist deputy, will go to Lake Placid in the name of our part.

#### Latin American Solidarity Statement

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Feb 80 p 8

[Statement by PCF Central Committee Secretary Maxime Gremetz: "International Solidarity--More than 100 Communists from Latin America Received by the PCF --Maxime Gremetz: 'We Shall Never Give Up the Fight for Liberties'"]

[Text] Last Friday, the festival hall of Joinville-le-Pont was the site of friendship and solidarity. The leadership of the PCF had invited to it the Communists of many Latin American countries, most of them in exile in France because of the repression that rages in their countries.

More than 100 of them responded to this invitation. Alongside exiles from El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Haiti, were Communist militants from Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, as well as Brazilians, a great many of whom have returned to their country to continue the struggle there. The new Nicaragua was represented by its ambassador, Alejandro Serrano-Caldera, and by its first secretary, Giovanni Delgado, and the Republic of Cuba by Armando Garcia, first secretary of the embassy.

Maxime Gremetz, secretary of the PCF Central Committee, greeted the participants warmly, and assured them of the full solidarity of the French Communists. He said in particular:

"International solidarity is an integral part of the policy of the French Communists. The founding of our party goes back, as you know, to just after the imperialist war that massacred, for the profit of the industrialists, millions of workers, peasants, laborers. From the beginning, we have held high the banner of solidarity of combat among the oppressed of the entire world.

"Today, the world is no longer as it was in 1920. But internationalist solidarity underlies our solidarity just as much as ever. We are solidly united with the peoples in struggle--with those who are fighting fascism, those who are fighting the system of oppression which the capitalist system constitutes, those who are building a new society....

"We are following with great attention the developments of the situation in Latin America, the struggles being conducted by the working class and the peoples of your countries in a wide variety of situations, conditions, under many forms. Quite obviously, we are not doing so as spectators. For we French Communists are resolutely on the side of the peoples who struggle; we are alongside the Communist Parties, the revolutionary and democratic forces that are fighting imperialism and the local big bourgeoisie.

"We know that each success, each victory won, is a success, a victory for the workers and the people of our country. We know also that this fight is not an easy one, that the road of struggle is not a royal road. But through struggles that are often tough, bitter, always complex, we appreciate at their true value the reverses that imperialism has suffered in Latin America...."

After hailing the victory of the Nicaraguan people under the leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, Maxime Gremetz underlined in detail the progress of the workers', popular, democratic and national-independence movement in each country of Latin America. He added:

"The Cuban revolution celebrated its 21st anniversary last month. The successes achieved by socialism in Cuba in this brief historic period are striking.

"To review them here would take a lot of time. Let me say simply that the people of Cuba, their Communist Party, their historic leader Fidel Castro, demonstrate every day that a few miles off the coast of the most powerful imperialism and despite the difficulties, dignity can triumph over imperialist domination, and poverty, illiteracy and injustice can be vanquished. It is this reality, an exemplary one for the peoples of Latin America, that imperialism is forced to accept, and this is what explains its hostility, its aggressiveness toward Cuba, and all the more so in that Cuba's international prestige keeps on growing...."

Maxime Gremetz next denounced the multiple violations of the rights of man and of the peoples in Latin America, "where one cannot take one step without noting the Yankee crimes," and he concluded: "You can be sure that the French Communists will never give up their struggle for liberties."

Dominican Republic Communist Party

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 4 Feb 80 p 11

[Joint communique by the French and Dominican Republic Communist Parties:  
"French and Dominican Communists--Independence, Democracy, Peace and Liberty  
--Georges Marchais and Narciso Isa Conde Sign a Joint Communique Underlining  
the Convergencies of the Two Parties"]

[Text] A delegation of the Dominican Communist Party led  
by Narciso Isa Conde, secretary general, has just made a

short visit to Paris on the invitation of the French Communist Party. Here is the complete text of the communique issued by the two parties.

Narciso Isa Conde, secretary general of the Dominican Communist Party, accompanied by Cesar Perez, member of the Central Committee, had a long talk at the headquarters of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party with its secretary general Georges Marchais and with Maxime Gremetz, member of the secretariat and responsible for its foreign-policy section.

In the name of the PCF, the French delegation congratulated the Dominican Communist Party, which, after regaining full legality, is showing each day the importance it is taking on in the political life of its country, and is thus proving that its action is creating better conditions for the struggles of the Dominican people in favor of democracy and social progress.

Narciso Isa Conde, for his part, expressed to the PCF the full solidarity of the Dominican Communists and workers.

The talks made it possible to note a very broad convergence of the views of the two parties on the democratic objectives of their struggles and on the means of carrying them on, for they both consider that democracy and social emancipation are the major exigencies of our time. This convergence of views thus concerns their analysis of the international situation.

In the conviction that they should work out their policy in complete independence and without taking any model, they understand that the ways to socialism are determined by the characteristics and conditions of struggle in their respective societies. In this sense, the two parties are struggling, under their particular conditions, for democratic advances that open up to their people their own way toward a socialist future.

For them, socialism, which requires the full blossoming of democracy and of liberty, can only be the result of great struggles by the majority popular movement, drawing around the working class all the social strata who are victims of the big bourgeoisie.

The delegations of the PCD [Dominican Communist Party] and of the PCF proceeded to a detailed exchange of views on the evolution of the international situation, which is marked by the modification of the relationship of forces in favor of the forces of national, social and human liberation. Imperialism is developing against these forces a great counteroffensive which involves redeployment of the multinational companies, ideological warfare, frequent interference and outrages against national sovereignties. It is also, as is shown by the situation in the Dominican Republic, making use of social democracy to develop the popular movement and to perpetuate its domination.

While imperialism is trying to modify the nuclear equilibrium and unleash a new militaristic escalation; while it is using its allies and is mobilizing



its naval forces in an attempt to change the relationship of forces in Southeast Asia; while it is developing throughout the world, under the impulse of the imperialism of the United States and certain of its allies, an enormous campaign aimed at recreating an anticommunist and anti-Soviet cold-war climate; and while the interferences and maneuvers of U.S. imperialism are indisputable and multiple in their forms, so as to obstruct the struggle of the peoples for progress and real democracy in national independence, the PCF and the PCD note that they make the same evaluation of the events in Afghanistan. They are working actively for respect for the principles of sovereignty and independence of the nations and of noninterference in the internal affairs of states.

They consider it of prime importance to establish more just and more stable economic relations among all nations, and that this is one of the great questions of our era. For this purpose, they consider it necessary to carry on the struggle to respond to the exigencies of independence, democracy, cooperation and justice. They agree on the necessity to develop their action alongside the world's other anti-imperialist forces for the building of a new international order founded on these principles.

The two parties consider the struggle for peace, for peaceful coexistence, one of the most important objectives for the future of humanity. They intend to contribute actively to the action for negotiations and agreements aimed at limited and halting the armaments race, and to initiate a process for arms limitation.

In the course of their talks, the delegations of the PCF and of the PCD devoted special attention to Latin America, in the name of their international solidarity. They reaffirm their support for all Communist Parties, for all the democratic and anti-imperialist forces in Latin America and in the Caribbean which are carrying on, under the most diverse conditions, their fight against imperialism and reaction and in favor of liberty and democracy, for national independence, economic and social progress, for socialism. In this spirit, they particularly express their support for the people of Cuba who are building socialism; for the people of Nicaragua who, after their victory over the dictatorship and its imperialist backers, are courageously confronting the great tasks of reconstruction of the country, under the leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front; for the people of El Salvador, who are presently rallying their forces in order to enforce their desire for real democracy; for the people of Haiti, and for all those on the continent who are struggling against imperialism.

The PCF and the PCD take into account the great diversity of the Communist movement in the world. On the basis of this reality, they are working to establish new relations among the Communist Parties and for their cooperation and international solidarity to develop even better.

This meeting in Paris of the delegations of the PCD and of the PCF constitutes an important contribution to the development of fraternal cooperation between the two parties, which will be continued and strengthened.

## Correction to Joint Communiqué

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 6 Feb 80 p 8

[Text] A typographical error distorted the sense of a passage in the joint communiqué of the PCF and the Dominican CP (L'HUMANITE of 4 February). The sentence in the seventh paragraph of the text should read that imperialism "is also, as is shown by the situation in the Dominican Republic, making use of social democracy to lead the popular movement astray...."

## PCF-PLO Solidarity

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Feb 80 p 115

[Letter from PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais to Yasser 'Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, on the 15th anniversary of the Palestinian revolution]

[Text] Dear Comrade Yasser 'Arafat,

On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Palestinian revolution, I would like to address to you personally and to all the leaders and militants of the Palestine Liberation Organization my warm and fraternal congratulations.

These 15 years of struggle have been marked by important successes; the struggle of the Palestinian people has developed; the PLO has asserted itself as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people, and its international audience has grown.

This struggle has not been without difficulties; the conditions of your combat were unprecedented and the enemies of your cause powerful. But nothing --neither reverses nor temporary setbacks--could weaken your people's determination to see their national rights recognized.

Today, new conditions exist for new successes. The Camp David agreements, contrary to what their promoters proclaimed, have not led to peace--quite to the contrary. The situation in southern Lebanon has deteriorated, and the risks of a new conflict are not eliminated. Moreover, these agreements do not recognize any of the rights of the Palestinians; "autonomy" proves to be a deception.

The real character of these agreements is understood better today, and it is clear that any negotiation without the PLO will end in failure. The orientations defined by the PLO in 1974 have borne their fruit, as evidenced by your recent meetings in Austria, Spain, Portugal and Turkey--meetings which have marked a step forward for your cause--as well as the evolution of international public opinion.

The conditions for a just and lasting peace cannot be evaded and have been clearly defined by the United Nations: withdrawal by Israel from all the

territories occupied since 1967; recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to build their own national state on Palestinian land. The right of all the peoples and states of the region to peace and security.

The French Communist Party wishes that France would truly work for the establishment of this peace, as I declared to you on the occasion of our unforgettable meeting in Algiers. I want to reiterate the importance that we attach to your official visit to Paris at the invitation of the government; I have no doubt that it will be a great step forward in recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and a great contribution to peace.

The French Communist Party, in conformity with its internationalist and anti-imperialist traditions, has not spared its efforts of solidarity with your people, with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Despite the difficulties resulting from a formidable political and ideological battle with the big propaganda media and other political formations, we have tirelessly explained the conditions of your people, of its struggles. This battle has borne its fruits, and we are happy to note that the cause of the Palestinian people is better understood today, that new sympathy has been won for it. For us, this is encouragement to develop our solidarity with you more and even better.

Dear comrade Arafat,

I would like, in conclusion, to wish important successes for the Palestine Liberation Organization and for the Palestinian people, and to express to you my warmest best wishes and my fraternal greetings.

1 January 1980

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## RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY TRYING TO MODERNIZE IMAGE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Olivier Pignon]

[Text] The Radical Socialist Party would like to up-date its image. The unveiling of a new Marianne (the Radical emblem that will decorate the movement's posters) next Wednesday, "a pleasant face, neither too old-fashioned nor too avant-garde" should be the symbol of the change. At the time of last October's congress, Didier Bariani was following Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber as president of the old party from the Place de Valois. A party man who has gained his experience in all the echelons of the movement, he was replacing a man who owed all his influence to his personal notoriety.

However, a political party exists only to the degree that it is talked about. Instead of the transitory projects of the former deputy from Nancy, projects which had led the party into taking unanticipated and often disputed positions, Didier Bariani is trying to establish a more regular and more complete presence on the political scene. First, by developing the popularity of the movement.

At the same time, the Radicals are trying to give new life to their doctrine. Without being false to their "manifesto," published several years ago by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, they have refined and polished a new "orientation text for general policy," which will also be presented next Wednesday. It will specifically contain some thoughts on "the sharing of power" which, according to the Radicals, is less and less in keeping with the democratic ideal: they emphasize "the permanent and current need for parliamentary control." Three brochures on employment, energy and social change are also ready for distribution. These are topics on which the Radicals are preparing to express some ideas which, according to Didier Bariani, are far from reflecting "the ideas of the majority."

"The Best"

Of course, the Place de Valois party is well anchored in the majority and in the UDF [French Democratic Union]. It shows no desire to abandon that position.

And if the Radicals are asked why they keep on supporting a policy which many observers judge to be in ever greater agreement with Gaullist inspirations--which they have an equal right to deny--they refuse to answer such an aggressive question.

As for openly criticizing the government and the premier, for the time being Didier Bariani is leaving that job to Guy Genesseeux, a former MRG [expansion unknown] and friend of Robert Fabre, who rejoined the Place de Valois party last October. He recently declared that the opinions of Raymond Barre on unemployment ("let the unemployed start businesses") were "indefensible" and that he had not rejoined the Radicals to put up with a policy of injustice.

The Radicals do not plan to abandon this freedom of opinion even for the presidential elections. This permits them to maintain a relative communion of ideas with the opposition Radicals as a condition for a more tangible composition of differences, which they have not renounced. "Robert Fabre will come back to the Place de Valois at the moment he chooses and under the conditions he chooses," the party president declares. As for the return of Michel Crepeau and his friends, Didier Bariani is confiding in the passage of time. All that is quite in agreement with the majority's need to rake as deeply as possible in the fringes of the opposition. The independent spirit the Radicals are choosing to demonstrate is certainly in no way contradictory to their 1981 strategy for the Elysee Palace.

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## COMPUTERIZATION OBSTACLES NOTED, REMEDIES SUGGESTED

Paris ZERO UN INFORMATIQUE HERDO in French 25 Feb 80 p 11

[Unsigned article: "Point of View: Data Processing Must Be Harmonized with Mechanical Means"]

[Text] In a previous issue of 01 HERDO (No 580 of 18 February), we discussed the report prepared by Gimex concerning the status of automation in France, and more particularly the penetration of this technique in various sectors. The relative slowness observed (a growth rate of 7 percent per year until 1985) can be explained by a certain number of obstacles. What are they? The following is taken from that report, detailing these obstacles and suggesting remedies.

The main obstacle to automation is the risk of eliminating jobs in certain areas. This is an essential aspect which must not be underestimated even if automation directly or indirectly brings a number of advantages on the individual and collective levels.

While automation is a privileged instrument of profitability -- and therefore of competitiveness -- it nevertheless is a partial conditioner of enterprise development, preserving the capacity of these enterprises to create new jobs.

In addition, it raises qualification and remuneration levels, while improving work conditions.

But there are other obstacles against the more rapid penetration of automation; among them is the difficulty in establishing, a priori, the figures which would provide proof of the profitability of an automation project.

#### Proofs Awaited

But among industries which are automated, are there many which reveal the quantitative advantages to be derived from automation? In addition, there are not many identical problems providing comparison between automation and non-automation.

There is also the fact that, from the user's point of view, comparison of several automation projects is difficult, especially at the systems level where available solutions do not necessarily encompass the same direct or indirect advantages.

In addition, the faulty perception of automation's profitability explains the fact that the cost of installations is sometimes judged too high, and the cost of programming often excessive, even when specially developed for a given application.

Therefore this brings us to the structures to be automated, and these are often far from being favorable to automation. This problem is less acute for large enterprises than for small or medium-size enterprises (PME) whose large numbers make information difficult and increase the cost of separate treatment and commercial activities.

At the same time, PME do not always have the training or the kind of activity which respond to the possibilities offered by automation techniques.

#### Importance of Dialogue

Difficulties with large sector clients are of another kind: the formulation and installation of an automated system require that various levels and services in the enterprise involved (studies, new projects, information, exploitation, or maintenance) participate in a way which is all the more essential as the automation system encompasses the total enterprise.

While a number of enterprises have adopted the appropriate structures, it is not unusual for the automation firm to play the part of coordinator among these various departments, going much beyond the normal sphere of activity of an outside service group.

The task is even more delicate if the nature of the project involves officials who would have few contacts in the normal conduct of their responsibilities. And this is one of the reasons why certain concepts which have become timely once again (such as optimization) are having so much difficulty in being adopted by enterprises, since nothing can be decided in practical terms until all levels concerned have become convinced of the usefulness of the project.

The remarkable variety of specializations and services from companies in the automation market, which sometimes include semiconductor manufacturers, information equipment makers, and SSI (expansion unknown), is not helpful in giving the user a clear picture of the profession, and in enabling him to rapidly identify the suppliers best indicated for solving his problems.

This results in very different marketing approaches with their share of disadvantages. For a given problem, there is sometimes an abundance of solutions.

A semiconductor manufacturer, who has to maintain a maximum volume of component sales, may perhaps attempt to develop and multiply circuit board and microcomputer models, sometimes going beyond what requirements would call for.

Does he provide adequate servicing and guarantees when the quantities ordered are small? Does he offer specialized programs, and simple programming for testing and simulation, adapted to industrial situations? Does the rotation of microprocessors in his catalog force the user to change his programs?

If static relays are involved, does the manufacturer provide the instructions necessary for their proper use, or does he merely sell his products as simple components, which they are not?

Finally, will a given manufacturer of automatic machinery demonstrate sufficient knowledge of industrial processes to judge the suitability of his own proposals? As for installers, or service groups, are they themselves well-prepared to take care of the interface between users and manufacturers?

#### On the Subject of Mechanical Means

Other difficulties exist, this time involving the actual design concepts of automatic systems. The problem is primarily a lack of engineers and technicians with training in two fields. This is true of automatic handling and storage, which are areas where the systems' design requires a single individual to have skills in automation as well as in mechanical means.

At the same time it should be noted that most problems still existing in automated systems engineering are due to a shortage of collaborators or of technical means in the mechanical field. While there are some solutions now as far as handling is concerned, many problems must still be eliminated between electronics, information, and mechanical specialists, involving equipment, machines, and automatic machinery, so that users may be presented with the best solutions possible.

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## BRIEFS

**LARGE SHIPYARD ORDER**--Relief is being felt at Saint-Nazaire since the Chantiers de l'Atlantique shipyards (a division of Alsthom-Atlantique) received confirmation of an order for four container ships from Delmas-Vieljeux shipping company. This amounts to an order of nearly 400 million francs and guarantees 3 million work hours (enough for 6 months). Last summer, Delmas-Vieljeux sought bids for a number of container ships that would perform well and be fuel efficient. After many problems and a lively go-round with the government, the Chantiers de l'Atlantique ended up with the contract that the Japanese, Onomichi, almost got. [Text] [Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 27 Mar 80 p 85].

**DGRST CHIEF**--Roland Morin, chief of the DGRST [General Delegation for Scientific and Technical Research], will step down from his position on 1 April 1981. Morin's departure, in the view of some, emphasizes the difficulties in coordinating research, the various sectors of which depend on ministries such as Industry, Universities, Defense, Transport, PTT and others. The secretary of state for research has, however, denied a number of erroneous reports and comments that have appeared in the press. [Excerpt] [Paris AFP SCIENCES in French 21 Feb 80 p 3].

**ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS**--According to a confidential estimate by the Ministry of the Interior, there are now probably about 300,000 illegal immigrants in France out of 4.4 million foreigners. Last year, the number of expulsions did not exceed 5,000. [Text] [Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 31 Mar 80 p 86].

CSO: 3100

## BANKING TODAY, ANGELOPOULOUS PLAN DISCUSSED

Athens THE ATHENIAN in English Apr 80 pp 19, 20

[Article by Jacques A. Case]

[Text] The Greek banking system today is not so cumbersome and slow-moving as it was a number of years ago. Today, the fourteen foreign banks which presently operate in Greece have inevitably exerted their competitive influence on the country's banking philosophy. Nevertheless, Greece's ten commercial banks dominate the Greek banking scene, because the foreign banks which operate here--half of them American--control only 13% of commercial deposits.

In a conversation with Professor Angelos Angelopoulos, former Governor of Greece's largest bank, the National Bank of Greece, certain facts and some important ideas emerged. Professor Angelopoulos believes that the time has come for a change of attitude in Greek banking. The Greek banking system is still in some ways antiquated, even if it is as an industry probably one of the most progressive sectors of the Greek economy.

According to Coordination Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, however, the Greek banking system is due for some basic reforms. Quoting Minister Mitsotakis, Professor Angelopoulos indicates that the time has come for Greek banks to think and behave internationally. If they are to think and act as international institutions, many of their cumbersome present procedures will have to change rapidly. Some of their sinecures will have to be done away with. Their overpacked staffs of thirty-five thousand employees, nationwide, will have to be trained to increase their productivity.

Because of extensive retirement benefits and other high emoluments, banking jobs in Greece are considered unusually desirable. When a bank announces that it has openings, great numbers of applicants flood it with academic records and employment applications. For reasons peculiar to Greece, unlike the United States in particular, banking jobs evoke an image of high prestige and exceptional job security in the public mind. Payscales in Greek banks are also unusually high, in comparison with other Greek industries.



Not so long ago, Greek banks mostly served the interests of businessmen, industrialists and other entrepreneurs. Today things are changing, and the system is becoming less conservative and stodgy. People from every walk of life are becoming clients; so much so, in fact, that the services provided for individuals in many ways go far beyond the usual range in American and European banks.

The custom of issuing personal checks to individual clients with which to pay monthly and other bills, so common elsewhere, is still an uncommon banking practice in Greece. It is one of several banking reforms proposed by Coordination Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, to be introduced in 1980; it is overdue. In some ways Greeks still overload their banking system by using their banks in ways only a cash-intensive and cash-oriented society would use them. They often go there in person to pay telephone and other utility bills, or transactions which could far more easily be made by personal check. One good reason for introducing the system of personal checking in Greece would be to curb some of the extensive tax evasion, now blatantly practiced by a vast segment of Greek business people, wage earners and especially self-employed professionals. It is part of a very widespread parallel economy of unreported second incomes. It is hoped that widespread personal checking will indirectly force tax evaders to report incomes closer to their true incomes and thus augment national revenues. A long, bitter and controversial strike by bank employees was in part caused because the Government's demand to extend working hours would interfere with the second jobs held down by many employees. Indeed, the bank employees finally won back their previous hours when the matter was put to arbitration in February.

Professor Angelopoulos, who has taught economics at the University of Athens and other academic institutions for many years, takes pains to stress the value of training. He believes that those who work for banks, within the Greek system, should be trained in banking as such, rather than in peripheral areas. When he addressed the General Assembly of the Union of Greek Banks last year, he specifically proposed the creation of a School of Banking. In his view, its graduates should be hired without reference to any other academic qualifications.

There are important differences between the Greek and the EEC banking systems, a sector which is historically related to the economic development of any country. Differences in banking structure will not be affected by the two "guidelines" so far promulgated by the Community in its banking policy. These guidelines essentially establish the basic preconditions for a bank to operate and the issuance of permits for that purpose within the countries of the EEC. They also introduce the principle of "equal treatment" in their operation.

These guidelines, however, leave many areas untouched, and a lot of room for exceptions. Significantly, every member state has the option of postponing its implementation for up to eight years, should their immediate application create technical and other problems which could not be solved in the short term.

Whereas certain important changes are involved in Greece's accession to the Community, relative to the issuance of permits to Community banks to establish themselves and operate in Greece, Professor Angelopoulos points out that, in the end, joining the Common Market "will not open the flood-gates" for the indiscriminate establishment of foreign banks in Greece. "Greece's banking policy towards foreign banks has always been absolutely liberal." As he sees it, moreover, the size of the domestic banking market is not so big as to permit the establishment in Greece of many more foreign banks. In addition to the fourteen existing foreign banks in Greece, an Arab-Greek bank was recently founded.

The various member states of the EEC have already taken steps to insure the protection of their banks and, "no doubt, these measures will also affect Greece." The largest commercial bank in the country, the National Bank of Greece, does more commercial banking than all other banks in Greece put together. Of several thousand banks in the world, it is one of the top one hundred in size. It opened a branch office in Paris recently, the latest in a series of several in Europe and America.

Professor Angelopoulos feels that as long as Greek banks update their procedures and services and modernize themselves, they will be able to meet the competition of foreign banks. He believes that Greek banks are in a position similar to European ones. To prove his point, he quotes the ratio of Greek bank outlays for personnel to assets, and points out that whereas that ratio for the Common Market countries as a whole is 1.84%, in Greece it hovers around 2% and at the National Bank of Greece only 1.75%. Also, the productivity index (i.e., gross revenues in relation to assets) is 9.6% for EEC countries. For Greece, according to National Bank figures, it is 9.54%-about the same level.

Greek banks are more than likely to take such steps as they see fit to be able to compete effectively in the broader spectrum of European banking. To meet the new conditions, they must increase their flexibility. They must, in effect, simplify transactions in order to reduce their operating costs and strengthen their competitive positions.

Investment in manufacturing and related areas has been a problem area for many years in this country. In the last twenty years there has been considerable progress in many sectors of the economy, but not in what is called productive investments. On the average, investments in plant and equipment have represented only about 3% of the Gross National Product in Greece, while the average for the Nine has been double that figure. A result of this long delay in industrial investment has been the large deficit in the country's trade balance. Greek exports cover only 40% of imports, against 90% or more in the countries of the Community.

Professor Angelopoulos sees the continuing, worldwide recession of the last five years as requiring global solutions, not localized ones. Not only on moral but on practical business grounds, he believes poverty and hunger in Third World countries can be wiped out by the end of the century,

if certain new global fiscal policies which he advocates are adopted and implemented with a new approach. If the present adverse economic conditions continue, he expects the numbers of unemployed, now seventeen million in the twenty-four OECD countries alone, to increase rapidly during the present decade.

The Keynesian theory of employment is no longer in tune with our times, Angelopoulos believes. He sees the lack of productive investment in manufacturing and related areas as a root cause of worldwide "stagflation." Another problem, of course, is the vast sums spent by all countries on military preparedness. In 1975, the frightening figure was \$300 billion, double what it was in 1972. By the end of 1978, the global figure was \$400 billion causing severe inflationary pressures.

To solve these problems, Professor Angelopoulos proposes the granting of 15-year loans to Third World countries, of a total magnitude of \$25 billion per year (about 0.5% of the GNP of the twelve major industrial countries), with no interest payments for the first five years and 5% interest during the remaining ten years. The purpose of such loans would be to create productive investments in manufacturing units which would create effective demand for their products and help eliminate unemployment. Since, on a worldwide basis, about \$25 billion would be given away on unemployment insurance benefits anyway, why not, Professor Angelopoulos asks, spend that same money to create jobs and demand for the products which these jobs will produce? In this way, new tax resources would also be created which would more than offset financing costs.

Coupled with this proposal Angelopoulos suggests a five-year moratorium on the service of existing debts. Third World countries already have debts of over \$350 billion; the servicing of these runs at an annual cost of over \$25 billion.

Seen as a new version of the Marshall Plan, the Angelopoulos Plan claims that the five-year moratorium on debt service and the new interest-free loan for five years would promote the development of the Third World countries. It would certainly create new purchasing power in these countries seeking to buy consumer goods from the industrialized countries. According to the Angelopoulos Plan, some \$45 billion would be available during each of the first five years. The productive result of this money would enable Third World countries to buy from their lenders, the industrial countries. Professor Angelopoulos points out: "It will be recalled that the Marshall Plan led to a significant fall in unemployment and provided a stimulus to sustained economic growth in the United States."

Policy measures taken in one country alone could not yield the desired results. The functions of individual states must be transferred to the international community as a whole to solve these massive problems. Nevertheless, on an initial, experimental basis, Professor Angelopoulos envisions the countries of the EEC as the vehicle for a regional version of his Plan with a number of Third World countries. As he sees it, it

could be done with \$12 billion or 0.8% of the GNP of the Nine. The cost would be about \$1 billion per year. On the other hand, the Nine spend \$7 billion a year for unemployment benefits and export promotion. Beginning with the sixth year, costs would drop to \$300 million per year. As Professor Angelopoulos sees it, the alternatives are continued poverty, hunger, rising unemployment, and "successive recessions which, beyond a certain point, may make violent reactions inevitable and endanger world peace."

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## CENTRAL BANK CHIEF HARALZ ATTACKS GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 20 Feb 80 p 16

[Editorial: "A Blow to Business"]

[Text] Jonas H. Haralz, the head of the Central Bank, delivered a speech at the Independence Party council that aroused a great deal of attention. The part of the speech dealing with the government's economic policy was published in MORGUNBLADID last Sunday. He pointed out that the government economic pact contained the most revolutionary goal ever proposed for bringing down inflation; if taken seriously, inflation is to be brought below 10 percent in 2 years. However, there is "literally no single thing that can defeat inflation," Haralz added. He then discussed the so-called "countdown method," whereby, contrary to the proposals of the Progressives, prices would be cut regardless of wages. He said that nowhere in the inhabited world had he heard that such ideas have been put into practice. "This must be nonsense," he said. "People must not mean what they are saying, because if they do, then this is one of the biggest blows to business in Iceland, both private and government business, that we have ever heard of. This means that well into this year, price increases will be brought down to an annual rate of 25 percent, whereas at the same time wage boosts will be around 35 percent. How can anyone expect a business to cope with a situation like that?"

Jonas H. Haralz then took up the section on finance and demonstrated that it contradicts the other points in the pact. Furthermore, he pointed out that on the one hand it stresses a balanced budget, while on the other hand calling for "increased outlays of 25-30 billion kronur in 1980 and 30-35 billion next year. If a balanced budget is really going to be a fact, then the entire section on all sorts of improvements, such as in agriculture, support for farmers, is meaningless. If these improvements are to come about, they are going to cost about this amount of money, which represents a direct increase in state expenditures and activities."



Jonas H. Haralz said, furthermore, in his speech:

"People have asked how the policy contained in the pact differs from the policy of the Independence Party. I will mention four points that the Independence Party has underscored in everything that the party has said about economic matters over the last several years. Firstly, it has emphasized that inflation must be defeated through effective and coordinated measures in financial, monetary and wage policy. The government pact does not call for vigorous measures in any of these fields, and there is no coordination whatsoever. Secondly, the Independence Party has emphasized that the government's role and expenditures ought to be reduced. The government pact calls for an increase in the government's role and expenditures. Thirdly, the Independence Party has stressed greater freedom of activity in currency exchange, in business and in pricing. The government pact does not call for any measures in this regard. Fourthly, the Independence Party emphasizes most of all that the conditions for free enterprise must be established for business on a sound economic foundation. The pact entails strong pressure on business through tight price controls and a mistaken exchange rate. In addition, the role of government is greatly increased through planning and the awarding of loans from public funds in accordance with these plans. All of this will be under the control of the ministers who are in charge of business matters, but all of them are from the Independence Party's main opponent, except the agriculture minister."

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## NATIONAL DEBT OWED TO CENTRAL BANK INCREASES 5 BILLION

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 1 Mar 80 p 2

[Text] The total Treasury debt owed to the Central Bank amounted to 32.3 billion kronur on 26 February, an increase of 5.7 billion from the beginning of the year. The increase in the debt for the same period last year totaled 9.8 billion, however.

According to information from Hoskuldur Jonsson, the chief adviser in the Finance Ministry, the situation has worsened by some 4 billion kronur less over the past 2 months than last year, but we must take into account that prices over these 2 years are not comparable. The reasons for this, among other things, are that a budget has not yet been passed, and the Treasury is operating on the basis of expenditure authorizations. This is why the Treasury is paying back as little of the debt as possible.

Jonsson said that in spite of this he felt that there were not many unpaid debts left. Lenders have been told, however, that they would not receive payments until a budget is passed, except for the limited payments mentioned above.

As of 26 February the Treasury's current account with the Central Bank showed credits of 373 million kronur. The Treasury owes about 4 billion in Treasury loans. Its largest debt is a loan from the Central Bank that is not insured against devaluation, but the major part of the loan is apparently price-indexed.

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## WASHINGTON TRADE ATTACHE DISCUSSES U.S. MARKET

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 29 Feb 80 p 25

[Interview with Ivar Gudmundsson, Iceland's trade attache in Washington and consul in New York, during the week of 25 February; place not given]

[Text] There has been much talk lately about sales of Icelandic products in the United States. We can mention sales of frozen fish in this connection. There have been cutbacks in sales of some varieties, such as canned fish, as the sales agency of the canned fish enterprise closed down its office in the United States. Iceland has achieved a good position in sales of wool products in the United States, and other items could be mentioned.

MORGUNBLADID discussed these and other related issues with Ivar Gudmundsson, Iceland's consul in New York and trade attache at its Washington embassy. Gudmundsson was first asked about Icelandic products in general on the U.S. market.

[Gudmundsson answers] There is a market for all of our products in the United States, but they are usually too expensive, exceeding the going world market prices. There have been experimental sales of fresh and frozen lamb in the United States. We have gotten the same price for these items as New Zealand, the largest exporter of lamb to the United States. The Icelandic lamb has been very popular, selling as soon as it has been put on the market. The price that we have received has not been as high as we needed.

Icelandic woollens have been gaining increasing popularity, but we are in a bind because of high tariffs. This applies particularly if there is anything on the item that can be called an adornment. This means an increase in the tariff.

Frozen fish is our number one export to the United States, and sales are so well established that we really do not have to pay much attention to them. The two firms that export frozen fish to the United States are so well established that we could not ask for a better situation. Fluctuations in price and demand are subject to the same laws as for other items.

In this regard I could mention that an elected committee was given the task of investigating whether U.S. fish imports were detrimental to the American fishing industry. The committee turned over its conclusions to the president of the United States in January. Its conclusions were that imports did not have a negative impact on the U.S. industry.

Over the last 3 years we have attempted to establish our canned goods on the U.S. market. The sales agency for canned fish has been responsible for this bid to enter the market, along with its affiliate in New York, Iceland Waters Industry (IWI), which has nominally discontinued operations. The manager of IWI, Norman Salkin, has personally taken over the distributorship for Icelandic canned goods.

[Question] Why has the sales agency in the United States been discontinued?

[Answer] The agency was not making it and was therefore discontinued, but the reasons for this can be traced back to our own actions. Bjorn Dagbjartsson, the director of the Research Institute of the fishing industry, recently reported this. He spoke the truth about the awful situation that prevails in this regard. On the other hand, he is implying that food canning is becoming an obsolete method, which is not correct, at least not as far as the United States is concerned. The fish varieties that are canned are usually not suitable for freezing, smoking or any other sort of processing.

Sales of canned fish are in the tens of millions of dollars on the United States market, as they are sold in small weights, which is convenient for consumers. Our canning problems in Iceland are due mainly to negligence and poor quality control, because the raw material is as good as elsewhere, if not better.

#### Many Examples of Poor Workmanship in Canned Goods Production

[Question] Can you mention any examples to support this assertion?

[Answer] Unfortunately, there are many examples of how careless we have been in this industry for the last couple of years. If we

take a look at the folding of IWI in the United States, we recall, for example, what happened with the canned clams that were imported 2 years ago. They were expected to have a promising future. About 6,000 cases were imported on a trial basis. When the cans were opened, they obviously contained mostly water, and when the food-stuffs control in Pennsylvania discovered this, imports of this item from Iceland were almost completely banned. This resulted in a sizable financial loss for IWI.

On the whole, I can say that IWI has constantly received wrong information concerning weights and measures; for example, 1½ ounces of caviar was marked 2 ounces. It was not uncommon for defective cans to be used which swelled up during storage. Regulatory procedures were not followed. Shortly after Iceland Waters began operations in New York, the decision was made to export fish balls, but they have not yet arrived.

The trout from Lake Thingvellir are one of the most popular canned items that Iceland has offered the U.S. market, and the trout has been used as part of the Iceland Waters trademark. Unfortunately, the supply of this item is limited. In 1978 Iceland Waters got about 6,000 cases, but last year it was announced that it could obtain only a small portion of that amount, because better offers were coming in from elsewhere.

The manager of Iceland Waters made repeated attempts to get more of the trout, and it turned out that he got 700 cases. When the product arrived in New York, it became clear that this was an old shipment that had been returned from Denmark and Germany. The cans were marked 1975, and the labels were old and had been discontinued 4 or 5 years ago.

The manager of Iceland Waters got in touch some time ago with an Arab who was interested in buying canned foods from Iceland. An agreement was reached to send one shipment to Saudi Arabia as a sample of quality Icelandic canned goods. After several months delay the order was finally filled, but when it was opened in that oil-producing country, half of it had clearly gone bad and was inedible. Further shipments of canned goods have not been made to Saudi Arabia.

In Spite of Everything, We Have Potential

[Question] Has Iceland lost its opportunities for sales of canned goods on the American market?

[Answer] In spite of everything, this is not the case, and Iceland now has a unique opportunity to get its products on the market if we do things properly as far as strict quality control is concerned.



The former manager of Iceland Waters has so much faith in this regard that he has decided to become the sole agent of the canned goods enterprise in the United States. He has made plans to import canned goods from Iceland this year totaling \$3 million, about 1.2 billion Icelandic kronur, of which \$2 million is for Kipper Snacks, lightly smoked herring fillets from the Nordurstjarnan (canning factory) in Hafnarfjordur, which is a good product.

It so happens that Iceland has cornered this market. Half of the sales are under one of the most famous brand names in the United States, King Oscar, and the other half are under the trademark of Iceland Waters and other brands. The key to the market is well-known brands, as we can clearly see, because the Kipper Snacks from Iceland under the King Oscar label are right next to the Kippers from the same firm under the Iceland Waters label. The item is exactly the same, but the King Oscar brand sells for 73 cents, and the Icelandic brand sells for 63 cents.

Our biggest hope for the future is to establish sales of Icelandic caviar, which is well-liked and in great demand, precisely because the United States is reluctant to buy caviar from Iran and now recently from Russia because of the invasion into Afghanistan. Icelandic caviar has pushed Danish caviar off the market, so to speak, and the Icelandic caviar is considered to have a longer shelf life, and the dyeing element is regarded as more stable than in competing brands.

The bad part is that a large portion of the import shipments has been wasted because the information concerning weights and measures on the label has not been reliable, and container lids have been loose.

If we use proper methods, Icelandic canned goods ought to have a promising future in the United States. Among other things, we have small herring, which ichthyologists say can be caught off the northern coast in some quantity during the summer. Small herring are an ideal raw material for sardine production, of which there is a shortfall in the United States. Another reason for optimism about a future market in the United States is the condition of the industry in Norway. A state monopoly has been established there, and importers of canned foods in the United States do not believe that this enhances the position of the Norwegian canned goods industry. Moreover, there is a shortage of the raw materials in many places, and I could mention other things.

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CSO: 3111

## FALL IN FISH PRICES ON U.S. MARKET WORRIES COLDWATER FIRM

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Feb 80 p 3

[Text] The prices of several Icelandic fish products were recently reduced in the United States. Cod was reduced 5 cents, from 108 to 103 cents, or 4.6 percent. Pollock fillets were also cut 6 cents, from 96 to 90 cents a pound, about 5 percent. Haddock was cut by 5 cents, from 130 to 125 cents, or about 3.8 percent. Finally, there was a 10 cent reduction in carp, both whole and filleted.

In order to find out the reasons for these cutbacks, MORGUNBLADID contacted Thorsteinn Gislason, the manager of Coldwater Seafood in Scarsdale in the United States.

"The following are the reasons for the price reductions that we recently decided on for several items on the U.S. market:

"The prices of carp and pollock fillets were reduced as part of a plan to increase sales in view of large supplies. The price of whole fish was cut to conform to the market price, which is, of course, always determined by supply and demand. We have not reduced the price of cod or haddock fillets, which are, however, very expensive compared to the competition.

"These are the most important fish products, in terms of value, that Iceland exports to the United States. Even though whole cod is often mentioned in comparing prices, it has, in fact, become a minor item of decreasing importance as far as our overall sales volume is concerned. You cannot charge a higher price for it than the market in general can tolerate.

"As we all know, the production of carp and pollock for the American market has increased sharply because of the catch restrictions on cod and on the take capacity of the fishing fleet. This is why we must boost sales of these varieties in the United States more than we have, and the increase must come much quicker than it would ordinarily have to. We are doing this by making maximum use of the sales

network and our factories and by bringing about new and increased consumption of these items, for which there is no real demand on the market. One of the necessary elements in this campaign is to charge prices that will make such an increase possible."

#### Stiff Price Competition

Gislason was then asked about future prospects and whether there was reason to fear further cuts.

"It looks as if a major increase in the sales of carp and pollock is possible. This will become apparent in the next few months. Competition in the sale of all fish products in the United States has stiffened considerably in recent times. The demand from restaurants has fallen off because people have less money to spend. This situation forces us to sell to more clients than before in order to make up for the reduced consumption of each individual client.

"Our sales of cod fillets have a secure underpinning, and we hope to hold our own against the unusually stiff price competition, especially from Canada. It is to our advantage in this sales competition that the Canadians all go their own way and have no sales associations.

"As far as price changes are concerned, I do not want to make any predictions. When they become necessary, they are made without any preparations, and the reasons that prompt them often come suddenly. Moreover, it is impossible to do a good job of pricing if you make major predictions about prospects.

"Prices are always increased when supplies and sales potential permit. However, certain market problems and a major rise in supplies can make price cuts absolutely necessary. If we cut prices and expand our marketing efforts, this will lead to an increased consumption of the varieties that we have to offer, and this will provide an underpinning for the high prices that we have always been famous for."

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CSO: 3111

## CLOSING OF HULL, ENGLISH FISHING PORT, EXPECTED TO HURT TRADE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 22 Feb 80 p 32

[Text] The fishing port in Hull is now closed; this was the most important foreign port for Icelandic vessels last year. All in all, 260 Icelandic vessels unloaded their catch in England last year, selling about 23,000 tons worth some 11.5 billion kronur; 124 delivered their catch in Hull and sold around 6 billion kronur in iced fish there. There were 64 deliveries in Grimsby, with sales of 3.5 billion, and 72 in Fleetwood, with sales of 2 billion kronur.

The trawler owners' association in Hull, which operates the fishing port, has had financial problems recently and attempted to resolve them in cooperation with influential figures in Britain, but so far without success. The authorities in Hull are still working on this problem. This week, the enterprise that runs the port petitioned for bankruptcy, as it was no longer able to meet its obligations. The port workers were laid off on Monday, at which time no ship had unloaded its catch for more than 2 weeks.

A telegram from Hull to the LIU [Alliance of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners] on Monday said, among other things, that if an Icelandic vessel was going to unload its catch in Hull in the near future, it would have to pay 19,000 pounds, or about 17.4 million kronur in insurance, the equivalent of 3 weeks wages for the long-shoremen. An LIU reply said, among other things, that Icelandic ships have not unloaded in Hull recently because of low fish prices there, but sales by Icelandic ships had been fairly stable until then. They absolutely refused to pay the required insurance fees, stating that the local people have to resolve their problems by themselves. Otherwise, Icelandic vessels will not be docking there in the near future.

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CSO: 3111

## AGREEMENT SIGNED ON FISH SALE TO USSR

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Feb 80 p 20

[Text] An agreement has been signed in Moscow for the sale of 9,500 tons of frozen fish worth 5.4 billion Icelandic kronur. The sale includes 6,500 tons of fillets and 3,000 tons of whole fish. The January 1979 agreement called for sales of 6,000 tons of frozen fillets and 4,000 tons of whole frozen fish. In September, an additional pact was reached for the sale of 7,000 tons of fillets, part of which was supposed to be delivered during the first few months of this year.

MORGUNBLADID received the following news release yesterday from the Sales Outlet of the Freezing Plants and the Federation of Icelandic Cooperatives:

"Yesterday an agreement was signed in Moscow for the sale of 9,500 tons of frozen fish, to be delivered from Iceland to the Soviet Union in 1980. This is divided into 6,500 tons of fillets and 3,000 tons of whole fish, with a total worth of \$13.5 million U.S. dollars, or about 5.4 billion Icelandic kronur, according to the current exchange rate. The price in dollars is up slightly from last year. The sellers are the Sales Outlet of the Freezing Plants and the Federation of Icelandic Cooperatives, and the buyer is V/O Prodintorg. The negotiations for the Icelandic firms was handled by Arni Finn-bjornsson from the Sales Outlet and Sigurdur Markusson from the Seafood Division of the federation."

Under a trade agreement between Iceland and the Soviet Union that is in effect until the end of this year, Iceland sells between 12,000 and 17,000 tons of fillets and between 4,000 and 7,000 tons of whole fish a year to the Soviets. The agreement that has now been reached deviates considerably from this framework. Last year saw a major increase in the production of the items that Iceland has sold to the Soviet Union, for example, carp and halibut.



Olafur Jonsson, assistant manager of the Seafood Division of the federation, said yesterday that the amount of frozen whole fish that had been agreed to was in keeping with Iceland's demands. However, we would like to have sold them more fillets and that is what we are aiming at under an additional agreement for the latter part of the year. Jonsson said that the prices obtained were satisfactory and competitive with those on other markets. Iceland has sold mostly carp to the Soviet Union, as well as a considerable amount of halibut and some ocean catfish, pollock, ling and torsk. The division of fish species under the agreement that has been reached is not available.

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CSO: 3111

## PROFILE OF EMERGING DC LEADER DONAT-CATTIN

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 23 Mar 80, pp 19-20

[Article by Sandro Magister: "Carlo, the Reckless"]

[Text] The former, challenged leader of a small, divided group, he became--following a series of tough moves--the architect of the new majority, Fanfani hopes. People keep wondering how he did it and what it means.

Rome. Fanfani emerged as the winner in the latest Christian Democratic Congress. Donat-Cattin is his only heir, the rising number one man in the DC [Christian Democratic Party] in 1980. This assumption cannot be overlooked and the DC is a party which supports and exalts the alternatives to itself. Just 12 years ago, Donat-Cattin was the rebel who aimed at the division of the DC by making himself a candidate for the leadership of a new left-wing Catholic party. Today he is the party's only deputy secretary elected by its own indivisible following and he is the well-known aspirant to the job of secretary-general--under the ensign of the new right.

Carlo Donat-Cattin is an anomalous picturesque personality constantly in motion, suitable, like few others, for the Christian Democratic polymorphic structure. This is also why, among the party's great leaders in the past, Fanfani is his undisputed teacher. Catholic integralism is their congenital structure. And this is the integralism which enabled both of them to bend every instrument--even the most contradictory--to the primacy of the idea.

"Reversibility" is the only true political formula used by Fanfani and Donat-Cattin: the reversible as the mechanics of Social-Christian power.

Fanfani emerged politically as the leaders of the Dossetti-style left. But in 1951, when the group was at its height and when Dossetti was deputy party secretary, Fanfani "made his jump": he negotiated directly with De Gasperi and got the Ministry of Agriculture for himself, he upset the balance inside the party, and that was the end for Dossettism. Just 3 years later, the man from Arezzo was to be DC secretary. Donat-Cattin's beginnings also go back to his position as leader of the white social left.

But in 1978, his joining the office of secretary Zaccagnini as deputy secretary marks his break with the DC-PCI [Italian Communist Party] policy of understanding which was theorized so enigmatically by Moro. Donat-Cattin emerged from the February 1980 Christian Democratic Congress as the leader of the party's anti-communist majority. For the Zaccagnini group, made up of many of his former group friends, this was the sunset. And Fanfani is the priest behind this promotion of Donat-Cattin into the sanctuary of party leaders, over the threshold of the secretariat.

Now, the brotherhood between those two men is not as old as their respective vocations. The most remote antecedent goes back to December 1964, during the presidential elections which brought Saragat to Quirinale Palace. Donat-Cattin voted for Fanfani for ten rounds of voting, in disagreement with his own party. He paid for his rebellion with punitive suspension but also with considerable publicity for his record as leader of the anti-Doroteo guerrilla group. So far, at least, the symbolism behind this episode. But reality was more subtle: Fanfani, by that time, was no longer the man for the revival of the center-left. Just 8 months earlier, breaking his 345-day silence (by his own count), maintained rather polemically, following the "easing-out" from the office of prime minister, engineered by Moro, he launched the slogan of "reversibility" which marked the final liquidation of the reform-oriented center-left.

The highways and byways of Donat-Cattin have something labyrinthine and twisted about them. But only for the noninitiated. The essential feature of this situation is the way in which he walks the high roads of the great non-Doroteo leaders (Moro, Fanfani). For him, Doroteism is an area of invasion, the revival of guerrilla clashes, the school of Christian democracy based on the "theory of needs" (with high grades: from Sindona to Caltagirone, there is no big scandal that does not directly involve men in his entourage). But it was the fortunes of the leaders of the past that guided Donat-Cattin's steps and moves. All of his whims and capers are (and are designed to be) mere preambles. They came after victories which other people had never really expected to materialize.

Thus, when Fanfani moved off toward Quirinale Palace and when Moro broke with the center-left in its decline (at the end of the sixties), Donat-Cattin likewise dissociated himself. He made references to a second Catholic party, he befriended the ACLI [Christian Associations of Italian Workers] of Livio Labor and the left-wing CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], Riccardo Lombardi and Luigi Pintor. But he did so in order right away to leave the Ministry of Labor after being drily recalled by Moro. Tricked by the Moro-Doroteo lesson, his congenital integralism likewise entered a phase of latency. These are the blank years in his political biography. A good share of the Catholic frontier intelligentsia rallied around a weekly publication promoted by him, entitled SETTEGIORNI. It was run by two Christian Democrats Ruggero Orfei and Piero Pratesi.

But this was just a temporary interlude. Between 1972 and 1973, SETTEGIORNI was already on the outside, separated from the Donat-Cattin orbit. It was not so much the issue of the divorce referendum that characterized the conflict but rather the anticipation, by the magazine, of a link between the DC and the PCI based on all of the Moro-Doroteo lay followers. At that time, Donat-Cattin moved toward Fanfani who, as a result of the June 1973 Giustiniani Palace agreement, again became party secretary. Nineteen seventy-three was the key year in the history of the two-man team of Fanfani and Donat-Cattin. Arnaldo Forlani, who was rather unpleasantly chased out of the secretariat, as a matter of fact slipped into the role of Fanfani's crown prince. With his sly criticisms, the leader from Arezzo a short while later did not fail to suggest rotation with a new and up-coming heir, that is, Carlo Donat-Cattin.

Since then, the latter has been increasingly lining up behind Fanfani, without any interruption. In 1974, Donat-Cattin was all for approving the antidivorce idea. In 1975, after the advancement of the left-wing forces in the administrative elections, he threatened to resign from his ministry if there was to be a PCI-PSI [Italian Socialist Party] board in Piedmont (actually, the exact opposite happened: the PCI was on the board and there were no resignations). At the end of July, during the DC National Council meeting which defenestrated Fanfani and installed Zaccagnini, he fought for Flaminio Piccoli to the very end.

Having shifted to the right, he now found himself somewhat caught off balance by the revival of Moro's authority. The enigma of the "third phase," beyond centrism and beyond the center-left, the assumption as to the "association" of the PCI with the administration--these persuaded him to go into a rather schizoid oscillation between ministerial functions in the "Andreotti-Berlinguer directory" (never refuted, although repeatedly accompanied by false promises of resignations) and the escalation of the bitter arguments against the government's and the secretariat's "yielding" to the PCI. In February 1978, his followers got together with the DC right wing of Fanfani and De Carolis in order to stop the PCI from getting into the government. But he did not; he waited for the outcome of the Moro situation; and when it was all over, he finally took up his position, ordering his followers to withdraw.

With Moro gone, the pairing with Fanfani really came out into the light of day. Donat-Cattin left the Ministry of Industry to take over as deputy secretary, side by side with the heavily vituperated Zaccagnini. In July 1979, the lineup that was to prevail at the next congress had taken shape and proved its effectiveness by defeating Giovanni Galloni who was running for reelection to the post of group leader at Montecitorio: Fanfani, Donat-Cattin, Bisaglia, Forlani, Rumor, Colombo. Only Piccoli was not yet a part of this outfit. Then came the turnabout during the days of the congress. The Donat-Cattin "preamble," Fanfani hoped, would rally all of the opponents of the unfinished stragey of Moro-Doroteo. For Donat-Cattin--the number one candidate of a party with a secretary (Piccoli) and a chairman (Forlani) on opposite sides of the fence--this was the moment for big undertakings.

His past predecessors had cleared the way for him. But is not Fanfani a man of many defeats? And what about the Moro-Doroteo inheritance? A big unknown. And Donat-Cattin could not possibly know what it was going to be --he being the man who, one day, compared Moro to the Count-Duke in the novel by Manzoni: "Nobody could ever boast that he knows his plans and designs; even those who are to carry them out, those who write his dispatches, understand nothing." As Fanfani did in the past, so Donat-Cattin now is trying to rule "his" DC. But he does not fully understand all of its inner workings.

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## LUCIANO LAMA EXPLAINS CGIL POSITION ON TERRORISM

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 24 Jan 80 pp 15-19

[Article by Luciano Lama: "On the Right Side in Defense of the Republic"]

[Text] On the anniversary of the death of Guido Rossa we recall him as a militant in our organization, a factory trade union leader, and a citizen who was aware of his duties to the working class and to the entire nation.

To praise his sacrifice, his civil courage, means taking the right side in the struggle against armed subversion, and to stimulate the worker's commitment to the defense of democracy. We never thought that Italy must see a phase of civil war in which organized labor must go it alone, replacing the state and the forces of public order in combating terrorism. But Guido Rossa was the exact opposite of the isolated "vigilante" or even of an independent organization in the struggle against terrorism. With this government, this democracy, these courts, to intervening effectively, collaborating actively, with them to defeat terrorism by applying the laws of the Republic. His testimony, that courageous testimony which led to his death, was an aware act of cooperation with the organizations of the state so that the state itself could validly defend itself and win in the severe test the armed party forced it to face.

I know that it is possible to engage in a lengthy discussion concerning the cooperation of citizens in institutions who at various times in history developed various views and judgments concerning the meaning of this cooperation. And it is right that it should be so since it is not the same thing to cooperate with a fascist police and court system, which were the instruments of class oppression and suffocation of freedom, as it is to cooperate with a democratic state in order to forestall success by the enemies of democracy. Thus, it seems to me absurd to talk in principle on this subject as though we were having a rational discussion in the world of ideas and not in that of the commitment or lack of commitment of workers and citizens regarding the attitude to be held toward a given government, in reference to its enemies. It is true that in any democratic nation any citizen must be judged by the courts and that, until proved otherwise, he must be considered innocent. But when evidence, coincidence,

facts, multiply and are clarified, then the guarantee in principle can become the welcome shield of a presumption of innocence which transfers cooperation from the organs of the state, which must administer justice, to the subversive forces and becomes a form of culpable collusion with those forces. In the painful and bitter affair of the fight against terrorism, too often we have found ourselves in reality faced by attitudes of this kind even in the presence of persons who had openly spurred youth and workers to commit crimes against democracy when they had not actually participated directly in terrorist action. On the other hand, it becomes rhetorical invocation or open mockery to advertise the efficiency of the police forces and of the courts, perhaps criticizing them for the paucity of results achieved and, at the same time, deprive these forces of the convinced collaboration of all those who are capable of giving such cooperation.

For these reasons, the trade union movement, and first of all the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor]--even though it assumed from the beginning a clear position of struggle against terrorism, aiding openly and each time calling upon workers to respond to the more bloody blows struck by terrorism--is aware of the inadequacy of this behavior in regard to the persistent and growing aggression of terrorist action.

The mass responses are repetitive but necessary since they testify to the political will of the workers to firmly hold on to the end to a position of struggle against the enemies of the state, a position which must be increasingly rooted in the consciousness of the masses. And also in this regard, referring to mass action if anything is to be pointed out it is that sometimes that action is not as great as would be required. But the strike following the political murders, the massacres, the more serious attacks, is not enough in itself. And here, certainly, there is still the most serious shortcoming in the antiterrorist action which we are conducting with determination and with no uncertainty. In fact, it is necessary to have a more direct commitment of the workers and of their factory and trade union units in organizing a constant, continuous cooperation with the organs of the state. Those who describe this position as a witch hunt, should reflect for a moment on the fact that in the middle ages the "witches" hunted down were innocent women, artfully accused, attributing to them evil intentions or guilt which generally were attributable to the power structure. Today we are not dealing with innocent women, we are dealing with armed enemies, with clandestine persons and organizations who act against defenseless servants of the state, trade union or company leaders, political men and journalists. We are dealing with those who do not hesitate to destroy, to exterminate honest workers and citizens dedicated to the defense of institutions, or in any case, who want to defend those democratic institutions.

For these reasons, which are all intended to safeguard the freedoms conquered through a great popular struggle, we believe that the commitment of the workers to the defense of the republic must still be increased, and,

in this regard, we point to the example of Guido Rossa, to his serene courage. If it is not true that in many factories there exist points of support or single components of the armed party, it is true instead that in some factories, particularly the large ones, this situation exists: In too many cases there is a repetition of the distribution of leaflets or pamphlets by subversive military organizations; in too many factories armed individuals have been seen, and others who inexplicably are absent for periods of time and then return. As can be seen, I do not at all refer to a few episodes of violence which we decisively condemn, on the occasion of trade union struggles and which however must not be confused with terrorism. I refer to events that demonstrate here and there the existence of supporters of the subversive forces who act clandestinely, but cannot hide so effectively as to leave no trace. To create a vacuum around terrorism, isolating it firmly on the political plane and fighting it, in view of concrete events, cooperating with the forces of order and of justice, means making an irreplaceable contribution to the defense of the state and of democracy. In the opposite case, the alternatives are only two and both are unacceptable: Either there is the authoritarian transformation of the state through harsher laws and harsher techniques of antiterrorist struggle, entrusted solely to the forces of order who would be left alone (and in this case, there could be no justification for opposition, perhaps justified in the name of guaranteeism, and constitutional principles, etc.) or, still worse, the surrender of the state to the violent action of terrorism.

In substance, if we want to prevent the republic from being transformed, in order to fight against an implacable enemy, into an authoritarian state which limits freedom, and if we are determined to prevail against the violent subversion of democratic order, we must know that the terrain on which those persons can most easily achieve results is the weakening of the level of consciousness of the workers and of the citizens, of the profound convictions of our people and of its firmness in the defense of institutions. The true objective of terrorism is not the armed destruction of the republic: They know that on the military plane the relationship of force would sentence them to failure at the outset. But they know also that their position can weaken the democratic attitudes of the masses, can feed the tendency to avoid commitment, to the search for a personal refuge by each individual; they know that if the game were to become a simple clash between subversion and the forces of order, with the people, with the workers lacking commitment and becoming spectators, their victory would be assured. So that this will not happen, the trade union movement, the plant organizations, must feel they are committed to daily cooperation with the forces of order and justice.

Guido Rossa was a bright example of courage also because he was not too often alone. We cannot ask everyone to be a hero, but we can ask everyone, each within his own means and according to his possibilities, to contribute to the defense of the ethical and political values which are at the basis of our democracy. And if the masses are involved in the struggle,

a void around the terrorists will be created and particular acts of courage and heroism will not be needed to be loyal citizens and workers.

But in order to achieve this result it is necessary to have a daily commitment and an untiring orientation of the trade union movement. This is the right way to honor the sacrifice of Guido Rossa.

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## TRADE UNION LEADERS INTERVIEWED ON TERRORISM

Rome RASSEGNA SINDACALE in Italian 24 Jan 80 pp 20-22

[Interview with Giorgio Benvenuto, secretary general of the UIL, and Franco Marini, associate secretary general of CISL; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] A demonstration will be held on 24 January in Genoa. The joint executive has announced a national assembly of the cadres and of delegates for a deeper analysis, and resulting mobilization of workers, against terrorism. What are the plans and commitments outside of those that are traditional, and believed by some to be ritual?

Benvenuto: Terrorism does not grow out of nothing for mysterious reasons. We are living in a confused domestic situation pregnant with political and economic problems for which no reasonable solution is seen, at least in the short term, and over which weigh extremely threatening international events. In this situation, we have a weak, minority government which is deaf to every request for greater social justice expressed by the trade union, which avoids demands to deal forthrightly with economic policy for the defense of workers' incomes, which does not commit itself to launching a serious energy plan, entrusting itself entirely to increases in rates which substantially affect only the workers. It abandons the South to its centuries-old misery, and does nothing about the cancerous problem of tax evasion. It is a government which suffers all the pressures of the present political climate and which continually aggravates it by its choices.

This is the culture in which terrorism proliferates. The trade union's struggle against it, therefore, must first of all be a struggle to dry up this culture and deprive terrorism of nourishment. The trade union must be committed against the present political picture, renouncing the idea of being a totality of corporative interests, eliminating from its action the division between the social and the political, playing a role of synthesis and leadership. Our conviction is that in the face of



progressive institutional, social and economic deterioration of the country, the trade union cannot continue to take refuge in the culture of opposition, but must pose for itself the problem of developing a culture of government, passing from demands to proposals. In particular, it is necessary to take serious steps against sidelining youth, in which terrorism may find followers or activists. In this sense, the attempt by the UIL [Italian Labor Union] to deal with the problem of drugs, which has begun to be felt even in the factories and which becomes increasingly alarming, seems to me to be useful.

Having said this, naturally, it is also necessary to have specific initiatives against terrorism and the concrete trade union commitments that would be more effective than those in the past. The national assembly of trade union cadres for an analysis of terrorism, announced by the joint executive, and the demonstration on 24 January at Genoa are examples. But it seems to me that the effort by the trade union to strengthen the ties between the working class and police force workers certainly will become closer as unionization of the police proceeds. The unity of all the workers--in and out of uniform--represents a great contribution toward isolation of the terrorists, which unfortunately is not appreciated by all political forces as much as it should be.

Marini: If the action and commitment of the organized workers movement in the struggle against terrorism has at times seemed foggy and spiritless as a result of a certain "ritualism" and if we ourselves often did not remove ourselves from this debilitating sensation of repetitiveness and impotence, then it means that it is necessary to courageously review the basic reasons for our commitment. Let me explain.

When the first blows of terrorism fell, the trade union yielded to an attitude that followed closely on the wave of ill-conceived "pan-trade unionism."

I am speaking of "organized vigilance" of the workers: As much as to say that the state, the institutions, the organizations and the police could not be trusted, and that we must replace them and fill the void with our forces almost as though we were building a piece of a "new state to be added to other pieces we had been building, perhaps claiming to supplement the action of parties, of parliament, of economic power."

If we have continued to subsume this "philosophy" in our commitment to fight terrorism, we have erred because we have done something outside of reality, we have committed willful acts of force. And it is for this reason that we are caught up in the suspicion of ritualism.

It is not the repetitiveness of our mobilizations, or our meetings and appeals and of our communiques, at every turn of the terroristic escalation that generates this feeling of malaise among us, among the workers.

If we clearly understand the duty of our actions and the correctness of our intentions, these actions can be repeated a hundred, a thousand times without being ritualistic.

Then the new reply to be given, I believe, should be based from now on no longer on the presumption of replacing the state, its republican institutions, its democratically legitimized organs; rather, it must start from a reconciliation of the working class with this democratic state as we developed it from 1946 on, in all these years, excluding no one; in the choices that were made under the guidance of this state, by Italian society on the plane of its organization of the broad lines of its foreign policy, of its domestic policy and of public order, of its economic policy in the direction of choice of market, of Europe.

To avoid equivocation concerning my statement that it is not meant to be provocative, I add that I believe that this state is also the fruit of the action and the presence of minority, but certainly not secondary, forces which have functioned in our society: That is, it is the fruit of the combined influence both of those who have governed as well as those who have been in the opposition.

And then, if the organized workers movement in its unity feels reconciled with the state and identifies itself with its basic rationale, to me it seems that our coming demonstrations must show a sign not of the mobilization of a "separate corps"--even though it be that of the mass of the working class, of the great majority of the active and constructive forces of society--but rather we should mobilize primarily as citizens (and then as workers) and make of our organization not an instrument of alternative aggregation, but an instrument of channelization of the energies in defense of the democratic state, of our constitution, of our republican institutions which are the patrimony not only of our class but also of the other classes and of the entire population.

[Question] The trade union sometimes is accused of not seeing the link between violence in the factories and terrorism. What role and what commitment can the workers at their place of work carry out in this direction?

Benvenuto: I would not identify terrorism and violence at the places of work. The relationship between the two phenomena is, I think, very indirect. Regarding the problem of violence in the factories and in certain forms of trade union struggle, it is necessary to recognize that there has in the past been an undoubted lack of attention by the trade union. It is certainly necessary and urgent to carry forward with maximum firmness the struggle against violence at places of work, regardless of for what reason it is expressed, through the definition of precise political and moral principles to which the trade union struggle must aspire. But the best cure against the tendency to use violence in the factories is certainly the revitalization of trade union democracy. If

the trade union knows how to strengthen itself, on the one hand, raising the level of participation and democracy at places of work, and on the other hand, developing serious and articulated hypotheses of participation by the great masses of workers in the administration of the country's economic and social policy, not only will violence decrease in the factories, but it will inflict a harsh blow on terrorism.

Marini: I say that we must stop these stories of the link between the factory and terrorism. This is as absurd as it would be absurd to talk of a link between medicine and terrorism perhaps because a doctor is a terrorist. This mentality and this exaggeration, when they come from outside can be the fruit of provocation or of the most banal simplification; while when they come from within us, they can be explained only by resort to an elementary drawing room psychology in the sense of wanting to ward off a feeling of being obscurely guilty, in the fear of actually having a good reason to be afraid.

What is the role of the workers, at the place of work, against terrorism? It is no different from the role of any honest citizen who might have knowledge of a crime: No temptation to organize an inquisition or a tribunal of the working class, but rather confidence in the institutions, in the courts, in the organizations of public order which can function and improve only to the extent that we citizens will be the ones to nourish the foundations of consensus within which they must function.

The reasoning must be the same for violent actions in the factories. They happen, but we must not see only their typical nature in relation to the place where they happen, but to know how to put them into a proper framework and combat them as an aspect of the same violence during this time of tension which is manifested in all the places of our difficult existence.

[Question] When the enemy is known it is easier to fight him. Recent developments in court action lead to further reflections on the nature and purposes of subversion. Has the trade union studied the phenomenon by its own analysis?

Benvenuto: One thing is clear, not only to the trade unions, but to the working masses together, and it is that terrorism, regardless of how it is masked, is their very dangerous enemy.

It--with its continuous and insidious attacks against democracy--feeds all the reactionary tendencies, or even simply conservative tendencies, and doing thus they wind up restricting the area of freedom of the workers by slowing down their legitimate struggles which try to create a more just and a more human society.

In this sense, we know our enemy very well: Beyond symbols and persons, whoever participates in terrorist actions, whoever knows about them but does not report them, whoever believes they are right, is our enemy even though he is not an accomplice.

Regarding recent developments in the courts, however, it seems right to me to wait until investigations have been completed and the judges have expressed themselves. Too often recently we have seen the release of suspects for lack, or insufficiency, of evidence even during the investigative period, people who were reported as terrorists. I would like to recall what I told the last central committee of the UIL: "Guaranteeism is the main rule of justice in a democratic society and everyone is innocent until proven guilty. Failure to allow this principle, even during emergencies such as those at the present time, would constitute a very serious precedent for freedom and first of all for freedom of the workers."

Marini: The trade union has not developed its own original theory of subversion. It is not able to do that because it lacks the cognitive instruments needed. Even on the plane of a "hypothesis of investigation," we prefer that this task be carried out by political scientists and sociologists (who are also groping in the dark).

Therefore, the trade union analysis is the same made by government offices, by the courts, by investigators, by its authorities. And apropos of authority, if we do not want a situation in which the head of the state is merely an amiable "grandfather Pertini" we must think that in his year-end message, even with the cautions called for by the occasion, there is much more than a personal opinion in regard to the puppeteers who pull the strings of terrorism from outside our country.

We have, and it is well that we do so, been concerned with the domestic tensions and the social malaise that can help the terrorist workers and their intermediate cadres. But it is also certain that our country, precisely because of its high level of democracy, precisely because of its civility and tolerance, precisely because of the guarantees that are behind the action of its institutions, has become the preferred territory of great international maneuvers for destabilization; the privileged theater for maneuvers of the most varied and conflicting secret services which have their main offices perhaps not in only one direction. There is an attack against our Italian society overall, against its institutions, against its international position, against its economic and financial power, against its leadership class, against its united trade unions, against the tattered (but constructive and progressive) debate of its parties. There is an attack that comes outside of this "Italian laboratory" which develops, even though among a thousand contradictions, the hypothesis of civility, of tolerance, of progress and of well-being which can be irritating to many, if for nothing else than as a "poor example" which is to be canceled as soon as possible.

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## POLICE CONDUCT MAJOR RAID AGAINST MAFIA

Messina GAZZETA DEL SUD in Italian 2 Feb 80 pp 1, 16

[Article by Roberto Vasapollo: "Mafia Summit Meeting in Vibonese Interrupted by CC, With Seven Arrests"]

[Text] Vibo Valentia--A Mafia summit meeting, which a few individuals belonging to the "new generation" were holding in the Limbadi countryside, was interrupted by a raid conducted by the Italian National Military Police [CC] of the Catanzaro group, by those of the operations division of the same city, by the CC of the Vibo Valentia company and by those of the Tropea Lieutenancy with the help of canine units and one of our city's helicopters. The CC action led to the arrest of seven persons, two of whom were being hunted, and the detention of an eighth.

The net put out by the CC, who acted under the orders of Lt Col Augusto Del Monaco, Major Rocco Difonte, Captain Antonio Plataroti and Lt Nicolo Bruno, caught the following: Michele Cutelle, 26 years old, of Laureana di Borrello; Giuseppe Mancuso, 31 years of age, of Limbadi, member of a clan of the same name; Saverio Loriglio, 28 years old, of Mileto; Enrico Zupo, 27 years of age, of Mileto; Francesco Fama, 34 years old, of San Costantino Calabro; Francesco Mercuri, 37 years of age, of San Calogero; and Rosario Mazzeo, 44 years old, of Mileto. The first five were taken to the district prison of Vibo Valentia, while the last two were confined in the district prison of Tropea.

The individual detained is Giuseppe Farsai, 26 years old, of San Calogero.

The massive raid was directed by Dr Elio Costa, assistant public prosecutor, of Vibo Valentia, and is within the scope of the campaign waged against fugitives from justice, the control of suspects and investigations relative to the kidnaping of university student Enrico Zappino, which occurred during the evening of 23 December 1979 in Mileto.

The CC, numbering about 50, arrived early at an area located between Nicotera and Limbadi on the border of Reggio Calabria Province with Rosarno a few kilometers away. Here they noticed a certain movement of



suspicious persons and vehicles toward an isolated spot on the outskirts of Limbadi where four estates belonging to the Mancuso's are located. The same structures are found in the vicinity of a quarry belonging to one of the Mancuso's, Francesco, considered the clan chief. From this quarry comes the inert material which Francesco Mancuso furnishes, or furnished, to Cogitau for constructing the Gioia Tauro port and which caused trouble in the past. In this regard, Francesco Mancuso appeared about 1 month ago before the Vibo Valentia court in response to some accusations which were made when the land was purchased on which the quarry is located and from which trial he was acquitted.

The site, located in an inaccessible area approachable only via a narrow road next to another which is dead-end and leads to the quarry, was surrounded by the CC who arrived there either from Limbadi or the crossroad of San Calogero in civilian vehicles: APE [European Parliamentary Assembly] motorvans, trucks and various other vans. Most of the men were riding in a cabined truck, in uniform, and this included the canine units.

There were five persons in the area of the estate--namely, Giuseppe Mancuso, Enrico Zupo, Francesco Mazzeo, Michele Cutelle (who was riding on a mare owned by the Mancuso's) and, inside the estate hidden from the view of the CC, Francesco Mancuso, 22 years old, of Limbadi. It was Giuseppe Mancuso himself who realized that the arrival of the truck in that area, the heavy vehicle being followed by an automobile, was highly suspicious. He therefore yelled to his brother, "Run, run, the police are coming." Francesco Mancuso had already avoided being captured by the CC of the Mileto station and by those of the Vibo Valentia radiomobile corps on 20 November 1979 when he was surprised in the vicinity of San Giovanni di Mileto in the company of Martino Maccarone, 26 years old, of San Calogero, who was arrested while in an automobile with his friend. In the vehicle there was a rudimentary explosive device intended for an assault in the Mileto area against some well-to-do person.

The brother's cries enabled Francesco Mancuso to flee through a window at the back of the estate. The youth thus reached the surrounding countryside and, although immediately chased by the CC, once more succeeded in escaping.

Even the others present, except Diego Mancuso, father of Giuseppe and Francesco, tried to escape, but their hope for escape was shortlived inasmuch as the CC fired a few machine-gun blasts into the air to scare them; the fugitives were seized and "pinned down" by the CC, who had shut off the entire area as in a vise.

While the CC were still checking the situation, two vehicles appeared in the road, a Giulia in which Fama and Loriglio were riding and an A-112 with Francesco Mercuri inside. All three were immediately cornered.

The first explanation they gave of their presence at the Mancuso farm was that they had come there to buy cheese and buttermilk curd; this version was in no way accepted by the CC who, for an hour and a half while still sifting the area in the hope of catching Francesco Mancuso, noticed the arrival of another automobile containing Antonio Cutelle, Michele's brother, who had certainly gone to find his relative, a guest of the Mancuso's while in hiding, even bringing him newspapers, mainly copies of the GAZZETTA DEL SUD. However, the seizures were not finished in that Giuseppe Mercuri, 21 years old, of San Calogero arrived on the scene and was arrested by the CC; meanwhile, Diego Mancuso will be denounced for aiding and abetting.

For all those arrested there is an accusation of personal aiding and abetting with regard to Michele Cutelle who was being hunted in view of a warrant for his arrest issued by the public prosecutor of Palmi for being accused of aggravated assault and a further accusation of aiding and abetting with regard to Giuseppe Mancuso who had been hunted since 31 July 1979 for having disappeared after ignoring obligations imposed by the special surveillance of public safety; this was in addition to the accusation of conspiracy.

Among the crimes which would probably be denied by all the accused are those of extortion and damage due to dynamite assaults which were recorded recently in the areas of Mileto, San Costantino Calabro, San Giovanni, San Calogero, Calimera, Limbadi and Nicotera. But in particular, the CC are certain that they have put their hands on individuals who had met to hold a summit meeting during which they were expecting to reach important decisions, acts to be carried out in the areas "belonging" to the various individuals.

The work of the CC is worthwhile also in ascertaining existing connections among the Mafia clans of Mileto, San Calogero, Limbadi and the foremost area of Reggio; this came to mind at the time of the arrest of Martino Maccarone who had arrived, as stated, on the night of 20 November 1979 while in the company of Francesco Mancuso, the only one who escaped yesterday's roundup, and with whom he was planning a new dynamite assault.

However, the CC's raid might also be connected with the kidnapping of Enrico Zappino, the son of Vibo Valentia's health official, still in the hands of bandits for more than a month; negotiations for the son's release have come to a standstill, since his family does not have the enormous sum of money asked by the bandits.

The connection between yesterday's roundup and the kidnaping of the young Zappino resulted from the consideration that, to hide a person in a specific area, it is necessary to have the approval of the Mafia members of that area, and among those arrested yesterday there are high-level members of Mileto's gangster group.

## LABOR UNIONS' REACTION TO CHIAROMONTE'S 'RINASCITA' ARTICLE

Comment by Eraldo Crea

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 29 Feb 80 pp 13, 14

[Text] A reading of Chiaromonte's article inevitably recalls the one, which has become "historical" even if only a few months old, written by Amendola which commented on the Fiat events. The reasons that led to the two articles are different, but the recipient of the message is the same, the trade union; and the inspiration is similar.

Amendola's presentation was an old-fashioned pedagogic message, corroborated by pitiless floggings: The correction of "errors" was his central concern. The clinical approach with the bedside manner prevails in Chiaromonte's article. His argument hinges on the "difficulties," as though to make them the object of the incongruencies of the trade union line.

I have a great deal of respect both for the educator and the doctor when, in the specific case, I know that they are sincerely concerned with the fate of the patient they are treating, nor am I among those who believe that a consistent way to apply the concept of independence is that each one is concerned only with his own affairs. We all know the price that the country, the democracy is paying on the altar of this rule of conduct which is not the final element of corruption of an authentic national solidarity. Yet there is something that does not convince me in this anxious attention to the "errors" or to the "difficulties" of the trade unions.

Meanwhile I see a risk: So long as this "attention" to the trade unions is given by the adversary and by his ringleaders (who are numerous and located even in areas least suspected by public opinion, as we know), it is the very transparency of the intentions behind such concerns that neutralize the desired effects of demolition of the political weight and unity of the trade unions. But when, despite the fact that the point of departure is a different group of concerns, the criticism or suggestions to the trade union come, so to speak, from the same trench, it is difficult to avoid a situation which produces the image of an encircled trade union, "displeasing to God and to his enemies," supplying an unjustified certificate of credibility to the adversary's attack.

Such a risk is all the more threatening if we fall into--as it seems to me happens also to Chiaromonte--a representation of the trade union difficulties in which the adversary, his strategy of restoration, remains offstage.

To bring it back to center stage is not to invoke extenuating circumstances, but is a need posed by disciplined analysis. To speak of "particularisms," of "corporativisms," of loss of "control of the labor market" or of "wage dynamics" tying these phenomena to a sort of mechanistic relationship with an anonymous aggregate identified as "worsening of the social crisis," carries with it the risk of indulging in tautology, of explaining facts by limiting oneself to defining them, evading the central theme of the forces and interests in play, of the subjects and the structure of power.

Is this an oversight? Nevertheless, Chiaromonte does not make the same error when he establishes a relationship between the failures of the EUR [Trade Union Headquarters] line and the "lack of democratic planning and a government capable of pushing forward a planning policy." Chiaromonte here puts his finger on one of the central weaknesses of the EUR line: It designated a line of political demands in function of a new political interlocutor, which has proven to be evanescent. It also developed a planning policy which, in its most organized phase of explicit statements--that linked to the Pandolfi name--turned out to be no more nor less than a framework of compatibility of economic and financial breadth. Within that framework employment and the South miserably fell from the rank of political objectives to that of mere expectations. This is the main reason why the EUR line was troubled and contradictory and was never, as it should have been in order to be victorious, a factor of unifying mobilization of workers.

The trade union paid heavily for the "ingenuousness" of betting on promises of a new formula for a political-parliamentary ranking rather than on the specificity of a policy made explicit on the scale of priorities of objectives and political-administrative instruments of control. It does not seem to me that Chiaromonte's article is clear about the implications of an analysis of this type even though he shows he assumes this. An alarming void continues to persist--and it is all the more alarming in a fluid political situation in which the PCI justly once more forcefully proposes its candidacy for the political leadership of the country--on the terrain of contents of an economic policy capable of dealing with the central problems of the crisis (employment, the South, energy, industrial policy beginning with sectors in a state of crisis, revitalization of agricultural policy) and to use an operational instrument of administration which is profoundly reformed and reorganized (public administration, state participations, credit systems, financial structures, government institutions dealing with the labor market).

The PCI certainly has full autonomy to establish the conditions on the basis of which it will participate in a planning confrontation among the democratic political forces designated to prepare for the post-Cossiga period. But when the PCI urges the trade union to qualify its role in terms of the "capacity to draft a line of effective economic and social transformation"



it cannot limit itself to hold it to the "overall assessment of general problems," to the "view of the overall interests of the nation" without specifying what, in its view and assessment, are the specific economic policy directions which define and qualify those interests, assuming them to be priority political objectives.

To emphasize that these interests are employment and the South means to remain chained to the post of prepolitics, of metaeconomic statements. From Carli to Pandolfi, from the liberals to the republicans, there is no one who does not assume these objectives to legitimize precise political and economic choices, to ask for precise attitudes from the trade union, generally with a great convergence toward considering these attitudes all the more coherent the more they are remissive, yielding, functional in terms of true priority objectives: Revitalization of production, savings, productivity, the reduction of the cost of labor. If it is believed, as Carli does, that following these objectives coincides more or less automatically with those connected to employment or to the South, in the sense that it constitutes its political strategy of achievement, this must be said explicitly. If, instead, as Chiaromonte justly appears to fear, those objectives can become "a weapon of the bosses to increase exploitation and profits" rather than "a weapon of the workers movement to push forward its policy of change," then it is necessary to begin to clarify that those are not "objectives" for the workers movement, but terrains of action and control, and therefore of conflict, with which undeniably it is necessary to deal on the terrain of a struggle concerning the organization of labor in which the themes of employment, quality of labor, of choices of investment emerge as the true stakes in the game.

In reality, there are no abstractly determined "general interests," there exist only those that are specifically assumed and politically privileged in the directions of economic policy. The policy of planning in our country has always become mired on this impervious terrain of the scale of priority of interests to be chosen on the structure of social needs and which must be made to aspire to the level of "political objective," of a parameter of reference for every other choice. That is why no one is convinced by that sort of equation which also seems to inspire Chiaromonte's analysis, by which "policy" is identified with "overall" and "specific" is identified with "corporative." History is made up of a sequence of "partialities" which are imposed on the level of general political value and of cultural and social hegemony. The problem is precisely that of knowing how to pick out the particular, the specific elements, the potentials for a qualitative leap forward in which later can be recognized the broadest spheres of needs, of interests, of expectations.

I agree with Chiaromonte on the meaning of a decrease in the trade union movement, of an escape backward in regard to difficulties, which the reemerging discussion on the "trade of the trade union" could have if there were to be a rupture in the great compromise achieved by Italian trade unionism beginning with the 1960's between the claims function and the function of social change,



or in other words, between the contractual and the political roles. But it is necessary to develop consciousness by all those who are interested in the defense of the original and profoundly innovative meaning of that compromise that it can sustain itself only on condition that the independent political dignity of the role of the trade union be "culturally" recognized, that it is agreed to discuss the concept and practice of the primacy of policy as a party primacy, that there is no effort to expand the "political nature" of the trade union as a key element in a governability that is entirely dependent on the recovery of an institutional authority over society: In other words there is the assumption of the emergence of a "political element" in society which is not reducible to the conceptual categories consolidated upon the separation between politics and economics, between the state and society. A correct assumption of trade union independence within the framework of a pluralistic view is put to the test in the destruction of this cultural and conceptual barrier. The crisis of the state and of the party as a total synthesis, the crisis of the government of society on the basis of general, predetermined rules are not hypothesis: They are the basic scenario within which, in the present, we are called upon to choose and to confront each other.

The assumption of the "political nature" of specifics is the great challenge the trade unions must face. To give a political and bargaining voice to the youth, to the women, to social strata emerging from the contradictions of capitalistic development, means destroying this screen of ethical or economistic mental structures with which we have been led to interpret and qualify attitudes, subjective behavior, interpersonal and social relationships. It means to rebuild from within these attitudes and relationships--and that is, to start from their "partiality"--objectives of a general political value.

Exchange of experiences and responsibilities between the political party sphere and that of the trade union referred to by Chiaromonte, means essentially playing the game around this challenge and not with the reproposal of old themes of incompatibility. Beyond any discussion of principle, these are found in a context of difficulty in unity relationships and problems of autonomy which certainly has no need to open terrains of confrontation on questions which were settled long ago. In regard to exchanges of experience and responsibility, it seems to me we are dutybound to mention two themes on which Chiaromonte's concern and alarm are based: The factory struggles and contract negotiations for public employment. The concern and alarm cannot fail to be shared by a trade union that sees its capacity for political leadership put to a severe test on both these decisive battlefronts.

Regarding public employment, it is well to avoid confusing effects with causes. The internal difficulties in relations between the federations and trade unions of a single category, which have existed and which persist, are to a large extent the effect induced by the choice or lack of choice, of ineffectiveness, of actions or omissions which in the first place involve precise responsibilities of the governing political class and, in the second place, of the local administrations and of parliament itself. To exercise a

political role of coordination and leadership of negotiating policy in a sector to which political power has not been able to ensure translation into law of the 1976 contracts, and much less, to recognize, according to the cadre law, the very principle of negotiability of the labor relationship, is like trying to steer a two-wheeled automobile without a steering wheel. Without considering that the road to be taken is that marked by the destruction of great public apparatuses, by a crisis of public administration which on the government level was assumed solely as a stimulus for the migratory vocations of the minister of public functions, by a stratification of the roles and positions marked by years of political patronage and disorder in the administration of the public works relationship. Nor would it seem that the solutions approved recently by the senate to insert the youths covered by Law 285 within the ranks of public administration would mark a real solution of continuity with such practices. Rather, the final touch was that of the change regarding the participation of staff personnel in judging suitability on the basis merely of education; 10 years of elaboration, regardless of how contradictory and troubled, for a new categorization centered on functional qualifications were canceled with one stroke of the sponge! It is the triumph of the educational diploma, which not by chance is in harmony with the resumption of very disciplined scholastic selection and the closed number. We also dispute the coherence with general objectives of the way the problems of temporary personnel in universities and schools were dealt with and solved (even if I consider those that were adopted the least coherent in the given situation), but we also dispute the mechanisms that produce temporary personnel in public offices, of the incidence of decades of vain expectation of reform of the universities and of the schools, of the compensating function which temporary employment has assumed to insure, within the framework of lack of reform, almost an elementary level of functioning of such institutions.

Let us also discuss professionalism, but let us at least make some premises clear. The statement is correct that the present salary structure over time produces a leveling of wages, but it seems to me that there is a defect of analysis when a general condition of leveling is assumed as an effect of an "excess of egalitarianism." This skips the structural data of a flattening out on the mass level of professionalism, even before there is this effect on salaries. This has involved skilled workers and employees and it was induced from the processes of reorganization of production. The introduction of electronic technologies and of informational programs has led to the emergence of new roles and profiles with a high professional content, even though limited to a very tight elite of cadres, but it has led to further unknown levels of expropriation of contents of intelligence and independence of work for the broad working masses and for large numbers of employees.

In a certain sense, the leveling of wages represents the mirror rather than the cause of such processes. On the other hand, if consideration is given to the professional and salary condition of the very large majority of women in places of work and to that of hundreds of thousands of youths placed in

the role of apprentices, particularly in those medium-small businesses toward which Chiaromonte wants us to have a "positive" attitude, there emerges a framework which, if anything, provides evidence of what gaps in egalitarianism are still to be filled.

This does not deny the centrality of the theme of professionalism as a reference parameter of a new wage policy, but then the problem is how to rebuild professionalism, how--without neo-Luddite concessions--to intervene in the processes of restructurization and organization of work to bend them to a new "political" dimension of labor which would involve reappropriation of intelligence, of independence, of power by the worker and which would rebuild the relationship between working conditions and living conditions on a new basis.

Research on this basis is entirely open and every opportunity for useful confrontation, provided that the subject of professionalism and the broader one of quality of work are adopted as key subjects in class recomposition and not as a new version of a strategy of alliances between the working masses and employees, between manual laborers and intellectuals, between those who make decisions and those who carry them out, assuming these stratifications of roles as an ineluctable factor in production and social relations.

Comment by Elio Giovannini

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 29 Feb 80 pp 14, 15

[Text] It seems to me absolutely out of place to question, as some have done, the legitimacy of the Communist Party in openly criticising the policies of the trade union organizations. Especially when these were intensely discussed among the workers and in the trade unions. It seems to me necessary that this discussion take place more than has happened in the past without undue sensitivity, and without attempts to be diplomatic.

I also believe that we all start with two considerations which Chiaromonte puts at the beginning of his discussion: The first that the trade union movement, the great force in Italian democracy, has been weakened but not defeated; the second, that there is a close relationship between the progress of the trade union, of its unity and independence, of its forces and the historical displacement of the country's social and political relations.

The discussion grows precisely out of the halt in this progress. Using our language, the question can be posed thus: Why has there been an enlargement in the trade union movement of the gap between the preaching of an overall line and the practice along lines of pure resistance? And better yet: Why the trade union movement has failed in its objective, which certainly was ambitious, of unifying within the movement the various sectors of the labor market into a great battle for change? To say that on the political level there was a failure of the hypothesis of change which so broadly influenced

the struggles in the first half of the 1970's means only unloading the problem onto the responsibilities--which were certainly important--of communist policy, and to remove the question of choices and responsibilities from the trade union. And this, correctly, is Chiaromonte's subject.

Let us, then, discuss this in open terms. I am not convinced of the diagnosis--which it seems to me inspires the entire proposal--of a correct trade union line that of the EUR whose realization is supposed to have been betrayed by the combined reaction of the external adversary, with the evolution of the political picture and the negation of the program, and the domestic corporativism and categorism.

The EUR plan for a social compact failed not only because there was a failure of the link with a political picture which already was in abeyance, but because it was to a large extent mistaken precisely on the trade union plane. Not in the expression of the great objectives of employment and development, which are the fruit of a mature tradition of Italian political struggle and trade unionism, but precisely in the subordination of their achievement to an emergency, experienced primarily in financial and provincial terms. We may recall the incredible discussion on the magic value of a deficit of 24 trillion. Behind the urgency of the monetary questions, we did not sufficiently realize the structural change in world exchange rates and the opening of a long phase of restructurization of capitalism. When we spoke of sacrifices we thought in terms of months, not of years. Above all, we overturned the pyramid upon which we had built the Italian labor force and its actual transformation into a political entity: Beginning always with contestation of the material conditions of exploitation in the labor relationship in order to gradually spread this contestation to the point of reviving the discussion of plant organization, of the economy, of society.

In EUR we proclaimed general objectives and we required from the organization the impossible effort of keeping us within the real movement. It was inevitable that this political nature of the cathedra not only would put the factory on the sidelines but that it would close every possibility of relationships with the new market of youth and women's labor: We wanted to strengthen the political shock potential of the trade union and we weakened the democratic rank and file on the country.

We are obliged to discuss EUR precisely because, as Chiaromonte writes, we now have the absolute need to quickly rebuild a true line, and not only a proclaimed line, which would deal with the problems of industrial crisis, of the quality of labor, of submerged economy: Of the unification of the movement. And in order to do this we must free ourselves of political reductionism, of those who see the trade union effort entirely within the evolution of the political picture. We must do this quickly: We must not be content with formal political unity achieved by the federations concerning difficult subjects such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the government crisis, and fail to see the fragility of this unity in view of the intensification of the political crisis which can be forecast in the coming months.



For this reason it is necessary to develop a politically independent trade union project beginning with the rejection of a policy of heavy bargaining reduction. How does Chiaromonte describe as serious the individual errors of the limited nature of the objectives of the fiscal dispute, the predominantly defensive administration of the question of temporary employment in the schools, the crisis of federal policies in public employment, without discussing the dependency upon a myopic minimalism, which is often corporative, which risks making us completely lose the historical battle of youth employment? Again: How is it possible to fully deal with the crisis of the councils without restoring a central role to the factory struggles?

In substance, it seems to me that the position Chiaromonte presented to a labor consultative group is a reverse reading of the situation. The trade union movement must once more pay great attention to the subjects of organization of labor and of productivity, knowing that this is not an objective but a terrain of struggle--on a negotiating, political and cultural level--a struggle for the conditions for extracting added value increments from the labor force. The great attention to real relationships of power, to the specific conditions, of production, cannot become a culture of the status quo and a cancellation of the objective of change.

The effort toward a nonwage presentation of the negotiating platforms goes in this direction: Either we seriously select the change in the labor organization, or the "realism" of accepting the factory as it is will be translated into the parallel "realism" of accepting a strong and generalized wage counterpart.

We must raise our sights: It is not a matter of lowering the egalitarian thrust in the factories, where in too many cases there has been a reduction to a pure question of wage differentials without the breadth that in the past characterized the struggle to make working conditions more equal in the direction of a collective professionalism. Rather it is a matter of reviving--outside of the plant, in society, and facing as is now possible--the central problem of the education/labor relationship and developing a large political initiative in regard to millions of temporary employees and of their present material and cultural needs. Chiaromonte's renewed proposal of the instrument of a trade union agreement to bring forth hidden labor seems to me insufficient, and to some extent already worn out. Without a national proposal that would deal with the insurance problem of millions of youth in search of first employment in the South, I do not believe that we will succeed in getting by only with the revival, regardless of how contractual and organized, of the trade union instrument. In parallel fashion, without a renewed discussion of the ethics of labor which is in our tradition, it will be difficult to deal with the merging culture of the crisis of orientation of young generations, in particular the women.

A last question that seems to me important remains to be discussed. Chiaromonte correctly criticizes certain distortions provoked by the application of regulations concerning incompatibility and it seems to me he proposes that



they be overcome. But in what direction? Must we take note that organizational unity will not be accomplished, and prepare ourselves to winter for 10 years in expectation of a better climate, in the meantime achieving possible adjustments, or will there be a new proposal within a project of trade union unification of the movement, a project for the reunification of the organizations? In brief, must we bury organizational unity or revive it?

Chiaromonte writes that we must avoid the opposition between worker categories and the federation, the existence of two centers of leadership for the movement. With the experience behind us, it has not always been true that horizontal structure would encourage the overall phase or the worker category phase over the corporative phase. It has not been that way since the end of the 1960's when an advanced worker category center, that of the metalworkers, prevailed over a more backward federal center, represented by the line of trade union federations. Unfortunately, contrary to what Chiaromonte writes, today this dialectic between two centers no longer exists or is considerably weakened. It is possible that the revitalization of the trade union will pass precisely through the reopening of a strong dialectic within the movement up to the reconstruction of more advanced centers of the present federal leadership. It is certain that this will happen if we do not know how to produce an effort of reconstruction of the trade union policy at least similar to that of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] in the second half of the 1950's.

6034

CSO: 3104

## PRI YOUTH APPROVE OF PCI IN SICILIAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 9 Feb 80 p 6

[Text] Sicily's republican youth are not excluding the possibility of giving "the PCI direct coresponsibility provided there are not less genuine guarantees on the level of international politics and our country's democratic future." This is how we interpret the final motion approved unanimously by the 10th Congress of the FGR [Federation of Republican Youth].

After analyzing the factors which brought about "the political and institutional crisis" in Italy, the document augurs the realization of a policy of rational solidarity which, according to the republican youth, cannot fail to consider the international policy which has worsened as a result of the "Soviet Union's imperialistic policy and its policy aimed at controlling the energy world on the one hand and, on the other, of the serious economic crisis of which our country's institutional crisis is a part."

In admitting the PCI's coresponsibility, the republican youth denounce in their motion "the irresponsible behavior of the leftist forces which, with demagogic and extremist positions, are adding elements of destabilization and lack of governability to our country's already serious situation."

For the formation of the next regional government, the PRI [Italian Republican Party] youth are auguring "the broadest majority possible and are prevailing upon their party to strive for the PCI's coinvolvement in that majority."

Again casting a glance within the Sicilian PRI, we find the republican youth denouncing "any attempt leading to the silent and stuffed re-entry of the controversial Rosario Cardillo into the party's activities and feeling it their duty to carry the battle to the end so that all who are responsible for acts of immorality be immediately expelled from the PRI in which, in view of its historic and risorgimental traditions, they can no longer find room."

"We shall not be subjected," the FGR's final motion further states, "to any top-level decision aimed at reinstating Cardillo in the party, while we firmly condemn any other attempt aimed at enlarging the PRI through the acquisition of political exiles from the monarchy or from the MSI [Italian Social Movement] afterwards, now called demo-national."

At the conclusion of the congress the FGR's regional directorate was elected and is composed of the following: Baiamonte, Montanti, Flores, Vella, Cappadona, Franco, Giacalone, Volpetti, Coco, Licitra, Lena, Travatello, Raffa, Di Liberto, and Marsala.

8568

CSO: 310'

## 'INCREASED DETERRENT' NEEDED TO COUNTER WAR DANGER

LD101029 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Apr 80 p 26 LD

[Article by Stein Savik: "Can the Specter of War be Exorcised?"]

[Text] Will there be a war? It is not long since this question could be answered with a well-founded no, and so it was put with a feeling of embarrassment. Before the Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan, not to mention the situation at the beginning of the seventies, in the golden age of detente, there were still several stable factors which made a war between the superpowers an "impossibility." What is the situation really like today?

Today there is no longer any risk of being met with a condescending smile by the experts if one asks if the "impossible" is nevertheless possible: they are even trying to answer the question themselves. "The danger of a nuclear war has grown; national and international actions have become irrational," the bulletin of atomic scientists, a journal published by American atomic researchers, states. For more than 30 years the journal has tried to symbolize the danger of war by a clock on its front cover--the hands have been moved backward or forward, mostly forward. In the latest issue they showed seven minutes to twelve.

This symbolism is obviously intended to have a deterrent effect, and the magazine's pessimism seems to have the desired effect. So what is the view of "The Man in the Street?" In West Germany the Emnid Public Opinion Institute has carried out an opinion poll on the danger of war. Some 10 percent of those interviewed considered a world war likely in the foreseeable future, and 48 percent considered it possible. The staff of the weekly magazine DIE ZEIT, which published the opinion poll, reported that the number of West Germans wanting to emigrate (to safer countries) has risen by leaps and bounds since the Afghanistan crisis.

In other words, fear of war is very real, even if it will perhaps become less urgent as the immediate impression of the Afghanistan invasion weakens (without the root cause of the fear disappearing).

But how justified is this fear? What stabilizing factors are there which can forestall the great catastrophe, or at least make it less likely?

Let us attempt to draw up a brief survey:

1. Factors militating against an intentional, direct war between the two superpowers--the Soviet Union and the United States:

Mutual nuclear deterrent is still the most decisive factor, however negative it may be in itself. As long as the nuclear balance is maintained--and it would take a lot to disturb it to any great extent--it is most improbable that one superpower will pull the nuclear trigger.

The deterrent factor can be broken down into individual components. Neither of the superpowers has so far given any indication that it really wants the atomic armament race to get out of control, since the advantages which one side could gain would in any case be short-lived and increasingly expensive to maintain. Everything suggests that the limitations which the Soviet Union and the United States accepted in the SALT agreements are being adhered to, despite the fact that it is not yet certain whether SALT II will be ratified by the American Senate.

The mutual dependence of the superpowers which formed the foundation of Nixon and Kissinger's global policy has indeed failed in several important areas. But the two superpowers still guard their "nuclear understanding." Neither has handed nuclear weapons to its allies or--and this is even more important--to countries which it would otherwise be most eager to have as allies. The main reason is that they do not wish to be dragged into nuclear war "by the back door."

Between the superpowers there are also other stabilizing elements of varying significance. Despite the tension triggered by the Afghanistan crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union continue talks on disarmament in various forms. Bilateral meetings are being held in Geneva on chemical and radiological warfare. The joint commission set up to monitor adherence to SALT I is still sitting. The two superpowers are members of the UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva. They were also represented at a major UN conference at which nearly 60 countries recently discussed a possible ban on bacteriological weapons. Experts stress that these talks continue "in the usual businesslike manner," even if the Afghanistan conflict has created a cooler atmosphere.

2. Factors militating against war in Europe:

Here, too, the deterrent factor is the most important. The decisive difference between Afghanistan and West Europe is that a Soviet attack on a NATO member would be answered with NATO's collective defense capabilities, backed by the U.S. nuclear guarantee. An invasion of Yugoslavia, a country in the "gray zone" between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, carries the risk of American military intervention--something which here, too, represents a deterrent.

The greater part of the network of negotiating contacts build between East and West during the years of detente is still intact. Even if not directly



stated, the slogan here is that "the channels must be kept open." The marathon negotiations on balanced troop reductions in Europe (MBFR) are continuing in Vienna, with as few results as before.

At present there are contacts regarding the CSCE follow-up conference planned for Madrid in the fall. Even if individual countries, including the Spanish hosts, favor a postponement because of the tense situation, the two superpowers are by all accounts keen for the meeting to take place. Washington and Moscow obviously have different motives. While the Russians are interested in all initiatives that can push their Afghanistan aggression into the background, the Americans obviously want to make use of the Madrid meeting for a broad condemnation of the new injustices against Soviet dissidents, primarily the exiling of Andrey Sakharov. But among the other questions which are expected to be discussed, if the meeting is not postponed, are "confidence-building initiatives" in Europe, which belong to the complex of questions touching disarmament and for which Norway, not least, is working.

It is open to discussion to what extent the smaller Warsaw Pact countries are able to influence Moscow's military decisions, especially the decision to begin an attack which would serve the Soviet Union's interests. But there is evidence to suggest that countries such as Poland and Hungary want to stop the buildup of tension in Europe, which could develop into armed conflict. They are trying to preserve the leeway they have managed to win for themselves from Moscow--Hungary in the economic, Poland in the political field--which is always jeopardized when relations between East and West deteriorate to any great extent. Important for Poland and Hungary and to some extent for the GDR in this respect is their increased dependence on trade with the West and credits from leading Western countries. There has also been a definite aim behind the American Government's exclusion of the "client" East European states from the economic boycott measures which it has directed against the Soviet Union since the move on Afghanistan.

But the deterrent--and therefore stabilizing--effect of the boycott has become doubtful as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. The fact that U.S. reprisals have not yet had any effect on the Russian attitude concerning Afghanistan calls into question the widespread assumptions that Western technology, exports and hard currency are of supreme importance for Moscow. But it is possible that the effect would have been different if the U.S. European allies had fully supported the boycott. Despite their individual interests, we must count on this happening if real danger of war threatens Europe.

### 3. Factors militating against war as a result of conflicts outside the East-West sphere:

As the Afghanistan crisis has shown, it is here that the greatest danger of war lies. A new Soviet offensive against countries outside the two great blocs would leave few U.S. alternatives apart from military retaliation in today's situation. At all events, one must assume that such an offensive, especially against an oil-producing state essential to the West, would make the danger of war imminent.

It has long been a basic stabilizing factor that the two superpowers have shown restraint in conflicts which could throw them into direct confrontation, even if important interests were at risk for both of them. A number of examples can be mentioned, but the most important are not difficult to remember: the Vietnam war, where the Russians helped the communists with weapons but not with troops. The wars in the Middle East, where the United States and the Soviet Union supplied weapons to their respective sides but refrained from direct intervention in the conflict, and on occasion even worked together to stop the fighting. The U.S. passivity with regard to Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Africa, the Russians' threat to intervene in the Sino-Vietnamese war, which was never put into practice.

The attack on Afghanistan was a serious blow to this key factor, because the Soviet leadership must obviously have taken into consideration that the action involved a certain risk of confrontation with the United States--or that it at least narrowed the safety margin for a future confrontation to a bare minimum. An unavoidable consequence of the aggression was that it removed the remains of another stabilizing factor from the era of detente--those agreements which the two superpowers entered into to prevent war and to remove the danger of war.

At the Moscow summit in 1972, the grand overture to the "superpower understanding," one of the most important principles adopted by Nixon and Brezhnev was that the Soviet Union and the United States would forestall conflicts between them by means of reciprocal consultations. This agreement was substantially expanded a year later at the summit in Washington and San Clemente. Here Nixon and Brezhnev signed a new principle agreement which, in the enthusiasm over the great rapprochement, was likened to an "antiwar pact." The agreement bound the two superpowers to consultations if the danger of nuclear war emerged not only between them but also between one of the superpowers and a third state. Even if that part of the agreement which covers consultations only refers to nuclear war, the document states elsewhere that the Soviet Union and the United States will seek to forestall confrontations with other states and refrain from threats to use force against third parties "in circumstances which could threaten international peace and security."

Favorable interpretations and hair-splitting on questions of international law are needed to assert that the Afghanistan invasion did not contravene this agreement. But, regardless of this, the concrete result is that there is now no certainty that consultation will be employed between Washington and Moscow if a new confrontation threatens. (It is significant that Moscow, according to confidential Polish information, did not even inform its Eastern bloc allies of the Afghan invasion, let alone consult them.)

It is true enough that several of the factors militating against "direct" war between the two superpowers and a military conflict in Europe could also obtain in a new "Afghanistan situation." The contacts which exist

between East and West can replace lost consultations between Washington and Moscow. But a conflict over a "third state" would be much more difficult to prevent if it were not controlled by the balance of power between the two great blocs. In other words, all other stabilizing factors could be of little significance if the United States does not redefine the limits for its military capability in purely deterrent terms.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the way to reduce the danger of a new war lies in the deterrent effect which the increased danger of war creates. When this realization has been made by one of the superpowers, the detente agreements intended to prevent new conflicts will be given real content. Despite today's gloomy prospects, there is still hope that reason and rational thinking will lead the world to a genuine superpower understanding with a firmer foundation. Even if the way to this understanding has to pass through the creation of an increased deterrent capability.

CSO: 3108

## ARTILLERY BATTERY IN WINTER GAME DEPENDS ON ADP FOR GUNS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Feb 80 p 38

[Article by Knut Falchenberg]

[Text] "To us who work indoors in offices, it is fun to get out and see what the boys are actually doing," says Inger Bekkevahr, dental assistant. Now she, too, has been firing a gun. Equipped with a military steel helmet and wearing a civilian Persian lamb coat, she resolutely pulled the firing lanyard. The gun roared, and the shell hit the target 4 kilometers farther away. Shots that miss the target are unknown at Haslemoen.

Dental assistants, however, do not use as heavy guns as that every day. But, on this particular day, those working in civilian jobs had decided that they wanted to find out what went on outside their offices. They moved into the field where the shells were whizzing.

At each of the guns in the battery, small loudspeakers start reverberating: "Load the guns." At gun Number 2, three men get down on their knees, with a shell ready. By means of a special key, they set the 'clock' of the shell at 20.7 seconds. Subsequently, the gun is loaded, and the gun commander shouts "fire." There is a roaring sound, and 20.7 seconds later, and 4 kilometers farther away, the shell, controlled by a time mechanism, explodes. The purpose of the exact time scale is to make the shell explode 15 meters beyond the hill. The 10,000 fragments of steel hurled out at the explosion will then have the best effect against the 'enemy.'

"Let me just take off the earmuffs, then I can hear better," says Corporal Jo Petter Grindstad. He eagerly reaches for what is the most exciting thing of the day, the huge thermos bottle of hot tea, which has just arrived.

"My secret weapon against 25 degrees of cold is that I wear seven pairs of pants," Grindstad discloses. "And if it gets to be too cold, we give the guns a rest and pull over into the tent. There we have got a wooden stove."

Guys who are on a shooting maneuver, apparently, have to be hardened a little, for the officers have not yet told them whether they will be spending the night in tents or in barracks.

"That is the big excitement--whether we shall finish the maneuver today, or whether we shall have to spend the night outside at the guns in order to continue tomorrow," says Corporal 314 Geir Nymoen.

Finally, the guys get the fire going in the stove in the tent. The smoke tumbles out of the pipe. Frozen sandwiches are unwrapped, more hot tea is poured into the field bottles. At this point, the cozy atmosphere which has been developing is suddenly interrupted by a brief order to get back to the guns.

The guys are clearly motivated for the service and obey instantly. For they know that, next time, they will be the ones to command other soldiers. The corporals who carry on the shooting maneuver at Haslemoen are ordinary conscripts who have signed up for the so-called USK course to become sergeants. They attend a training school for recruits for 3 months, subsequently a sergeant course for 6 months, whereupon they will be sent to standing detachments for the last 3 months of their first-time service.

"Such a course is an excellent way to serve one's term in the armed forces," says Christian Strom from Oslo. "We learn a lot about guns and technology, about leadership and about the armed forces. Personally, I have chosen this training course in the military service to find out if I like military life, with a view to a possible professional career in the armed forces."

In the field artillery, the situation is the same as in the other special branches of the armed forces--those who have embarked on it become captivated by a pride in their profession.

"In addition, the field artillery in Norway is a little ahead of other countries," Major Roar Hornes tells AFTENPOSTEN. "Norway is the only country in the West which already today has started using data processing computers for the guidance of its artillery. This applies to standing artillery units at Setermoen, Forsangermoen at Harstad, and here at Haslemoen, as well as to the mobilization detachments."

Thanks to modern technology, one avoids having to shoot one's way toward the target. Preferably, one must hit the target at the first shot.

A key point in this set-up is that one or several observation posts are located in the front line with a view of the enemy. By means of Norwegian-built laser equipment, this post is able to determine the exact position of the enemy's forces up to a distance of 20 kilometers. This observation post then reports back to the command posts. Today, this reporting of ordinary speech takes place via radio, which can take up to 2 minutes. At Haslemoen, however, a new data reporting system is being tested which can transmit such a message in a couple of seconds. This reduces the enemy's chances of disturbing the communication by electronic means.



This is not the last thing in the field of data processing technology.

In March the production of a radar system for weather observations will be started. This system calculates wind direction, wind velocity, air pressure, and humidity in the upper layers of air. And already today, the field artillery regiment has radars which measure the velocity of exit of shells from gun barrels.

By means of all this information--from the observation posts, from the meters of exit velocity, and from weather radars--the data processing equipment at the command posts can calculate the exact setting of the guns, in order for the shells to hit the target.

The training within this branch of the armed forces takes place at Haslemoen in the municipality of Våler, in Soler. The training school for recruits, the military academy which provides basic training toward the rank of officer or non-commissioned officer, and the school for further training in shooting, cover a total area of 19 square kilometers. In addition, Haslemoen has a fully equipped field artillery battery and a training battery, and it also has two Cessna aircraft with their own airstrip.

These aircraft are used to survey enemy targets which cannot be seen from observation posts on the hill. "We have about thirty such aircraft in the armed forces. The problem is that the aircraft of the army are not only in demand among civilian companies. Our shortage of aircraft is also connected with the fact that aircraft of the army are used in the air force," says Major Kjell Gudbjørgsrud, who is in charge of the air force troops at Haslemoen.

7262  
CSO: 8139

## ECONOMICS MINISTER BOHMAN OFFERS VIEWS ON 1980'S

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by Gösta Bohman: "You Can't Lift Yourself by the Bootstraps!"]

[text] I often get the question: Does Gösta Bohman really think it is reasonable to ask that the wage-earners approve lowered real wages?

Forecasts for the 1980's are not especially bright. Many are pessimistic. But negative predictions can also trigger measures that lead to a development along more positive lines.

The 1970's, in the words of Professor Ulf of Trolle, were "the decade of the big backlash." It is not at all improbable that the 1980's will be the decade of reflection and economic reason. It is perhaps for that very reason that Sweden's situation at the very outstart is so full of problems.

For a long series of years the public sector has been allowed to grow more than twice as rapidly as the increase in our productive potential. And Sweden's great dependence on oil and the repeated "oil shocks" have intensified the country's imbalance in relation to the outside world. In a single year Sweden's oil bill rose by 11 billion kronor--corresponding to about 3,000 kronor per wage-earner. Since then new oil price rises have taken place. And the OPEC countries have threatened limitations on production.

## Limited Time

Our trade deficit with foreign countries is a sign that the production capacity is inadequate in relation to the domestic consumption and the imports that it gives rise to. In the long run no country can buy more than it sells. Living on loans is possible only for a limited time, unless the loans lead to profitable investments that pay off in full.

## Even the Opposition

Realization of this binding relationship should be general at the beginning of the new decade. Even our biggest opposition party now realizes that

the deficit in our balance of payments must be reduced. Unanimity also prevails to the effect that this should be done first and foremost through an increase in exports and not through a restriction of imports brought about by harsh austerity measures with all their consequences for prosperity and employment.

But it is easier to talk about increasing exports than to accomplish that by economic and political measures, especially in a situation with downward business trends and when other countries are trying to straighten out their own trade balances.

### Aggravate Situation

When the three-party government in its annual budget proposal and finance plan drew the logical conclusion from the analysis on which all democratic parties were agreed, the Social Democrats refused to do the same. The proposal they presented is of a nature to aggravate the situation and to render the urgent adaptation to economic reality more difficult.

The revenue balance of the financial plan was worked out in December of last year. Although many factors are very uncertain even in the present situation, most indications are that as a result of new oil price increases we must count on a further deterioration of the calculated trade balance by between 3 and 4 billion kronor.

There is also the risk that the international business downturn--even though just now the trend seems a little more favorable than had been expected--will be deeper during the latter part of 1980 than had been assumed earlier. That would obviously affect both the price trend and the growth of the Swedish economy. And that would restrict the room for consumption.

In the finance plan the government calculated on an increase of 1.5 percent in private consumption and 2.7 percent in public spending.

### Cause of Crisis

A prerequisite for Sweden's being able to cope with its balance of payments problem is for us to master inflation better than other countries, increase productivity, and prevent increases in the costs of production. After the oil price rises of 1973, as is well known, the opposite was the case. That was one cause of the crisis in which our national economy found itself in the fall of 1976. In that perspective the room for wage increases is extremely limited.

When I venture to say that, the counter-question is immediately voiced: Does Gösta Bohman really think it is reasonable to ask the wage-earners to accept reduced real wages? At the same time that you are demanding productive efforts and an increase in production? Isn't that placing the whole responsibility and the whole burden on the wage-earners?

### Full Understanding

My answer is no. It is not the government that is shifting its responsibility to the wage-earners. I fully understand that the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] can say that it will no longer accept the undermining of the buying power. According to one LO paper, "The limit of what our members can stand for in the way of tightening up has now been exceeded."

"The main demand in this year's [wage] negotiations must therefore be substantial general wage increases." And as a condition for a "quiet" negotiating atmosphere the LO demands that the state authorities pass a law transferring "excess profits" to special funds, the use of which shall be determined by the wage-earners.

### Everybody's Responsibility

Let me declare clearly that the responsibility for our national economy is the *joint responsibility* of all of us. And that both the state authorities' and the job market organizations' possibilities of influencing the developments is severely restricted by the economic reality shaped by developments beyond our national boundaries.

When the prices of oil or other international raw materials rise, our *whole* economy is hit. Attempts to compensate through negotiations by demanding higher wages makes bad worse. It is like trying to lift oneself by the bootstraps. Those who make such an attempt injure themselves.

Price rises on oil *reduce* the real economic room for wage increases. Wage increases under those circumstances lead to reduced power to compete, increased unemployment, and worse inflation.

### Wage-Earners Exposed

But the division of the spending potential *between* private and public consumption is not unalterable. Holding back the increase in public consumption is a prerequisite for increased room for private consumption and a better trend in real wages. The harder the opposition parties set themselves against savings within the public sector, the heavier responsibility is placed on the parties in the job market, and the greater the trials to which the wage-earners are exposed.

The state authorities have to bear the responsibility for economic policy. And therein lies the demand to shape it in such a way that the wage agreements are facilitated within the framework of the national economy. The earlier reductions in the graduated income tax, as well as the index-controlled tax scales, contribute to increasing the gain from the agreement concluded.

Still other measures are conceivable to the extent that the parties to the negotiations are agreed on them. The state authorities will keep out of the wage negotiations.

Provided good liquidity prevails in the firm, measures to promote investment can obviously be considered. But the talk about "excess profits" definitely has no place in an economy whose greatest problem is the generally too low profitability.

#### Same Purpose

One starting point for the year's budget work and for the efforts to reduce the increase in public expenditures was to provide greater possibilities of real wage improvements. And for the same purpose the government has made the demand on the municipalities to carry out the earlier undertaking to bring down the rate of increase in their spending expansion.

Thus when the Social Democratic members of the league of municipalities refuse to participate in discussions with the government on this question, it does not show consideration of or responsibility for the wage-earners.

#### Forced To Borrow

In the long run curbing the increase in public spending is thus necessary if Sweden is to have order in its economy. The sectors exposed to competition must be expanded.

Otherwise we shall not be able to straighten out our balance of payments deficit and shall be forced to continue to borrow abroad. Manpower and capital must not be tied up in the public sector. Sweden's ability to compete internationally must be strengthened to make possible economic growth, prosperity, and secure employment.

#### Not Possible

It is no longer possible to solve our problems in either state finance or the economy by higher taxes. The reforming of our tax system must continue and the rate of increase in public spending must be adapted to our economic growth.

It is no longer possible to burden our internationally competing economy with constantly increasing costs. Its profitability, efficiency, and productivity must instead be strengthened and its adaptation to altered competitive requirements facilitated.

#### Take Into Account

Certain international forecasters are counting on a new business upturn after 1981. Quite regardless of how much faith can be placed in such prophecies, Sweden's economic policy must be directed toward taking into account our country's prerequisites for continued prosperous development.

We must come to grips with the weaknesses which are due to past economic and political mistakes and which stood out with ever greater sharpness during the 1970's. The wishful thinking of the past decade must be replaced with realism and insight into what our country's dependence on a harshly competitive outside world demands of all of us.



## GOVERNMENT APPROVES COMPANY PLAN TO MINE PEAT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Feb 80 p 8

[Text] The State Forest Industries Corporation (ASSI) got state approval yesterday for peat mining in the communes of Boden and Arvidsjaur for a trial period of 25 years.

The peat will be primarily used in ASSI's own installations, but there are plans to supply energy to the community heating system in Piteå commune and possibly to other purchasers as well.

It is expected that by the summer of 1983 at the latest the peat mining will get started on a large scale. But before that ASSI is obliged to work out a number of environmental problems connected with the peat mining.

One of the government's conditions is that ASSI shall pay for a general documentation from the environmental and geoscientific points of view. Another is that there will be consultation with the forestry bureau concerning possible effects on forest production and with the agriculture bureau and local inhabitants concerned about the effect of peat mining on reindeer breeding.

The ASSI will also investigate the possibilities of restoring the mining tracts for agricultural and timbering use.

8815

CSO: 3109

## BRIEFS

HEATING SYSTEM EXPERIMENT--The Enköping heating department should get a state grant to convert a 25 MW (million watt) hot water plant to burn coal in what is called a floating bed, in the opinion of the State Industrial Board. The installation will show whether it is possible to burn coal in an environmentally proper way in small and medium-sized hot-water plants. It is estimated that conversion to coal burning and coal treatment in the Enköping installation will cost a total of 6.75 million kronor. The industrial board proposes that the state cover half the cost. The heating department in Enköping got a good 6 million kronor in state grants earlier for a demonstration plant for burning in a fluidized bed (floating bed). [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Feb 80 p 8] 8815

SMALL POWER PLANT--DAGENS NYHETER, Örebro--Vattenfall [the state water-power agency] is now building its first mini-power plant. This is being done at Dylta mill in Närke. There used to be a 62-year-old power plant here, but it was destroyed in the heavy spring flood of 1977. The new fully automatic power plant will produce eight times as much power as the old one, and is expected to supply electric power to several hundred households. The mini-power plant is considered as a pilot project to ascertain how many streams and watercourses can be considered for such use in the future. The Axbergshammar power plant situated a few kilometers upstream on the Dylta will get the next mini-power plant. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Feb 80 p 28] 8815

CSO: 3109

## SIGNIFICANCE, PROBLEMS OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY NOTED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 18 Mar 80 p 11

[Article by Dr Walter Hunzinger, president of Swissgas in Basel: "The Growing Importance of Natural Gas"]

[Text] Up to now we have wasted energy mostly because it was cheap. Even today we cover around 75 percent of our energy needs with crude oil products, whereas the large part of the Western World uses only about 50 percent for its needs. The Commission for the Formulation of a Swiss Energy Concept (GEK), therefore, stressed conservation and substitution primarily and accorded significant importance to natural gas because it is inexpensive and does not pollute the environment.

Natural gas was first used in Switzerland at the beginning of the last decade. It then spread rapidly to the household and services sectors (heating and warm water) as well as to the industrial sector (processing heat and heating) and finally was used for district heating purposes. Annual consumption of gas increased from about 1,600 Tcal (1971) to more than 7,000 Tcal (1978), which is more than a fourfold increase in a few years and in this way contributed to the availability of an important substitute. It has been possible to integrate the supply of natural gas harmoniously into the heating market.

Today gas covers almost 5 percent of Swiss energy needs. The gas industry set itself the goal of increasing its share of the market by the year 2000, an upper limit of over 10 percent of the entire energy needs being projected. Because energy consumption will continue to increase up to the turn of the century--even though it will be considerably less than in the past--at that time, a demand of around 30,000 Tcal is being projected so that gas will remain an important contribution towards diversifying our energy supplies.

With regard to prices, it is being assumed that the costs for acquiring, transporting, and distributing will remain within the bounds of the general world market prices. It is true that the purchasing price of natural gas suppliers is largely tied to the crude oil prices (OPEC); but this cost ratio is quite a bit lower than for crude oil in comparison with the final

price paid by the consumer; on the other hand, the transportation and distribution costs are higher for gas than for crude oil, but this mainly concerns fixed costs which were financed with long-term credits (obligatory loans). In the future, therefore, natural gas will have excellent prospects in the market and will be able to help solve the energy supply problems existing in our country.

#### Consumption and Reserves

The presently recorded supplies (over 70,000 billion cubic meters) will last for at least another 50 years at the current annual total consumption of less than 1,500 billion cubic meters. This also means that natural gas has been used much less than crude oil worldwide. In addition to this, in the past few years new finds have largely exceeded output. Around 70 percent of the total reserves are in Western Europe, in Africa, in the Near East and in the Soviet Union. Therefore, Western Europe has an advantageous geographical position in comparison with the two other consumer centers of the United States and Japan. In a later phase, that is in the course of the next century, the gas industry will also have increasing amounts of coal-produced gas at its disposal so that reserves of natural gas can be conserved. Pilot plants for coal gasification (just as for coal liquification) are already being operated in many countries.

Today and in the near future, Switzerland will receive its natural gas supplies from fields in Holland and the North Sea. The Swiss transport network still has important capacity reserves available to it and is tied into the constantly expanding European transportation network.

#### Questions on Supply Safety

The Swiss gas industry is subject to government control--primarily by the cities and municipalities. Therefore, one of its main objectives is to guarantee reliable gas supplies. After the essential parts of the transport network were established in a first phase (until 1974) there ensued a second phase--which has not yet been completed--with the objective of creating a circular connection which increases supply safety and simultaneously ensures that other areas, which do not yet receive natural gas, are included. As a result the number of trans-boundary feeding pipelines has been expanded. This development has not yet been concluded. Assuring gas supplies is guaranteed by the high investments in exploration and pipelines by the natural gas producers.

Unfortunately, however, an important problem has not yet been solved. Regardless of the storage tanks at the gas plants and the levels of gas in the high pressure pipelines, we still do not have any larger storage facilities for containing hundreds of millions of cubic meters of gas. Our industry has participated since 1971 in the Swiss consortium for subterranean storage tanks (other members include the crude oil industries, the Nagra and the Swiss Rhine Salt Works as a marginal partner). In the past few years,

large scale vibroseismic measurements of Lake Geneva all the way up to Lake Constance have been made, whereupon two drilling operations began in 1975-1977 in Tachugg and Ruppoldsried which unfortunately did not provide any positive results. This year the explorations should be continued once the currently revised geological studies and expert analyses are made available. Other drilling operations are being planned. These efforts will cost more than the 6 million Swiss Francs already expended for previous exploratory efforts.

With respect to the growing importance of gas in supplying our energy, it is indispensable for public gas supply that storage capacities be given high priorities. The costs Switzerland will expend for this purpose will influence the price of gas. Yet because of the constant increase in gas consumption leading to a per unit reduction in the pipeline costs, which are largely fixed as was described above, they should be maintained at acceptable levels even if the state should not grant any subsidies for this purpose in the interest of necessarily reducing crude oil consumption as opposed to other European countries.

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CSO: 3103



## MONSIGNOR ETCHEGARAY VISIT, NORMALIZATION OF VATICAN-PRC RELATIONS

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Mar 80 p 12

[Article by Alain Jacob: "Discussions of Msgr Etchegaray in Beijing Make Apparent Willingness To Normalize Relations Between the Vatican and China"]

[Text] Beijing- Several hours before leaving Beijing for Xian, on Monday 3 March, Cardinal Etchegaray was allowed to visit the tomb of one of the founders of the Catholic missions in China, Father Matteo Ricci, who died 11 May 1610. This highly unusual dispensation illustrates the special consideration extended by the Chinese authorities to the French prelate during his visit to China. This attitude was apparent throughout his trip, including his visit to the University of Beida, where he was presented a work on the Middle Kingdom written in the 17th Century by a Jesuit of Basque origin.

Msgr Etchegaray pronounces himself "charmed" by the friendliness and courtesy which have been shown him and does not hesitate to speak of the warmth of the reception which he found in Peoples China. These signs have their importance in the context in which the visit took place. It was organized on a Chinese initiative but, considering Msgr Etchegaray's position as a cardinal, it could not have taken place without the approval of the pope, who quite obviously, was kept abreast of preparations for the trip. Through the mediation of the archbishop of Marseille, it is a contact unprecedented in more than 25 years which is starting up between the Chinese Government and the Vatican.

The way the cardinal used his time in the Chinese capital--detailed by the XINHUA and Chinese television--leaves no doubt, moreover, of the significance of this trip. If he did not attend the mass celebrated at the church of Nantang Sunday morning, Msgr Etchegaray nevertheless had the opportunity to have several meetings with three Chinese bishops--including the new bishop of Beijing, Msgr Fu Tieshan--who have been consecrated since 1957 without the approval of the Holy See. With Mr Wang Bing'an, president of the Association for Friendship with Foreign Peoples, he was able to have discussions with one of China's finest diplomats, several times

chosen for delicate missions, and whose experience as ambassador to Warsaw was instructive regarding the conditions under which a Catholic church could exist in a socialist country.

### Concrete and Positive Talks

The most important talks took place 1 March with Mr Ulanhu, vice president of the National Assembly and member of the Politburo, and Mr Xiao Xianfa, director of the Bureau of Religious Affairs in the Council of State Affairs. These *"prolonged"* talks were *"concrete"* and *"positive"*, we are informed. They ranged over all aspects of the status of the Catholic Church in People's China and showed a shared willingness to find solutions to problems still hanging in limbo.

It goes without saying that in talks at such a level the details remain confidential and one must reserve judgment on the ultimate outcome. It is nevertheless possible to identify the main obstacles which remain in the path of normalizing relations between the Vatican, on one side, and China and the "Patriotic Church of China" on the other. The problems are basically of four different kinds.

The diplomatic problem is certainly the least difficult to resolve. President Hua Guofeng alluded to it in trenchant terms on the eve of his trip to Europe last fall (LE MONDE of 9 October 1979), but the situation is neither more nor less delicate for the Vatican than it is for France or the United States, which also maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan before recognizing People's China. Moreover, the groundwork has already been laid on this matter: while the authorities on Formosa still maintain an ambassador to the Holy See, the latter has for several years had only a charge d'affaires in Taipei.

The question of religious practice in China can also be considered as on the way to a solution. At least the Chinese authorities have adopted a new attitude on the subject which consists, briefly, in recognizing that the existence of religious beliefs among the people is a fact which realism cannot deny. It also seems to be accepted these days in Beijing that this survival of faith is not necessarily in contradiction with the building of a socialist society. For the time being, only three churches are open to worship in all of China (in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Tianjin), but several sources agree that other sites of worship are in process of restoration, and that the faithful will be able to congregate their regularly in the near future (notably in Shanghai, and doubtless in Wuhan, Kunming, Sichuan, old Manchuria, etc.)

The relationship to the spiritual authority of the pope poses a more complex problem. The Chinese Government is jealous of its independence and is reluctant to accept that a "patriotic" church could be dependent, if only in part, on some authority other than its own. Historically, the problem is not new, and the Vatican, over the centuries, in particular over the question of nomination of bishops.

## The Underground Church

The Chinese bishops are theoretically "elected," and it is difficult to forget that the Holy See refused, during the fifties, to recognize the canonical validity of these episcopal elections. Political circumstances, however, have changed a great deal since that time, and efforts could be directed toward a solution based on recognition by the Chinese clergy and bishops of a "communion with the pope" the exact content of which remains to be defined.

The most serious difficulty, finally, remains: the existence in China of an underground church which has not joined the ranks of the official "patriotic" church and is considered as practically beyond the law by the Chinese authorities. No one can say how many of the faithful are numbered in this community, but it is known that several dozen priests (slightly less than 100, it seems) and 2 bishops (Msgr Ignace Kung, former bishop of Shanghai, and Msgr Dominique Tang of Guangzhou) are still in more or less strict detention.

The affair is especially delicate because in certain cases civil and religious matters are intertwined, and because relations in general, between the "patriotic" clergy and these persecuted survivors of a church owing allegiance exclusively to the authority of Rome, are most strained. It is not certain that solutions can be found which would satisfy everyone's feelings. At most one can mention the opinion of certain Catholics who do not belong to the "patriotic" church and who point out that, since their attitude up to now has been dictated by their loyalty to the pope, they would consider it logical to change that posture if the Holy See itself instructed them to do so.

The issues are, as we see, both numerous and complex. The new factor is that the Chinese Government has apparently decided to grapple with them and to begin a dialog on this subject with a French bishop--homage was rendered to Msgr Etchegaray for the France's past initiatives in establishing relations with the People's Republic--whose status as a cardinal meant that he was also an interlocutor for Rome.

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**DATE FILMED**

2 May 1980

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